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A DISSERTATION UPON PARTIES;

In Several Letters to

CALEB D'ANVERS, Esq;

Dedicated to the Right Honourable

Sir ROBERT WALPOLE.

Multa Me dehortantur à vobis, Quirites, *nî Studium Reipublicæ omnia superet; Opes Factionis, vestra Patientia, Jus nullum, ac maximè, quod Innocentiæ plùs Periculi, quàm Honoris est. Nam illa quidem piget dicere, his Annis XV. quàm Ludibrio fueritis Superbiæ paucorum; quàm fædè, quâmque inulti perierint vestri Defensores; utì vobis Animus ab Ignaviâ atque Socordiâ corruptus sit; qui ne nunc quidem, obnoxiis Inimicis, exsurgitis, atque etiam nunc timetis Eos, quibus vos decet Terrori esse. Sed quanquam hæc talia sunt; tamen obviam ire Factionis Potentiæ, Animus subigit. Certè Ego Libertatem, quæ mihi à Parente meo tradita est, experiar; verum id frustrà, an ob Rem faciam, in vestrâ Manu situm est,* Quirites. *Neque Ego vos hortor, quod sæpe Majores vestri fecere, uti contrà Injurias armati eatis. Nihil Vi, nihil Secessione opus est. Necesse est, suomet ipsi more præcipites eant.* Sallust. Bell. Jugurth. in Memmii Orat.

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MVSEVM
BRITAN
NICVM

To the Right Honourable

Sir Robert *WALPOLE*,

KNIGHT of the most noble Order of the Garter, Chancellor and Under-Treasurer of the Exchequer, first Commissioner of the Treasury, and one of his MAJESTY's most honourable Privy-Council, *&c.*

SIR,

AS soon as the Demand of the Publick made it necessary to collect the following Papers together, and to prepare a second Edition of them, I took the Resolution of addressing them to *You*. The *Style* of my Dedication will be very different from That, which is commonly employ'd to Persons in your Station. But if you find nothing agreeable in the *Style*, You may find perhaps something useful, something that will deserve Your serious Reflection, in the *Matter* of it. I shall compare You neither to *Burleigh*, nor *Godolphin*. Let me not prophane the Tombs of the Dead, to raise Altars to the Living. I shall make You no Compliments on the Wisdom of your *Administration*, nor on the Wonders You have perform'd, to the Honour and Advantage of this Kingdom, in

the Course of *fourteen*, or *fifteen Years*, either at home, or abroad. I shall leave these copious Themes to others, and shall confine Myself to Reasons of another Kind, that induced me to *this Dedication.* If these Reasons prove sufficient to convince the Publick of the extreme Propriety of it, I have all that I propose to Myself.—Give me Leave to present to You, in one short View, the general Design of these little Essays.

They are design'd then to expose the Artifice, and to point out the Series of Misfortunes, by which We were divided formerly into *Parties*, whose Contests brought even the fundamental Principles of *our Constitution* into Question, and whose Excesses brought *Liberty* to the very Brink of Ruin.

They are design'd to give true Ideas of *this Constitution*, and to revive in the Minds of Men the true Spirit of it.

They are design'd to assert and vindicate the Justice and Honour of the *Revolution*; of the *Principles* establish'd, of the *Means* employ'd, and of the *Ends* obtain'd by it.

They are design'd to explode our *former Distinctions*, and to unite Men of all Denominations in the Support of *these Principles*, in the Defence of *these Means*, and in the Pursuit of *these Ends.*

They are design'd to shew how far *these Ends* were answer'd at the *Revolution*, or have been answer'd since; and by Consequence how much, or how little is wanting, to render that glorious Work compleat, according to the original Plan, and agreeably

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to the Engagements taken, at that Time, with the Nation.

Let me now appeal to You, *Sir* — Are *These* Designs, which any Man, who is born a *Briton*, in any Circumstances, in any Situation, ought to be ashamed, or afraid to avow? You cannot think it. You will not say it. That never can be the Case, until We cease to think like *Freemen*, as well as to be *free*. Are *These* Designs in Favour of the *Pretender?* I appeal to the whole World; and I scorn, with a just Indignation, to give any other Answer to so shameless, and so senseless an Objection. No; they are Designs in Favour of the *Constitution*; Designs to secure, to fortify, to perpetuate that excellent System of Government. I court no other Cause; I claim no other Merit.

Stet Fortuna Domûs, et Avi numerentur Avorum.

Let the *illustrious and royal House*, that hath been call'd to the Government of these Kingdoms, govern them till Time shall be no more. But let the Spirit, as well as the Letter of the *Constitution*, They are intrusted to preserve, be, as it ought to be, and as We promise ourselves it will be, the sole Rule of their Government, and the sole Support of their Power; and whatever happens in the various Course of human Contingencies, whatever be the Fate of particular Persons, of Houses, or Families, let the *Liberties of Great Britain* be immortal.

They will be so, if *that Constitution*, whose genuine Effects they are, be maintain'd in Purity and Vigour. A perpetual Attention to this great Point is therefore the Interest and Duty of every

Man

Man in *Britain*; and there is ſcarce any Man, who may not contribute to the Advancement of it, in ſome Degree. The old may inform the young, and the young may animate the old. Even They, who are moſt retired from the Scene of Buſineſs, may be uſeful, in this Cauſe, to Thoſe, who are in it; to Thoſe, who are heated by the Action, diſtracted by the Cares, or diſſipated by the Pleaſures of the World. I ſay, they may be uſeful; and I add, that they ought to be ſo to the utmoſt, that their Situation allows. *Government* is the Buſineſs of Thoſe, who are appointed to govern, and of Thoſe, who are appointed to controul Them. But the *Britiſh Conſtitution* is the Buſineſs of every *Briton*. It is ſo more particularly, indeed, of Perſons raiſed, like *You*, to the higheſt Poſts in the Government. *You* lye under particular Obligations of this Kind, beſides the general Engagements of Intereſt and Duty, that are common to All; and a Neglect in *Others* would be a Breach of Truſt in *You*. We ſay that *our Kings can do no Wrong*. The Maxim is wiſely eſtabliſh'd, and ought to be follow'd, no Doubt, as far as the Conduct of *Princes* renders the Obſervance of it practicable. But from the Eſtabliſhment of *this Maxim* reſults the Neceſſity of *another*, without which the Exerciſe of the *executive Power* would remain under no Controul. Though *our Kings can do no Wrong*, and though They cannot be call'd to Account by any Form our *Conſtitution* preſcribes, their *Miniſters* may. *They* are anſwerable for the *Adminiſtration of the Government*; *each* for his *particular Part*, and the *prime*, or *ſole Miniſter*, when there happens to be one, for the *whole*. He is ſo the more, and the more juſtly, if He hath affected to render Himſelf ſo, by uſurping on his

his *Fellows*; by wriggling, intriguing, whiſpering, and bargaining Himſelf into this dangerous Poſt, to which he was not call'd by the *general Suffrage*, nor perhaps by the deliberate Choice of his *Maſter* himſelf. It follows then that *Miniſters* are anſwerable for every Thing done to the Prejudice of the *Conſtitution*, in the ſame Proportion as the Preſervation of the *Conſtitution* in its Purity and Vigour, or the perverting and weakening it, are of greater Conſequence to the Nation than any other Inſtances of *good*, or *bad Government*.

Believe me, *Sir*, a Reverence for the *Conſtitution*, and a conſcientious Regard to the Preſervation of it, are in the political, like *Charity* in the religious Syſtem, a Cloke to *hide a Multitude of Sins*; and as the Performance of *all other religious Duties* will not avail in the Sight of God, without *Charity*, ſo neither will the Diſcharge of *all other miniſterial Duties* avail in the Sight of Men, without a faithful Diſcharge of *this principal Duty*. Should a *Miniſter* govern, in various Inſtances of *domeſtick* and *foreign Management*, ignorantly, weakly, or even wickedly; and yet pay this Reverence, and bear this Regard to the *Conſtitution*, He would deſerve certainly much better Quarter, and would meet with it too from every Man of Senſe and Honour, than a *Miniſter*, who ſhould conduct the Adminiſtration with great Ability and Succeſs, and ſhould at the ſame Time procure and abet, or even connive at ſuch indirect Violations of the Rules of the *Conſtitution* as tend to the Deſtruction of it, or even at ſuch Evaſions as tend to render it uſeleſs. A *Miniſter*, who had the ill Qualities of *both Theſe*, and the good Ones of *neither*; who made his *Adminiſtration* hateful

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in ſome Reſpects, and deſpicable in others; who ſought that Security by ruining the *Conſtitution*, which he had forfeited by diſhonouring the *Government*; who encouraged the profligate, and ſeduced the unwary, to concur with Him in this Deſign, by affecting to explode all *publick Spirit*, and to ridicule every Form of our *Conſtitution*; *ſuch a Miniſter* would be look'd upon moſt juſtly as the Shame and Scourge of his Country; ſooner or later He would fall without Pity; and it is hard to ſay what Puniſhment would be proportionable to his Crimes.—— To conclude this Head therefore; ſince the Obligation of Intereſt and Duty on every Man, eſpecially on every *Miniſter*, and more eſpecially ſtill on a *prime*, or *ſole Miniſter*, to reverence the *Conſtitution*, to conform his Conduct to it, and neither to invade, nor ſuffer it to be invaded by Others, are ſo undeniable, and ſo ſtrong; and ſince the Means, which the *Miniſter's* Power gives Him to preſerve it in Purity and Vigour, or to corrupt and weaken it, are ſo many; nothing could be more proper than a Dedication to One, in your exalted Station, of *Papers*, that are written to explain this Intereſt, and to enforce this Duty, and to preſs them on the Underſtanding and Conſcience of every Man in *Britain*; but of *Him* moſt, who is moſt concern'd.

After the general Reaſons, that have been given, and ſuggeſted, for addreſſing this Dedication to *You*, give me Leave to deſcend into ſome, that are a little more particular, and that regard the *Man*, as well as the *Miniſter*.

If the *Principles of the Revolution*, and the *Means* employ'd in it, have not been vindicated by *Me*,

Me, with as great Force of Reason and Eloquence, as they were by *You*, in a famous Oration You made at *Sacheverel's* Tryal, they have been vindicated however to the best of my Power. The *Cause* is the same, though the *Performances* are not equal; and since the *Cause* is the same, the *Cause* will recommend *my Writings* to your good Opinion, how little soever You may like the *Advocate*. But I have something more to urge in my own Favour. You had a *Sermon* to condemn, and a *Parson to roast*, (for That, I think, was the decent Language of the Time) and, to carry on the Allegory, You *roasted him at so fierce a Fire, that You burnt yourselves*. Your Arguments being confined to the Propositions *this Preacher* had advanced, You may seem rather to have justify'd *Resistance*, or the *Means* employ'd to bring about the *Revolution*, than the *Revolution*; for though the *Principles of the Revolution* were, and must for ever remain true, and though the *Means* were just, and will for ever be so, in Cases of the like Nature; yet *true Principles*, and *just Means*, require to be farther sanctify'd by their *Ends*. The Man, who should affect the greatest Zeal for the *Principles* then establish'd, and the *Means* then used, would deserve, I think, to be rank'd among the *false Brethren*, and would prove himself a treacherous, and a mercenary Friend to the *Revolution*, if He shew'd any Indifference about the *Ends* obtain'd, or endeavour'd in any Manner to defeat Those, that were intended to be obtain'd by it. The People, who run so great a Risque, and bring about so great an Event, in order to restore their *Constitution*, and to secure their *Liberties* against Dangers of every Kind, and especially against Those, which recent Experience hath taught Them to apprehend,

have ſurely a good Right to the whole Benefit of *ſuch a Revolution*; and They cannot be deprived of any Part of this Benefit, or left expoſed to any Shadow of the ſame Dangers, by any Rule of Juſtice, or good Policy.

Such Conſiderations as Theſe made Me think that, to aſſert and vindicate fully the *Honour and Juſtice of the Revolution*, it was neceſſary that the *Ends of the Revolution* ſhould be inſiſted upon in *my Arguments*, whether they were ſo or not in *yours*; and that the Importance of the *Subject*, as well as the Difference of the *Occaſions*, (for the whole lay open before Me) would be a ſufficient Reaſon for ſupplying in the *Copy* what was wanting in the *Original*. I have endeavour'd therefore to ſhew how much our *Conſtitution* hath been improved, how far our *Liberties* have been better ſecured by the *Revolution*, and how little is wanting to compleat that glorious Deſign, and to render the *Britiſh Conſtitution* the moſt perfect Syſtem of a free Government, that was ever eſtabliſh'd in the World If *all the Ends of the Revolution* are already obtain'd, it is not only *impertinent* to argue for obtaining any of them, but *factious Deſigns* might be imputed, and the Name of *Incendiary* be apply'd with ſome Colour, perhaps, to any One, who ſhould perſiſt in preſſing this Point. On the other Hand, if *any of theſe Ends* have not been fully obtain'd, the Reproach of *Faction* and the Title of *Incendiary* will belong to every Perſon, who raiſes a Conteſt by his Oppoſition to theſe Inſtances, and who endeavours to make the *Friends of the Conſtitution* paſs for *Enemies to the Government*. Thus it is eaſy to join Iſſue; and when Iſſue is once join'd, it cannot be difficult to decide.

If

If *a principal End of the Revolution* was to ſecure the Nation for the future againſt all the Dangers, to which *Liberty*, as well as *Religion*, had been expoſed before the *Revolution*; if one of theſe Dangers aroſe from the *Corruption*, that had been employ'd to create a *Dependency of the two Houſes of Parliament on the Crown*; if *this Corruption* might have ſucceeded very probably then, had the *Means* been ſufficient to ſupport it; if no Proviſion was made, at the *Revolution*, to ſecure the *Independency of the two Houſes*, and the *Freedom of Elections*, againſt *Corruption*; if no Proviſion hath been made againſt this Danger, ſince the *Revolution*, proportionable to that Increaſe of the *poſſible Means of Corruption*, which hath happen'd ſince the *Revolution*, by the Increaſe of the *Revenue of the Crown*, of *Debts*, of *Taxes*, of *Officers*, and *Powers* to raiſe *theſe Taxes*; if all This be ſo, (and the whole Merits of the Cauſe may be ſafely reſted there) how can it be pretended that *all the Ends of the Revolution* have been already obtain'd? They have not moſt certainly. When, and in what Manner, they ſhall be obtain'd, it would be Preſumption in any *private Perſons* ſo much as to inſinuate. They may repreſent ſuch Things as They judge to be of uſe to the Publick, and may ſupport their Repreſentations by all the Reaſons, that have determined their Opinions. Thus far their Province extends. All beyond This belongs to their *Superiors*; and, in the Caſe before us, to the Wiſdom of the Nation aſſembled in *Parliament*. This however I would add; that as a Conſiſtency of Character ſeems to exact from *You* a Zeal for obtaining *all the Ends of the Revolution*, ſuitable to That, which you have expreſs'd for the *Principles* it eſtabliſh'd, and the *Means* it employ'd,

ſo the particular Obligations *You* lye under to promote the Honour and Intereſt of *his preſent Majeſty*, and of his *royal Family*, ſeem to exact the ſame; for, after all, the *Revolution* is the Foundation of the *preſent Settlement*; whatever ſtrengthens the *Foundation*, ſtrengthens the *Superſtructure*; and there can be no Need of going about to prove that to obtain *all the Ends of the Revolution* is to ſtrengthen *that Foundation.* The Arguments, that prevail'd formerly with many againſt the *Principles* and *Means of the Revolution*, are quite exploded; the Prejudices againſt them are quite worn out. We may therefore perſuade, without flattering ourſelves, that the Foundation of our *preſent Settlement*, and of all our future national Happineſs, is laid immoveable in theſe *two Reſpects.* Shall it not be ſo, and does it not become *You*, in a particular Manner, to endeavour that it ſhould be ſo, in *every Reſpect?* Could You forgive yourſelf, if you neglected the firſt Opportunity of concurring to remove the leaſt Pretence from the diſaffected, nay from the well-affected, to ſay that the *Ends of particular Men*, of *Parties*, and of *Families*, have been anſwer'd by the *Revolution*, even beyond their ſeveral Expectations; but that the *national Expectations* have not been ſo fully anſwer'd, nor the *Ends of the Revolution* intirely obtain'd? No Man knows better than *You* the Truth and Force of what hath been here advanced. No Man therefore is able to make a juſter Application of it to the moſt important Intereſts of *your Country*, to the true Intereſt of *your royal Maſter*, and to *your private Intereſt* too; if That will add, as I preſume it will, ſome Weight to the Scale; and if That requires, as I preſume it does, a Regard to *Futurity*, as well as to the *preſent Moment.* Upon the whole

whole Matter therefore, I cannot but expect that You ſhould receive ſavourably an *Addreſs*, made ſo properly, and in which, if I have preſs'd You a little warmly, yet I have done it with the Decency, that every *Gentleman* owes to *Another*, at leaſt to *Himſelf*. You will allow Me, and every Friend of the *Revolution* and of *Liberty*, Leave to hope that the Time is coming, when You will not oppoſe, or ſhall not have it in your Power to oppoſe, the Endeavours of Thoſe, who promote the intire Completion of *all the Ends* propoſed by the *firſt*, and the full Security of the *laſt*. Whenever This happens; whenever the *Independency of the two Houſes of Parliament*, and the *uninfluenced* and *uninfluenceable Freedom of Elections*, are once effectually ſecured againſt the Dangers, that may ariſe poſſibly hereafter from the Growth of *Corruption*; then will all our *future Kings* be reduced to the agreeable Neceſſity of eſtabliſhing their Thrones, as We are obliged to acknowledge that the Throne is *now* eſtabliſh'd, not on the narrow and ſandy Foundations of *Court-Craft*, and *unconſtitutional Expedients*, but on the *Popularity of the Prince*, and the *univerſal Affection of the Subjects*; Foundations of the *kingly Authority* ſo evidently ſuppoſed by our *Conſtitution*, that a *King*, who will add Weight to his Scepter, muſt govern by them, or govern againſt *this Conſtitution*, againſt the very *Rule of his Government*.

I am now come to the laſt Reaſon, drawn from the Subject of *theſe Writings*, that I ſhall trouble *You* with, for dedicating them to *You*. The Attempt to extinguiſh the Animoſities, and even the Names of *thoſe Parties*, that diſtracted the Nation ſo long, ſo fatally at firſt, and ſo fooliſhly at laſt, intitles

titles this Volume to *your kind Reception of it*, at least, as properly as the Attempt to expose the Dangers, that may possibly arise hereafter, from *Corruption*, to the *Independency of Parliament*, and to the *Freedom of Elections*. Whilst a real Difference of *Principles* and *Designs* supported the *Distinction*, We were divided into *national Parties*; and This was Misfortune enough. It was lamented as a great one, at the Time, by every good Man of every Party. But if the *Distinction* should remain, when the *Difference* subsists no longer, the Misfortune would be still greater; because They, who maintain'd the *Distinction*, in this Case, would cease to be a *Party*, and would become a *Faction*. *National Interests* would be no longer concern'd; at least, on *one Side*. They would be sometimes sacrificed, and always made subordinate to *personal Interests*; and That, I think, is the true Characteristick of *Faction*. This Attempt therefore ought to have *your Approbation*. To dedicate it to *You* may be construed to suppose that it will have *your Approbation*; and He, who supposes that it will, makes You no indifferent Compliment.

When the *Court* fomented our *national Divisions*, the very worst Designs were carry'd on; for to *divide* can never be an Expedient for good Purposes, any more than to *corrupt*; since the Peace and Prosperity of a Nation will always depend on *uniting*, as far as possible, the Heads, Hearts and Hands of the whole People, and on improving, not debauching their Morals. *Divide et impera*, is a Maxim often quoted. How are We to apply it? There is no Place for it, in *arbitrary Governments*; for in *Them*, the Interest of the *Governors* requires that a *servile Union*, if it may be call'd an *Union*, should be

be maintain'd by the Weight of *Power*, like That of Slaves in a *Galley*, who are united by their *Chains*, and who tug the Oar together, at the Sound of a *Whistle*. In *free Governments*, it can have Place as little, whilst They, who are at the Head, intend the Maintenance of *Liberty*. To what Case then can it be ayply'd? There is but one, and That is the Case of *Those*, who aspire at more Power than a *free Constitution of Government* gives Them. *Such Governors* must divide and incense *Parties* one against another, that They may be always able to bribe the Passions of *one Side*, and so usurp on *both*. But the *Prince*, who pursues this Method, risques the Power He hath for a Power He does not want. He would be the more inexcuseable, under *such a Constitution as ours*; because, if He could not gain Esteem by his *great*, He might gain Affection by his *good Qualities*; and *this Principle* would carry Him, even better perhaps than the *other*, to the Power He would obtain. What can a *Prince* desire more than to be placed at the Head of an *united People*; among whom He may have as many *Friends* as He pleases, and can have no *Enemies*, unless He creates them, by supposing Them to be *such*, and by treating them accordingly? If the Designs of a *Prince*, in fomenting the *Divisions*, are to invade the *Liberties of his People*, his Designs are laid in the utmost Iniquity; and if *These* are not his Designs, they must be laid in the utmost Folly. When a *People* submits quietly to *Government*, and is willing to obey on the *Terms*, on which alone *their Prince* hath a Right to command, how extravagant must his Demands be, and how unaccountable his Conduct, to *divide such a People?* Shall He expect, for Instance, that *all his People* should think like *Him* and *his Council*, about every

every Occurrence, about every Measure He takes, and every Man He employs; and since This is too much to ask of *Freemen*, nay of *Slaves*, if his Expectation be not answer'd, shall He form a *lasting Division* upon such *transient Motives?* Shall He proscribe every Man, as an *Enemy to his Government*, who dislikes the *Administration* of it? *Proscriptions* are abominable, and inhuman, when they are back'd by a Fulness of *arbitrary Power*. But to hang up the *Tables of Proscription*, without the Power of sending *Centurions* to cut off every Head, that wears a Face disliked at Court, would be Madness in a *Prince*. Such a Conduct cannot suit his *Interest*, however it may his *Passions*, in any Circumstance whatever. There are indeed Circumstances, wherein it may suit the Interest of a *Minister*. Till the Sword of *civil War* be drawn, a *Prince* can scarce become irreconcileable with his *People*, and be reduced, for Want of *national Strength*, to support his Power and Dignity by the Force of *Faction*. But a *Minister* may fall easily, and soon, into this desperate State; and after fomenting, as long as He could, the *Divisions of Parties*, He may have no Refuge but in *Faction*. There may be such a Conduct, as no *national Party* will bear, or at least will justify. But *Faction* hath no Regard to *national Interests*. *Faction* therefore will bear any Thing, share in any Thing, justify any Thing. If the *Minister*, who takes this Method to support Himself, hath any Art, He will endeavour to disguise his *Faction* under the Name and Appearance of a *national Party*. But even this Disguise will soon fall off. The best of Those, who were engaged in the *Party*, will quit the *Faction*, and then the *latter* must stand confess'd to publick View. But it is not only the *criminal Conduct of a Minister*, and the

Fear

Fear of resting his Administration on the *national Judgment*, that may oblige Him to govern by *Division*, and by *Faction*. As the most opposite Notions are often united in the Head, so are the most contrary Sentiments in the Heart of Man. *Incapacity* often begets *Sufficiency*; and yet a *Consciousness of Incapacity* often begets a *Jealousy of Power*, grounded on a Sense of the *superior Merit of other Men*. The *Minister*, who grows less by his *Elevation*, like a *little Statue* placed on a mighty *Pedestal*, will always have *this Jealousy* strong about Him. He must of Course select a *Faction* to Himself; and *this Faction* must be composed, to answer his Purposes, of Men *servilely obsequious*, or *extremely inferior to him by their Talents*. Whenever This happens, the Reign of *Venality*, of *Prostitution*, of *Ignorance*, of *Futility*, and of *Dulness* commences. The *Minister* will dread to see the *Persons* employ'd, whom He *secretly esteems*, for this very Reason, because He *esteems* Them. *Abilities to serve the Commonwealth* will be an Objection sufficient to outweigh the strongest Proofs of *Attachment to the Person of the Prince*, and of *Zeal for his Government*; nay, even the Merit of a *whole Life spent in giving these Proofs*. In short, the very Reasons, that should determine the *Prince* to employ Men, will determine the *Minister* to proscribe Them. Dislike, or Contempt of *Him*, will pass with his *Master* for Disaffection to the Government; and, under this pompous Name of *Government*, will nothing but the paultry Interest, or Humour, of the *Minister* be couch'd. The *Minister* will reap, perhaps, (for even That may be doubtful) the immediate Benefit of *dividing*, or maintaining the *Divisions of the Nation*, and of nursing up *Faction*, by continuing longer in Power, his sole Security,

and by deferring, if not escaping, the *evil Day*, the *Day of Account and Retribution.* But the *Prince* will reap, in this Case, the permanent Mischief of establishing *Division* and *Faction*; and may possibly make the lamentable Exchange of his *own Popularity*, for his *Minister's Impunity.* I need not finish up this Picture of Imagination, since I write to *You*, who know so much better than I pretend to do the *Characters of Men*, and the *Arts of Government.* It is sufficient that I have hinted at the general Causes and Effects of the Endeavours, that are sometimes used, and to which *Great Britain* hath not been a Stranger, to foment *national Divisions*, and to govern by the *Faction of a Minister*, arm'd with the Power of the *Prince*, against the Sense and Spirit of a *Nation*, and the Interest of the *Prince* himself. This may serve, and it is all I shall say, to bespeak Your Approbation of the Papers that follow, on Account of the *Matter* they contain.

But, *Sir*, the Reasons I have given, how pertinent soever they may be, are not the only Reasons I had for addressing Myself, in this Manner, and upon this Occasion, to *You.* There are Reasons of another Kind; Reasons, that come still more home to *Yourself*; Reasons, that appear very important to Me, and that will appear so to *You*, perhaps, when You have reflected duely on them, and have weigh'd impartially the Consequences of them. I shall press these Reasons with all the Plainness and Force, that Decency permits, in so publick and personal an Application; because, though *Truth* may sometimes offend, I am very indifferent to Offences taken with *Truth* on my Side. If You hearken to *Truth*, which Men in your Station seldom

dom hear, You may be the better for it. If You do not, the *Author of this Dedication* cannot be the worſe; for I will add, upon this Occaſion, that whoever He is, He is one You cannot impoſe upon, in your *private Capacity*, neither as a Man, nor as a Gentleman; and that You can as little do it, in your *publick Capacity*. You cannot diſappoint Him; becauſe the Temper of his Mind gives You no Hold on Him. He hath neither *Avarice* to make Him deſire *Riches*, nor *Ambition* to make Him deſire *Power*, nor *Vanity* to make Him deſire *Honours*. You cannot oppreſs Him; becauſe He is free from *Guilt*, and from every *probable* (for no Man is free from every *poſſible*) *Imputation of Guilt*. The *Laws of his Country* are his Protection; and they are ſufficient to protect every *Briton*, who reverences and obeys them, in how *peculiar a Situation* ſoever He may be found. They, who act againſt *theſe Laws*, and They alone, may have Reaſon to fear, let their *Situation be never ſo high*, or their *preſent Power never ſo great*.

Having ſaid This, I proceed to obſerve to You, that You are in the right moſt certainly to retort by *Yourſelf*, or *Others*, in the beſt and ſmarteſt Manner that *You*, or *They* can, whatever the Writings publiſh'd in the *Craftſman* may contain, which You judge to be injurious to *Yourſelf*, or reflecting on *your Adminiſtration*. The Publick will judge uprightly upon the whole Matter. The Laughers will be for Thoſe, who have moſt *Wit*, and the ſerious Part of Mankind for Thoſe, who have moſt *Reaſon* on their Side. Again. As to Affairs of Peace, or War, publick Occurrences, domeſtick Management, foreign Negotiations, in ſhort, the News of the Day, and the current Buſineſs of the

Time, *weekly* and *daily Papers*, or *more elaborate, anniversary Treatises*, are properly employ'd by You to explain, in your own Favour, the Series of your Conduct; to refute *Caleb*; or, which is still more easy, and by some thought as useful, to keep up the Cavil on *one Point*, till a *new one* is started, that draws off the Attention of the World. All This may be call'd *fair War*; and whoever prevails in the Judgment of the Publick, the Publick will reap Information from the Contest, and will have Reason to be pleased with *these Appeals*, which present an Image of the Custom, that obtain'd in the antient Commonwealths of *Greece* and *Rome*, where the greatest Interests of the State were debated, and the greatest Men in those Governments were accused and defended, in *publick Harangues*, and before the *whole People*.

But the Writings of the *Craftsman* have not been confined, to these Subjects, that are *personal*, or *temporary*. The Cause of the *British Constitution* hath been pleaded through the whole Course of *these Papers*; every Danger to it hath been pointed out; every Security, or Improvement of it, hath been explain'd and press'd.——Now here, *Sir*, begins my Complaint. I said that the Cause of our *Constitution* hath been *pleaded* in the *Craftsman*; and I am sorry that the Expression is so precisely just, that no other would come up to the Case. The Cause of the *Constitution* hath been *pleaded*; for the *Constitution* hath been *attack'd*; openly, insolently *attack'd*, and is so every Day by Those, against whom the *Craftsman* so often employs his Pen. Who could have expected (for I will give an Instance or two) who could have expected, at this Time, and under the *present Establishment*,

ſtabliſhment, to hear the Neceſſity of maintaining *ſtanding Armies*, in Times of *Peace*, even againſt the *People of Britain*, who maintain Them, contended for and aſſerted?—Who could have expected to hear a *Dependency*, a *corrupt Dependency of the Parliament on the Crown*, contended for and aſſerted to be a neceſſary Expedient to ſupply a *Want of Power*, which is falſely ſuppoſed, *in the Crown*; as if our Fathers had oppoſed, and at length deſtroy'd that Chimæra, call'd *Prerogative*, formerly ſo dangerous to our *Liberties*, for no other Reaſon but to furniſh Arguments for letting looſe upon us *another Monſter*, more dangerous to our *Liberties* by far?—Who could have expected that Attempts to revive the Doctrines of *old Whiggiſm*, and the Principles and Spirit of the *Revolution*, in Oppoſition to ſuch manifeſt Contradictions of them all, would give any Umbrage, or cauſe any Alarm, among Men, who ſtill affect to call Themſelves *Whigs*, and pretend Zeal for a *Government*, that is founded on the *Revolution*, and could not have been eſtabliſh'd without it?—This could not have been expected, I think; and yet ſo it is. There are *Perſons*, who take to Themſelves the Title of *miniſterial Writers*, that have ſometimes the Front to aſſume That of *Writers for the Government*. *Theſe Perſons*, are not content to ring, in daily Panegyrick, Encomiums on the Wiſdom and Virtue, the Juſtice and Clemency, the Succeſs and Triumphs of *your Adminiſtration*, and to anſwer, or to attempt to anſwer, the almoſt innumerable Objections, that have been made (it matters not here whether juſtly, or unjuſtly) to *your Conduct at home*, and *your Own*, and That of *your Brother abroad*; but They take Fire, They ſhew an Alarm, and They grow angry, whenever any Thing is written,

written, nay when a Word is dropt, in Favour of the *fundamental Articles of British Liberty.* Sometimes They argue directly, and in plain Terms, against them. Sometimes They perplex and puzzle the Cause; evade what They cannot deny; and, when They cannot impose a Fallacy, endeavour at least to hinder Men from discerning a Truth. Thus, *Sir*, They mingle *your Justification* with the *Condemnation of our Constitution*; and labour, as much as in Them lies, to make *your Preservation* and the *Destruction of this Constitution* a common Cause. If You could possibly doubt the Truth of what is here advanced, I might refer You to the *particular Pamphlets* and *Papers*, which are known at least by the *Answers*, that have been given to them, till such Time as an Extract of all the Passages, hinted at here, be made publick, as I hope it will; and whenever it is, I dare appeal beforehand to your private Thoughts, whether the *Principles* they contain, and the *Consequences* deducible from them, would not destroy, if they were to take Place, the whole Scheme of the *British Constitution.* It hath been ask'd, why do the *Writers on one Side* eternally harp on *Liberty*, and the *Constitution?* Do They mean to instil *Jealousy* and *Distrust*, and to alienate the *Minds of the People?* In what Instances have the *Laws* been broken, or hath the *Constitution* been invaded by Those, who govern? These Questions deserve an Answer; and I shall answer the *first*, by asking another Question. Why do the *Writers on one Side* eternally labour to explain away *Liberty*, and to distinguish Us out of our *Constitution?* If nothing had been said of *this Kind*, I am persuaded that much less would have been said of the *other*; and I can assure You, with great Truth, that the Publick had not been troubled, particularly, with *this*

Differ-

Dissertation upon Parties. As to the *other two Questions*, they may be taken together. There is a plain and real Difference between *Jealousy* and *Distrust*, that may be observed in the present Case. Men may be *jealous*, on Account of their *Liberties*, and I think They ought to be so, even when They have no immediate *Distrust* that the Persons, who govern, design to invade them. An Opportunity of invading them open'd, is Reason sufficient for awakening the *Jealousy*, and if the *Persons*, who have *this Jealousy*, apply to Those, who govern, to help to cure it, by removing the Opportunity, the *latter* may take This, if They please, as a Mark of *Confidence*, not *Distrust*; at least, it will be in their Power, and surely it will be for their Interest, to shew that They deserved *Confidence*, in this Case, not *Distrust*. But it will be always trifling, and foolish, to ask what *Laws* have been broken, what Invasions on the *Constitution* have been made; because as nothing of this Sort will be done, when there are no Designs dangerous to the *Constitution* carried on; so when there are *such Designs*, whatever is done of this Sort will be private, indirect, and so cover'd, that the greatest moral Certainty may be destitute of Proof. Whenever any of these Things are done publickly, directly, and in a Manner to be easily proved, the Danger will be over, the *Constitution* will be destroy'd, and all Fear for it and Concern about it will be impertinent, because they will come too late. If ever that old, trite Maxim, *Principiis obsta*, was well apply'd, it is so in the Case We speak of here.

The Reasons I have given for mentioning *these Writers* ought to excuse Me for it; at least to *You*; and even to *You* I shall say very little more about Them.

Them. The Flowers They gather at *Billingsgate*, to adorn and enliven their Productions, shall be pass'd over by Me, without any Reflection. They assume the Privilege of *Watermen* and *Oyster-Women*. Let Them enjoy it in that good Company, and exclusively of all other Persons. They cause no Scandal; They give no Offence; They raise no Sentiment but Contempt in the Breasts of *Those* They *attack*; and it is to be hoped, for the Honour of *Those*, whom They would be thought to *defend*, that They raise, by this low and dirty Practice, no other Sentiment in *Them*. But there is another Part of their Proceeding, which may be attributed by malicious People to *You*, and which deserves for that Reason alone some Place in *this Dedication*, as it might be some Motive to the writing of it. When *such Authors* grow scurrilous, it would be highly unjust to impute their Scurrility to any *Prompter*; because They have in Themselves all that is necessary to constitute a *Scold*; *ill Manners*, *Impudence*, a *foul Mouth*, and a *fouler Heart*. But when They *menace*, They rise a Note higher. They cannot do This in their own Names. Men may be apt to conclude therefore that They do it in the Name, as They affect to do it on the Behalf, of the *Person*, in whose Cause They desire to be thought retain'd. Many Examples of *these Menaces* might be quoted, and most of them would be found directed against *one particular Person*. After employing the whole Impotence of their Rhetorick against Him, and venting for many Years together, almost without Notice on his Part, as much Calumny as their Imaginations could furnish, a *Pamphlet* hath been lately publish'd, the profess'd Design of which is to call for a *vigorous Proceeding in Parliament against* THIS MAN. To introduce this

this Proposal, it is preceded by a long Series of Facts; some notoriously false; some, which it is impossible should be true; others, which it is impossible *this Writer* should know to be true, if they were so; and others again, not only destitute of Proof, but even of Probability. Such *Accusations* must be brought by some * *Creature, of so notoriously prostituted a Conscience*, that *his Evidence would be rejected in any common Cause*, and should not be refuted therefore by Me, if I was concern'd to refute Him. But, *Sir*, if I take Notice of *this Libel*, or refer to *others of the same Kind*, it is not done out of Regard to *these Authors*, whom I despise, as I am persuaded the *Person* does, against whom all the Virulence of their Malice is directed. My Concern, upon this Occasion, is for *You* alone, and You will allow me to represent what that Concern dictates. It is possible that *You* may have very strong Resentments against *this Person*, and He against *You*. It is possible that You may have shewn *yours*, and He may have shewn *his*, according to the different Circumstances *You* have been in, and the different Opportunities *You* have had. But This will not become a *Matter of State*, though You are a *Minister of State*. The Publick will espouse *your Passions* no more than *his*; nor concern itself to enquire who gave the first Occasion to *these Resentments*; who hath acted the Part of a *fair*, and who of a *treacherous Enemy*. It is, I doubt, too certain that the *Publick* hath been employ'd sometimes to revenge *private Quarrels*, and to serve the low Turns of *Envy*, or *Jealousy*. But, in all these Cases, the Publick hath been imposed upon; *these Motives* have been conceal'd; *others* have been pre-

d tended;

* *See the* Grand Accuser, *&c. p.* 77.

tended; and the *others* have been of a *publick Nature* alone; because the bare Suspicion of any *private Interest*, or *Passion*, in a *publick Prosecution* is sufficient, and most justly so, to create invincible Prejudices to it. The *Scribblers* I speak of have laid You therefore under great Disadvantages, notwithstanding your *Elevation*, and your *Power*, whether You design any Thing against the *Person* so obnoxious to You, or not. They should have conceal'd industriously, what They have affected to proclaim; since it is certain that, how great soever *your Popularity* in the Nation may be, They will never bring up Mankind to think that any Person should be prosecuted by *Methods extraordinary*, or even *ordinary*, purely for your Ease, your Pleasure, or your Safety. If They could prove, what They frequently throw out, that every Man is a *Friend to the Pretender*, who is not a *Friend to You*; and that He, who objects to *your Conduct in the Administration*, endeavours to pull down the *present Government*, and set up *another*; then, indeed, They might raise a Spirit against *this particular Person*, for aught I know; but most certainly against *many Others*, of much greater Consequence, who appear every Day, in the Face of the World, not to be *your Friends*, and who make no Scruple of objecting, with the utmost Freedom, to *your Conduct*. But such Assertions as these will only serve to make Men angry, or laugh. They, who have the best Opinion of your *Abilities*, will no more agree that the *present Establishment* is supported, than that it was made, by *You*. They will never be wanting in their Respect to the *Crown* so much, as to confound the Cause of the *King* with the Cause of his *Minister*; or to suppose that the Reins of Government would grow weaker in his

Majesty's

Majesty's Hand, if *You* was out of Power, or out of the World.——In short, *Sir*, You may pass, and I believe You do pass justly, for a *Man of extreme good Parts*, and for a *Minister of much Experience*; but You would not desire, I think, to be represented as the *Atlas*, who supports this State; and *your Brother* will not certainly pass for the *Hercules*, who relieves You, and who sustains, in his Turn, the important Burthen.

I know very well that something is added to supply, if That were possible, this Defect, and to make the Cause more plausible. It is pretended that the Writings imputed to *this particular Person*, and several others publish'd in the *Craftsman*, contain Reflections of a very *extravagant*, *indecent*, and even *seditious Nature*; such as They alone, who are capable of supposing them, are capable of making. But then these Reflections are to be proved by the *Constructions*, which the *Accusers* make of the Expressions employ'd by *Those*, whom They accuse; *Constructions* as arbitrary, and as forced, as many of Those, by which some of the best Men at *Rome* were brought within the Interpretation of the *Law of Majesty*, by some of the worst. Examples of much the same Sort have been set even in *Britain*, whilst the Practice prevail'd of supposing *Innuendo's*, and *Parallels*, and *oblique Meanings*, and prosecuting and condemning Men on *Suppositions*, and *Interpretations*. But there is no Room to fear that any such Examples should be renew'd, whilst * *a* BRITISH SPIRIT prevails in a BRITISH PARLIAMENT. Whilst *that Spirit* prevails, no

* *See* some Considerations concerning the publick Funds, &c. p. 98.

Parliament will condemn any Man upon Principles, which Parliaments have always condemn'd as unjuſt and tyrannical. Leſs than any will They condemn Thoſe, who write in Defence of *this Conſtitution*, at the Requeſt and on the Inſtances of Thoſe, who attack it. A *Britiſh Spirit* and the *Spirit of the Britiſh Conſtitution* are one and the ſame; and therefore † *if ever there ariſes a* BRITISH SPIRIT *in a* BRITISH PARLIAMENT, of which I preſume no Doubt ought to be made at this Time, *Vengeance* will not overtake the *former*; it may be the *latter*.

What hath been ſaid might ſuffice to ſhew how fooliſh and vain it is to throw out Menaces againſt *Thoſe*, who have nothing to fear, at a Time, when Zeal to preſerve the *Conſtitution* in every Part inviolate ſeems daily to increaſe. But ſince I have enter'd on the Subject, and the Matter ſeems of ſome Concernment to *You*, give Me Leave to add one Conſideration more, that may ſerve to ſhew how fooliſh and vain ſuch a Proceeding would be, even at any other Time.—Let us ſuppoſe that the *very Perſon* pointed at was, and could be proved to be, the Author of *this Diſſertation upon Parties*, for Inſtance, which I now dedicate to *You*. Let us ſuppoſe that the Reſolution was taken to follow the generous and equitable Advice of the *Pamphlet-writer*, who thinks He ought to be proceeded againſt in a *peculiar Manner*. Let us even ſuppoſe that We lived in an Age, when Parliaments were brought, in ſome Degree, under *that very Dependency*, againſt which ſo much is ſaid in *this Diſſertation*. In ſhort, let us ſuppoſe that the moſt innocent Man,

† *Ib.*

Man, who was obnoxious to *Those in Power*, might have reasonable Grounds to fear an exorbitant Exercise of *this Power* against Him. But then let Us make one single Supposition on the *other Side*. Let Us suppose that *this obnoxious Man* was really in earnest; that He wrote from his Heart; and that He felt there the same Warmth for the *British Constitution*, which He express'd in his Writings, and labour'd to infuse into the Breast of every other Man. I would ask You, *Sir*, do You think *such a Man* would be ashamed to avow, in the Face of his Country, the Contents of the *following Sheets*, or be afraid to suffer for them? Could any Eloquence, even *yours*, if You would employ it so unworthily, expect, by the Help of false Surmises, and invidious Comments, (the base Inventions of *little Railers*) to make Him pass for an *Enemy to the present Establishment*, who had proved Himself a *Friend to that Constitution*, in Consequence of which, and for the Sake of which alone, *this Establishment* was made? Would his Endeavours to reconcile *Parties*, and to abolish *odious Distinctions*; would pleading for the Attainment of *all the Ends* proposed by, and promised at the *Revolution*; for securing the *Independency of the two Houses of Parliament*, and the *Freedom of Elections*, as effectually against *Corruption*, as they are already secured against *Prerogative*; would This, I say, make Him pass for the *greatest of Criminals?* No, *Sir*, not in the Breasts even of Those, who gave Sentence against Him, if Men capable of giving such a Sentence could be found. Among the rest of Mankind his Innocency would be acknowledged; his Constancy would be applauded; his *Accusers*, and his *grand Accuser* in the first Place, would pass alone for *criminal*. He might fall a Victim to *Power*;

but

but *Truth* and *Reason*, and the Cause of *Liberty* would fall with Him; and He, who is buried in their Ruins, is happier than He, who survives them. Thus I am persuaded the *Person* here intended would be found, upon Trial, to think. The Event therefore of *such a Prosecution*, whatever it might be, could not turn to his Disadvantage; and consequently to threaten Him with it would be ridiculous, even at such a Time as We have supposed, much more at the present. Void of all Ambition, except the Ambition of honest Fame, He might stand the Efforts of Violence in *such a Cause*, not only with little Concern, but with much inward Complacency. Weary of the World, determined and preparing to retire totally from it, He would surely suspend his Retreat to face the Persecution; and whatever his Persecutors might imagine, They would erect a Sort of *triumphal Arch* to the Man They hated. He would leave the World with more Honour than they would remain in it. By suffering in Defence of the *Constitution of his Country*, They, who had thought favourably of Him, would think that He crown'd the *Good*, and They, who had entertain'd Prejudices against Him, that He atoned for the *Ill*, which had been imputed to Him. Such different Judgments You know, *Sir*, will attend every Man's Character, who acts on our divided Stage, and He is happy, who can reconcile them so nearly. It never happens that there is a Man, of whom *all speak well*; as it rarely, very rarely, happens that there is a Man, of whom *all speak ill*, except Those, who are hired to *speak well*.

I find it hard to leave off, when I have the Honour of writing to *You*, *Sir*; but having now explain'd

plain'd the principal Reaſons, that induced Me to addreſs this Dedication to *You*, it is Time that I ſhould force Myſelf to a Concluſion, and conclude by recommending the *following Sheets* to your ſerious Peruſal. I recommend them to nothing elſe. I do not apprehend that they will want your Patronage any more than the *Perſon*, who wrote them. Let them ſtand, or fall in the publick Opinion, according to their Merit. But if You ſhould find any Thing in them, that deſerves your Notice, You will have an Obligation to *One*, from whom You leaſt expected any; to,

SIR,

Your moſt humble Servant,

THE AUTHOR OF THE DISSERTATION UPON PARTIES.

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A DISSERTATION ON PARTIES.

LETTER I.

SIR,

TO CORRUPT and to DIVIDE are the trite and wicked Expedients, by which *some Ministers* in all Ages have affected to govern; but especially such as have been least capable of exerting the true Arts of Government. There is however a Difference to be made between *these two Expedients*, to the Advantage of the *latter*, and by Consequence between the Characters of *Those*, who put them in Practice.

Every busy, ambitious Child of Fortune, who hath Himself a *corrupt Heart*, and becomes Master of a *large Purse*, hath all that is necessary to employ the Expedient of CORRUPTION with Success. A *Bribe*, in the Hand of the most *blundering Coxcomb*, that ever disgraced Honour and Wealth and Power, will prevail as much as in the Hand of a

Man of Sense, and go farther too, if it weigh more. An *intriguing Chamber-Maid* may slip a Bank-Note into a griping Paw, as well as the most subtle Dæmon of Hell. *H———e* may govern as triumphantly by *this Expedient* as the *great Knight*, his Brother, and the *great Knight* as *Burleigh* himself.

But every Character cannot attempt the other Expedient of *dividing*, or *keeping up Divisions*, with equal Success. There is, indeed, no Occasion for any extraordinary Genius to *divide*; and true Wisdom despises the infamous Task. But there is need of that left-handed Wisdom, call'd *Cunning*, and of those Habits in Business, call'd *Experience*. He, that is *corrupted*, co-operates with Him, that *corrupts*. He runs into his Arms at the first Beckon; or, in order sometimes to raise the Price, He meets Him but half Way. On the other Hand, to *divide*, or to maintain and renew the *Division of Parties* in a State, a System of *Seduction* and *Fraud* is necessary to be carried on. The *Divided* are so far from being accessory to the Guilt, that They would not be *divided*, if They were not first *deceived*.

From these Differences, which I have observed between the *two Expedients*, and the Characters and Means, proper to put them in Practice with Success, it may be discover'd perhaps why, upon former Occasions, as I shall hereafter shew, the Expedient of *Dividing* prosper'd so much better than That of *Corrupting*; and why, upon some later Occasions, the Expedient of *Corrupting* succeeds so well in those Hands, which are not, and, I trust, will not be so lucky in maintaining, or renewing our *Party-Divisions*.

Much hath been written by You, Mr. *D'Anvers*, by your Correspondents and Others, who have drawn

drawn their Pens in the Cause of *Truth*, *Virtue*, and *Liberty*, against the right reverend, as well as undignify'd, the noble, as well as ignoble Assertors of *Corruption*; enough surely to shame Those, who have not lost all Sense of Shame, out of so ignominious a Crime; and to make Those, who have not lost every other Sense, tremble at the Consequences of it. We may flatter ourselves that these honest Endeavours have had some Effect; and have Reason to hope that far greater will follow from those illustrious Examples of Repulses, which have been lately given to the *grand Corruptor*, notwithstanding his frequent and insolent Declarations that He could seduce whomsoever He had a Mind to gain. These Hopes are farther confirm'd to us by repeated Declarations of the Sense of Parliament, and will be turn'd, we doubt not, into Certainty, whenever the Wisdom of the two Houses shall again think it proper to raise new Barriers of Law against *this encroaching Vice*.

In the mean time, I think nothing can better answer the Design of *your Papers*, nor promote the publick Good more effectually in the present Conjuncture, than to put our Countrymen frequently on their Guard against the Artifice, which is clumsily, but industriously employ'd to maintain, and, if it be possible, to create *new Divisions* amongst Them. That Day, which our Fathers wish'd to see and did not see, is now breaking upon us. Shall We suffer this Light to be turn'd again into Party-Darkness by the Incantations of *Those*, who would not have pass'd for Conjurers, even in the Days of Superstition and Ignorance? The Nation is not only brought into an Uniformity of Opinion concerning the *present Administration*, by the Length and the righteous Conduct of it; but We are grown

into an Unanimity about *Principles of Government*, which the moſt ſanguine could ſcarce have expected, without Extravagance. *Certain Aſſociations of Ideas* were made ſo familiar to us, about half a Century ago, and became in the Courſe of Time ſo habitual, that We ſhould have not been able, even a few Years ago, to break them, nor have been eaſily induced to believe, on the Faith of any Prediction, that *Experience* and the Evidence of *Facts* would, in a few Years more, break them for us, deſtroy all our Notions of *Party*, and ſubſtitute *new ones* in their Room.

The Power and Majeſty of the PEOPLE, an ORIGINAL CONTRACT, *the Authority and Independency of* PARLIAMENTS, *Liberty*, *Reſiſtance*, *Excluſion*, *Abdication*, *Depoſition*; Theſe were Ideas aſſociated, at that Time, to the Idea of a WHIG, and ſuppoſed by every *Whig* to be incommunicable, and inconſiſtent with the Idea of a TORY.

Divine, *hereditary*, *indefeaſable Right*, *lineal Succeſſion*, *Paſſive-Obedience*, *Prerogative*, *Non-Reſiſtance*, *Slavery*, nay, and ſometimes *Popery* too, were aſſociated in many Minds to the Idea of a TORY, and deem'd incommunicable, and inconſiſtent, in the ſame Manner, with the Idea of a WHIG.

But now That, which *neither Side* would have believed, on the Faith of a Prediction, is come to paſs;

——— quod Divûm promittere nemo
Auderet, volvenda Dies en! attulit ultro.

Theſe Aſſociations are broken; *theſe diſtinct Sets of Ideas* are ſhuffled out of their Order; *new Combinations* force themſelves upon us; and it would actually be as abſurd to impute to the *Tories* the Principles, which were laid to their Charge formerly, as

as it would be to aſcribe to the *Projector* and *his Faction* the Name of *Whigs*, whilſt they daily forfeit that Character by their Actions. The Bulk of *both Parties* are really united; united on *Principles of Liberty*, in Oppoſition to an obſcure Remnant of *one Party*, who diſown thoſe Principles, and a mercenary Detachmeut from the *other*, who betray them.

How *this Change for the better* comes to have been wrought in an Age, when moſt Things have *changed for the worſe*; and ſince it hath been wrought, why the *old Diſtinctions* are kept up in ſome Meaſure, will I think be accounted for in treating this Subject farther. At preſent, what ſhall We ſay to Thoſe, who publickly ſpeak of *this national Union* as impracticable and chimerical; yet privately act againſt it, with all their Might, as a practicable Thing, and a real Evil to Them? If it be as compleat and as well cemented, as I imagine it is, and as every honeſt *Briton* wiſhes it may be; nay, if there be nothing more than a ſtrong Tendency on all Sides towards it, which no Man of the leaſt Obſervation and Candour will deny; it is ſurely the Duty of every one, who deſires the Proſperity of his Country, to ſeize the Opportunity, to cultivate and improve it. If Men are to be *known by their Works*, the Works of Thoſe, who oppoſe *this Union*, denote Them ſufficiently. Wicked and unhappy Men! who ſeek their *private Safety*, in oppoſing *publick Good*. Weak and ſilly Men! who vainly imagine that THEY ſhall paſs for the NATION, and the NATION for a *Faction*; that THEY *ſhall be judged in the Right, and the* WHOLE BODY OF THE PEOPLE *in the Wrong*.—— On whom would They impoſe?—— How long do They imagine that ſo unequal a Conqueſt can laſt?

There

There is no Complaint, which hath been more conſtantly in the Mouths, no Grief hath lain more heavily at the Hearts of all good Men, than Thoſe about our *national Diviſions*; about the Spirit of *Party*, which inſpires Animoſity and breeds Rancour; which hath ſo often deſtroy'd our inward Peace; weaken'd our national Strength, and ſullied our Glory abroad. It is Time therefore that All, who deſire to be eſteem'd good Men, and to procure the Peace, the Strength and the Glory of their Country by the only Means, by which They can be procured effectually, ſhould join their Efforts to heal our *national Diviſions*, and to change the narrow Spirit of *Party* into a diffuſive Spirit of *publick Benevolence*.

That we may be more encouraged to do ſo, it will be of Uſe perhaps to conſider, in ſome Particulars, what Advances are already made towards that *national Union*, without which no *national Good* can be expected in ſuch Circumſtances as ours.

Let us begin with the preſent Temper of the Members of the *Church of England* towards the *Diſſenters*. Thoſe Laws, by which the *latter* were debar'd from ſerving God after their own way, have not been theſe many Years a Terror to Them. Thoſe, which were deſign'd to hinder the Propagation of their Principles, and Thoſe, which ſhut the Door of all publick Preferment, even to ſuch amongſt Them, as *conform'd occaſionally*, are repeal'd. Far from deſiring to impoſe any new Hardſhips upon Them, even *Thoſe*, who have been reputed their Enemies, and who have acted as ſuch on ſeveral Occaſions, acknowledge their Error. Experience hath removed Prejudice. They ſee that *Indulgence* hath done what *Severity* never could; and from the Frankneſs of *Theſe*, if I was a *Diſſenter*,

ter, I ſhould ſooner entertain Hopes of future Favour, than from the double Dealing of *Thoſe*, who lean on the *Diſſenters*, when They are *out of Power*, and who eſteem Them a Load upon Them, when They are *in it*. We are now in the true and only Road, which can poſſibly lead to a perfect Reconciliation among *Proteſtants*; to the Abolition of all their *Differences*; or to Terms of *Difference* ſo little eſſential, as to deſerve none of *Diſtinction*. Theſe happy Ends muſt be obtain'd by *mutual good Will*. They never can be obtain'd by *Force*. It is true, indeed, that *Force*, which is the Effect of a Majority and ſuperior Power, may ſupport a Rivalſhip and erect even *Counter-Eſtabliſhments*. But then, by the ſame Means, our antient Diſputes will be revived; the Church will be thought really in Danger; and religious Feuds, which have been ſo long and ſo beneficially kept down, will once more diſturb the Peace of the State. It is a certain Truth, that our *religious* and *civil Conteſts* have mutually, and almoſt alternately, raiſed and ſomented each other. *Churchmen* and *Diſſenters* have ſometimes differ'd, and ſometimes thought, or been made to think, that They differ'd, at leaſt, as much about *civil* as *religious Matters*. There can be therefore no Way ſo effectual to compoſe their Differences on the *latter*, as to improve the growing Union between Them on the *former*. *Idem ſentire de Republicâ*, *to think alike about political Affairs*, hath been eſteem'd neceſſary to conſtitute and maintain *private Friendſhips*. It is obviouſly more eſſential in *publick Friendſhips*. Bodies of Men in the ſame Society can never unite, unleſs they unite on *this Principle*; and if They once unite on *This Principle*, They will unite on *all others*, or They will readily and chearfully make one another eaſy about them.——Let me ſpeak plainly. It becomes a Man to do ſo, who means honeſtly.—

In

In our political Divisions of *Whig* and *Tory*, the *Dissenters* have adhered to the *former*, and They want no Apology for doing so They join'd Themselves to Those, with whom They agreed, and stood in Opposition to Those, with whom They differ'd in *Principles of Government*. There could be no Objection brought against Them, on this Account. They certainly did not follow *Power*. They did not act like a *Sect* or a *Faction*, who had, and pursued an Interest distinct from the Interest of the whole. Their *Non-Conformity* hath nothing to do here. They concur'd with *Conformists*; and if they had been *Conformists* themselves, as they were *Dissenters*, they would have acted in the same Manner. But if *this Division of Parties*, on the same Principles, subsists no longer; if there be in Truth neither a *Tory*, nor a *Whig*, as I have said above, but a *Court* and a *Country Party* in Being; if the political Principles, which the *Dissenters* have formerly avow'd, are manifestly pursued on *one Side*; and Those, which they have opposed, or others equivalent to them in their Effects, are pursued on the *other*; can the *Dissenters* hesitate about the Option they are to make? I am persuaded they cannot. I know that several amongst them do not. What might be, and certainly would be said, if they made their Option to stand by the *M———r*, I will not so much as suggest. What must be the Conquence of their standing by the *Nation*, in Opposition to *Him*, (for between *these two Powers* the present Contest lies) it is easy to tell, and impossible to deny. They will prove, in this Case, to the whole World, that the *Spirit of Liberty* animates, and *Conscience* alone determines their Conduct. They, who could never brook a *Regal*, will have the Merit of saving their Country from the Danger of a *Ministerial Tyranny*; and the

their Country will owe them all the Acknowledgments, which are due from good and grateful Citizens of the ſame Commonwealth.

As to the other great and national Diviſion of *Whig* and *Tory*; He, who recollects what hath paſs'd in *Parliament*, and obſerves what paſſes out of it, can differ very little in his Opinion from what hath been ſaid concerning it. The principle Articles of *your civil Faith*, publiſh'd ſome time ago, (or, to ſpeak more properly, the *civil Faith of the old Whigs*) are aſſented and conſented to by the *Country Party*; and I ſay, upon good Authority, that if *this Creed* was made a Teſt of *political Orthodoxy*, there would appear at this Time but very few *Hereticks* amongſt us. How different the Caſe is, on the *other Side*, will appear not only from the Actions, but from the Principles of the *Court Party*, as we find them avow'd in their Writings; Principles more dangerous to *Liberty*, though not ſo directly, nor ſo openly levell'd againſt it, than even any of Thoſe, bad as they were, which *ſome of theſe Men* value Themſelves for having formerly oppoſed.

In ſhort, the *Revolution* is look'd upon by all Sides as a *new Æra*; but the *Settlement* then made is look'd upon by the whole *Country Party* as a *new Magna Charta*, from whence *new Intereſts*, *new Principles of Government*, *new Meaſures of Submiſſion*, and *new Obligations* ariſe. From thence We muſt date both *King* and *People*. His Majeſty derives his Title from *Acts*, made in Conſequence of it. We likewiſe derive, not our Privileges (for they were always ours) but a more full and explicit Declaration, and a more ſolemn Eſtabliſhment of them from the ſame Period. On this Foundation all the *reaſonable*, *Independent Whigs and Tories* unite. They could unite on This alone; for the *Whigs* have always profeſs'd the Principles, which

 paved

paved the Way for the *Revolution*; and whatever the *Tories* may have profess'd, they acted upon the same Principles, or they acted upon none, which would be too absurd to assert, when they brought about that great Event, in Concert with the rest of the Nation, as I shall some Time or other prove.

To this *Magna Charta*, and *these Principles*, let us adhere inviolably, in Opposition to the *two Extremes* mention'd by Me at the Beginning of this Letter, viz. to *Those*, who *disown* them, and to *Those*, who *betray* them.——Let neither the polemical Skill of *Lesly*, nor the antique Erudition of *Bedford*, persuade us to put on again those old Shackles of *false Law*, *false Reason*, and *false Gospel*, which were forged before the *Revolution*, and broken to Pieces by it.———As little let us suffer the arch Slyness of *G—on*, the dogmatical Dryness of *H———e*, or the soucing Prostitution of *Sh—k* to slip new Shackles on us, which are inconsistent with the constituent Principles of our Establishment.———Let us maintain and improve the *national Union*, so happily begun, and bless God for disposing the Temper of the Nation almost universally to it.——*Such a Coalition* hath been long wanted in this Kingdom, and never more than at this important Crisis; for on This it will depend whether *They*, who not only oppose the Progress of that *growing Corruption*, which had well nigh overspread the Land, but endeavour to extirpate it by the Roots, shall prevail; or *They*, who nourish and propagate it, who eat Themselves, and tempt othert to eat the baneful Fruit it bears.———On This it will depend whether *They* shall prevail, who constantly insist against the Continuance of a *standing Army in Time of Peace*, agreeably to the Principles of our *Constitution*; or *They*, who plead for it, and endeavour to make it a necessary Part of

that

that Conſtitution, though incompatible with *publick Liberty*.——On This it will depend whether *They* ſhall prevail, who endeavour to conceal the *Frauds*, which are practiſed, and to ſcreen the *Fraudulent*, at the Riſque of ruining *Credit*, and deſtroying *Trade*, as well as to monopolize in the Hands of a *Few* the whole Wealth of the *Nation*; or *They*, who do their utmoſt to bring the *former* to Light, and the *latter* to Puniſhment at a Time, when *glaring Fraud*, or very ſtrong Symptoms of *Fraud*, appear in ſo many Parts of publick Management, from ſome of the *greateſt Companies* down to the *Turnpike* at *Hyde-Park* Corner.———On This it will depend whether *They* ſhall prevail, who deſire that *Great Britain* ſhould maintain ſuch a Dignity and prudent Reſerve in the Broils of *Europe*, as become her Situation, ſuit her Intereſt, and alone can enable Her to caſt the *Ballance*; or *They*, who are eager, on every Occaſion, to proſtitute her *Dignity*, to pawn her *Purſe*, and to ſacrifice her *Commerce*, by intangling Her not only too much with the *other great Powers of Europe*, from whom She may ſometimes want reciprocal Engagements, but even with *thoſe diminutive Powers*, from whom it would be ridiculous to expect any.

I am, SIR, Yours, &c.

LETTER II.

SIR,

WHILST I was writing my laſt Letter to You, it came into my Thoughts that nothing would illuſtrate the Subject better, nor enforce more ſtrongly the Exhortation to an *Union of Parties*, in Support of that Conſtitution, on the Terms of

which alone all Right to govern us, and all our Obligation to obey is now founded, than an Enquiry into the Rise and Progress of our *late Parties*; or a short History of *Torism* and *Whiggism* from their Cradle to their Grave; with an introductory Account of their Genealogy and Descent.

Your Papers have been from the first consecrated to the Information of the People of *Britain*; and I think they may boast very justly a Merit singular enough; That of never speaking to the Passions, without appealing to the Reason of Mankind. It is fit they should keep up this Character, in the strictest Manner, whilst they are employ'd on the most important Subject, and publish'd at the most important Crisis. I shall therefore execute my Design with Sincerity and Impartiality. I shall certainly not flatter, and I do not mean to offend. Reasonable Men and Lovers of Truth, in whatever Party they have been engaged, will not be offended at Writings, which claim no Regard but on this Account, that they are founded in Reason and Truth, and speak with Boldness what Reason and Truth conspire to dictate. As for the *Drummers and Trumpeters of Faction*, who are hired to drown the Voice of Both in one perpetual Din of Clamour, and would endeavour to drown, in the same Manner, even the dying Groans of their Country, if She was already brought into that extreme Condition; They shall not provoke Me to break a most contemptuous Silence. The Subject is too solemn. They may prophane it, by writing on it. Far be from me to become guilty of the same Crime, by answering Them.

If the Enquiry I am going to make into the Rise and Progress of our *late Parties* should produce in any Degree the Good, which I intend, it will help to confirm and improve the *national Union*, so happily

pily begun, by taking off ſome Remains of Shyneſs, Diſtruſt and Prejudice, which may ſtill hang about Men, who think alike, and who preſs on from different Quarters to the ſame common Point of View. It will help to unmask more effectually the wicked Conduct of Thoſe, who labour with all the Skill and, which is much more conſiderable, with all the Authority They poſſeſs, to keep up the *Diviſion of Parties*; that each of Theſe may continue to be, in its Turn, what all of them have been too often and too long, the Inſtruments and the Victims of private Ambition. It will do ſomething more. A few Reflections on the Riſe and Progreſs of our Diſtemper, and the Riſe and Progreſs of our Cure, will help us of Courſe to make a true Judgment on our preſent State, and will point out to us, better perhaps than any other Method, the ſpecifick Remedies ſtill neceſſary to preſerve our Conſtitution in Health and Vigour.——Having premiſed This, I come to the Point.

Queen *Elizabeth* deſign'd, and the Nation call'd King *James* to the Throne, tho' the whole *Scotiſh Line* had been excluded by the Will of *Henry* the 8*th*, made indeed under the Authority of *an Act of Parliament*, and yet little regarded either by the *Parliament*, or the *People*. As ſoon as He was on the Throne, a flattering *Act of Recognition* paſs'd; for though all Princes are flatter'd on their firſt Acceſſion, yet thoſe Princes are ſure to be flatter'd moſt, who deſerve Panegyrick leaſt. In *this Act* the *Parliament* acknowledged, *on the Knees of their Hearts*, (ſuch was the Cant of the Age) the *indubitable Right*, by which they declared that the Crown *deſcended to Him immediately*, on the Deceaſe of Q. *Elizabeth*. Of *this Act*, and of the Uſe, which ſome Men, very weakly I think, endeavour'd to make of it, I ſhall have Occaſion to ſpeak hereafter. I would

would only obſerve here that This is the *Æra* of *hereditary Right*, and of all thoſe exalted Notions, concerning the *Power* and *Prerogative of Kings*, and the *Sacredneſs of their Perſons*. All together They compoſed ſuch a Syſtem of Abſurdity as had never been heard of in this Country, till *that anointed Pedant* broach'd them. They have been ſpoken of pretty much at large in your Papers; particularly in ſome of Thoſe, publiſh'd under the Name of *Oldcaſtle*. To them I refer.

To aſſert that the extravagant Principles of *Eccleſiaſtical* and *Civil Government*, which began to be propagated in *this Reign*, and were carried ſtill higher in the *next*, gave Occaſion to Thoſe of *another Kind*, or of *another Extreme*, which were taught with Succeſs, and gain'd by Degrees great Vogue in the Nation, would be too much. Opinions very different from Thoſe, which received the Sanction of a *legal Eſtabliſhment in Church and State*, had crept about obſcurely, if not ſilently, even whilſt the Government of *Elizabeth* laſted. But This I ſay; that the Principles, by which King *James* and King *Charles* the *1ſt* govern'd, and the Exceſſes of *Hierarchical* and *Monarchical Power*, exerciſed in Conſequence of them, gave great Advantage to the *oppoſite Opinions*, and intirely occaſion'd the Miſeries which follow'd. Phrenzy provoked Phrenzy, and two Species of Madneſs infected the whole Maſs of the People. It hath coſt us a Century to loſe our Wits, and to recover them again.

If our Grievances under King *Charles* the *1ſt* had been redreſs'd by a ſober, regular, Parliamentary Reformation of the State; or, if the civil War happening, a new Government had been eſtabliſh'd on Principles of the Conſtitution, not of Faction, of Liberty, not of Licentiouſneſs, as there was on the Abdication of King *James* the *2d*; We may conclude,

clude, both from Reaſon and Experience, that the abſurd and ſlaviſh Doctrines I have mention'd would have been exploded early. They would have been buried in the recent Grave of *Him*, who firſt deviſed them; and the Memory of *Him* and of *Them* would have ſtunk together in the Noſtrils of Mankind. But the Contrary fell out. The State was ſubverted, inſtead of being reform'd; and all the Fury of Faction and Enthuſiaſm was employ'd to deſtroy the Conſtitution to the very Foundations. A natural Conſequence follow'd. If the Principles of King *James*'s and King *Charles*'s Reigns had been diſgraced by better, they would not have riſen again; but they were only kept down for a Time by worſe; and therefore they roſe again at the *Reſtoration*, and revived with the Monarchy. Thus that epidemical Taint, with which King *James* infected the Minds of Men, continued upon us; and it is ſcarce hyperbolical to ſay, that *this Prince* hath been the original Cauſe of a Series of Misfortunes to this Nation, as deplorable as a laſting Infection of our Air, of our Water, or our Earth, would have been. The Spirit of his Reign was maintain'd in That of his *Son*, (for how could it well be otherwiſe, when the *ſame Miniſters* were continued in Power?) and the Events of both produced the civil War. The civil War ended in the Death of the King, and the Exile of his Family. The Exile of theſe Princes reconciled Them to the Religion of *Rome*, and to the Politicks of *foreign Nations*, in ſuch Degrees as their different Characters admitted. *Charles* ſipp'd a little of the poiſonous Draught, but enough however to infect his whole Conduct. As for *James*,

——*Ille impiger hauſit*
Spumantem Pateram.

He

He drank the Chalice off to the lowest and foulest Dregs.

That *Principles* as absurd as these in their Nature, and as terrible in their Consequences, such as would shock the common Sense of a *Samojede*, or an *Hottentot*, and had just before deluged the Nation in Blood, should come into Vogue again at the *Restoration*, will not appear strange to Those, who carry themselves back as it were to that Point of Time. The Wounds of the *civil War* were bleeding, and the Resentments of the *Cavaliers*, who came into Power at Court and in Parliament, were at their Height. No Wonder then if few Men had, in such a Ferment as This, Penetration enough to discern, or Candour enough to acknowledge, or Courage enough to maintain, that the *Principles* We speak of were truly and primarily the Cause of all their Misfortunes. The Events, which proved them so, were recent; but for that very Reason, because they were recent, it was natural for Men in such a Circumstance as This, to make wrong Judgments about them. It was natural for the *Royal Party* to ascribe all their and their Country's Misfortunes, without any due Distinction to the *Principles*, on which King *Charles* and even King *James* had been opposed; and to grow more zealous for *Those*, on which the Governments of *these two Princes* had been defended, and for which they had suffer'd. Add to This the national Transport, on so great a Revolution; the Excess of Joy, which many felt, and many feign'd; the Adulation employ'd by many to acquire new Merit, and by many to atone for past Demerit; and you will find Reason to be surprised, not that the *same Principles of Government*, as had threaten'd our *Liberties* once, and must by necessary Consequence do so again, were establish'd; but

but that our *Liberties* were not immediately, and at once given up. That they were ſaved, We owe, not to *Parliament*, no not to the *Convention Parliament*, who brought the King Home; but to thoſe great and good Men, *Clarendon* and *Southampton*. Far from taking Advantage of the Heat and Fervour of the Times, to manage Parliaments into *ſcandalous Jobs*, and *fatal Compliances with the Crown*, to their immortal Honour, (with Gratitude and Reverence to their Memories be it ſpoken) They broke the *Army*, ſtinted the *Revenue*, and threw their Maſter on the *Affections of his People*.—But I return.

Beſides theſe Reaſons, drawn from the Paſſions of Men, others of a more ſober Kind may be given, to account for the making a Settlement at the *Reſtoration* upon Principles too near a-kin to Thoſe, which had prevail'd before the War, and which had in Truth cauſed it. Certain it is, that although the *Non Conformiſts* were ſtun'd by the Blow they had juſt received, and though their Violence was reſtrain'd by the Force of the preſent Conjuncture; yet they ſtill exiſted. Symptoms of This appear'd, even whilſt the Government was ſettling, and continued to appear long after it was ſettled. Now, every Symptom of this Kind renew'd the *Dread* of relapſing into thoſe Miſeries, from which the Nation had ſo lately recover'd itſelf; and *this Dread* had the natural Effect of all extreme Fears. It hurried Men into every Principle, as well as Meaſure, which ſeem'd the moſt oppoſite to thoſe of the *Perſons fear'd*, and the moſt likely, though at any other Riſque, to defeat their Deſigns, and to obviate the preſent Danger, real or imaginary. May We not fairly conjecture, for it is but Conjecture, ſomething more? In ſuch a Temper of Mind, and ſuch a Situation of Circumſtances,

 might

might not even Thoſe, who ſaw how groundleſs and dangerous ſuch extravagant Notions about the *Right*, *Power* and *Prerogative of Kings* were, imagine however that it was a Part of Prudence to give Way to them, and to countenance them, in the preſent Conjuncture; to ſuffer the Opinions of the Nation to be bent too far on *one Side*, as they had been bent too far on the *other*; not that they might remain crooked, but that they might become ſtrait?

The ſame Spirit and much the ſame Reaſons as determined our Settlement, at the *Reſtoration*, upon ſuch high Principles of *Monarchy*, prevail'd relatively to our *religious Differences*, and the Settlement of the *Church*. I ſhall ſpeak of it with that Freedom, which a Man may take, who is conſcious that He means nothing but the publick Good, hath no Bye-Ends, nor is under the Influence of ſerving any particular Cauſe.

I ſay then very frankly that the *Church* and the *King* having been join'd in all the late Conteſts both by Thoſe, who attack'd them, and Thoſe, who defended them, *Eccleſiaſtical Intereſts*, *Reſentments*, and *Animoſities* came in to the Aid of *Secular*, in making the *new Settlement*. Great Lenity was ſhewn at the Reſtoration, in *looking backwards*; unexampled and unimitated Mercy to particular Men, which deſerved no doubt much Applauſe. This Conduct would have gone far towards reſtoring the Nation to its *primitive Temper* and *Integrity*, to its *old good Manners*, its *old good Humour*, and its *old good Nature*, (Expreſſions of my Lord Chancellor *Clarendon*, which I could never read without being moved and ſoften'd) if great Severity had not been exerciſed, immediately after, in *looking forwards*, and great Rigour uſed to large Bodies of Men, which certainly deſerve Cenſure, as neither juſt, nor politick.———I ſay, not *juſt*;

because

becauſe there is, after all, a real and wide Difference between *Moral* and *Party Juſtice*. The *one* is founded in Reaſon; the *other* takes its Colour from the Paſſions of Men, and is but another Name for *Injuſtice*. *Moral Juſtice* carries Puniſhment as far as Reparation, and neceſſary Terror require; no farther. *Party Juſtice* carries it to the full Extent of our Power, and even to the gorging and ſating of our Revenge; from whence it follows that *Injuſtice* and *Violence*, once begun, muſt become perpetual in the ſucceſſive Revolutions of *Parties*, as long as *theſe Parties* exiſt.——I ſay, not *politick*; becauſe it contradicted the other Meaſures, taken for quieting the Minds of Men. It alarm'd all the *Sects* anew; confirm'd the Implacibility, and whetted the Rancour of *Some*; diſappointed and damp'd a Spirit of Reconciliation in *Others*; united Them in a common Hatred to the *Church*; and rouzed in the *Church* a Spirit of Intolerance and Perſecution. This Meaſure was the more imprudent, becauſe the Opportunity ſeem'd fair to take Advantage of the Reſentments of the *Presbyterians* againſt the *other Sectaries*, and to draw *Them*, without perſecuting the *Others*, by the Cords of Love into the Pale of the Church, inſtead of driving them back by ſevere Uſage into their antient Confederacies. But when Reſentments of the *Sort* We now mention were let looſe, to aggravate Thoſe of the *other Sort*, there was no Room to be ſurprized at the Violences, which follow'd; and They, who had acted greater, could not complain of Theſe, great as they were, with any very good Grace.

If we may believe * *One*, who certainly was not partial againſt *theſe Sects*, *both* Presbyterians

* *Dr.* Burnet, *afterwards Biſhop of* Salisbury, *in one of his Tracts.*

and Independents *had carried the Principles of Rigour, in the Point of Conſcience, much higher, and acted more implacably upon it, than ever the* Church of England *hath done, in its angrieſt Fits.* The ſecuring Themſelves therefore againſt *Thoſe*, who had ruin'd Them and the Conſtitution once already, was a plauſible Reaſon for the *Church Party* to give, and I doubt not the true and ſole Motive of many for exerciſing, and perſiſting in the Exerciſe of great Severity. General, prudential Arguments might, and there is Reaſon to believe they did, weigh with particular Men; but they could have little Force, at ſuch a Time, on Numbers. As little could ſome other Conſiderations have then whatever they have now. The Promiſes at *Breda*, for Inſtance, and the Terms of the *Declaration* ſent from thence, could not be urged with Force to a *Parliament*, who had no Mind, and was ſtrictly under no Obligation, to make good ſuch Promiſes as the *King* had made, beyond his Power of promiſing, if taken abſolutely; or from which, if taken conditionally, He was diſcharged, on the Refuſal of *Parliament* to confirm them. ——Thus again, the Merit pleaded by the *Preſbyterians*, on Account of the Share They had in the *Reſtoration*, which was very real and very conſiderable, could avail however but little. That they went along with the national Torrent, in reſtoring the Conſtitution of Church and State, could not be denied. But then it was remember'd too that theſe Fruits of Repentance came late; not till They had been oppreſs'd by *another Sect*, who turn'd upon Them, wreſted the Power out of their Hands, and made them feel, what They had made others feel, the Tyranny of a *Party*.

Such Reaſons and Motives, as I have mention'd, prevail'd; and worſe than theſe would have

have been ſufficient, when the Paſſions of Men ran ſo high, to lay the *Diſſenters*, without any Diſtinction, under extreme Hardſhips. They ſeem'd to be the principal Object of the Fears and Jealouſies of *Parliament*. Addreſſes were continually made, and the Edge of the Law continually whetted againſt Them, from 1660 to 1669, when the Law *for ſuppreſſing Conventicles*, and the *laſt of theſe penal Statutes* paſs'd, as I remember. Experience will juſtify Me for ſaying that this long and extreme Rigour was unwiſe, as well as unjuſt. It appears, indeed, from the Memorials of thoſe Times, that They, who ſuffer'd, had given abundant Provocation, though not ſufficient Excuſe, to the Rigour, under which They ſuffer'd. Some former Hardſhips, which the *Diſſenters* had endured from the *Church*, made Them more violent againſt it, when They got Poſſeſſion of an uſurp'd Power. Juſt ſo the Violence, which *They* exerciſed at that Time, ſtimulated the Severity They felt in their Turn, when the legal Conſtitution of the *Church* was reſtored. Notwithſtanding all which, I incline, upon very good Reaſons, to think that this Severity was not in the firſt Deſign of the *Miniſters*, nor would have been ſhewn, if *another fatal Influence* had not prevail'd The Influence I mean is That of *Popery*. It prevail'd from the firſt Moments to the laſt of the Reign of King *Charles* the *2d*. The *beſt Miniſters* were frequently driven off their Byaſs by it. The *worſt* had a ſure Hold on their *Maſter*, by complying with it. On the Occaſion now mention'd, *this Influence* and the Artifice of the *Popiſh Faction* work'd very fatally on the Paſſions of *Parties*, and the private Intereſts of *Individuals*; and the *Miniſters*, and the *Church*, and the *Diſſenters*, were Bubbles alike of their *common Enemy*. *Barefaced Popery* could ask no Favour,

Favour, becauſe *Popery* could expect none. *Proteſtant Diſſenters* were therefore to ſerve as ſtalking Horſes, that *Papiſts* might creep behind Them, and have Hopes of being, ſome Time or other, admitted with Them. The *Church Party* was halloo'd on the *Diſſenters*; whilſt the *Diſſenters* were encouraged to unite and hold out; whilſt They were flatter'd with an high Opinion of their own Strength, and the King's Favour; and whilſt ſome *leading Men* amongſt Them, who thought it better to be at the Head of a *Sect*, than at the Tail of an *Eſtabliſhment*, were perhaps encouraged, and confirm'd in that Thought, by the private Applications of the *Court*.

Theſe Arts, theſe wicked Arts (for ſuch they were) prevail'd; and though the 2000 *Miniſters*, who went out of their Churches on one Day, were far from being all of the ſame Mind, or having one poſitive, conſiſtent Scheme; though many of Them muſt have loſt their Benefices, even if They had comply'd with the *Act of Uniformity*, becauſe They were *Intruders*, and in actual Poſſeſſion of Benefices legally belonging to *Others*; yet, by uniting in the Point of *Non-Conformity*, They appear'd as *one Body*, and in ſome Senſe They were ſo. Several of Them were popular for certain Modes of Devotion, ſuited to the Humour of the Time; and ſeveral were Men eminent for true Learning and unaffected Piety. They increaſed the Zeal of their Flocks, and created Compaſſion in others. Here the *Court* began to reap the Fruits of their Management, in the Struggle for a *Toleration*. I uſe the Word, though I know it may be ſimply cavill'd at. The firſt Step made was an Application to the *King*, who declared Himſelf ready and willing to *diſpenſe*, in their Favour, with ſeveral Things in the *Act of Uniformity*; and thus the *Diſſenters* were made, by the Severity of the *Parliament*

liament and the Intrigues of the *Court*, the Instruments of introducing a *dispensing Power*. Such Attempts were made more than once; but happily fail'd, as often as made, through the vigorous Opposition of *Parliament*; till at last the Scene began to open more, and the *Dissenters* to see that They were made the Tools of promoting, what they never intended, the Advancement of the *Prerogative* above *Law*, and the Toleration of *Popery* against it.

To conclude. By such Means, as I have described, the Constitution of *Parties* after the *Restoration* preserved unhappily too near a Resemblance to the Constitution of *Parties*, before the *War*. The *Prerogative* was not, indeed, carried so high, in some Instances, as *James* and *Charles* the 1*st* had attempted to carry it. Nay, some Supports of it were brought off, and taken away; and others more dangerous, as We have observed, were prevented by the Virtue of the *Men at that Time in Power*. But still the Government was establish'd on *Principles*, sufficient to invite a King to exercise *arbitrary Power*, and support Him by their Consequences in the Exercise of it afterwards; so that, in this Respect, the Seeds of *future Divisions* were sow'd abundantly. The *Dissenters* had, indeed, lost much of their Credit and all their Power. But still they had Numbers, and Property, and Industry, and Compassion for Them; so that here was another Crop of *Dissentions* planted to nurse up, and to strengthen the other. They did not inflame the Contest, which follow'd, into a civil War, as they had help'd to do formerly; but I think that, without them, and the Disunion and Hatred among *Protestants*, consequent upon them, the Zeal against *Popery* could not have run into a Kind of *factious Fury*, as We shall be obliged to confess it did. I think that Fears of falling once more

more under *Presbyterian*, or *Republican Power*, could not have been wrought up in the Manner they were, towards the End of this Reign, so as to drown even the Fear of *Popery* itself; so as to form a Party, in Favour of a *Popish Successor*; so as to transport both Clergy and Laity into an Avowal of *Principles*, which must have reduced us to be at this Time *Slaves*, not *Freemen*, *Papists*, not *Protestants*, if the very Men, who had avow'd such *Principles*, had not saved themselves and us, in direct Opposition to them.——But I am running into the Subject of another Letter, when This is grown too prolix already.

I am, SIR, Yours, &c.

LETTER III.

SIR,

THE Sum of what hath been said, concerning the *Settlement of Church and State*, and the *Division of Parties*, at the *Restoration*, amounts to This; that as the Attempts of King *James* and King *Charles* the *1st*, against the Spirit of the Constitution, threw the Nation into a civil War, and all the miserable Consequences, both necessary, and contingent, of that Calamity; so the Fury, Enthusiasm and Madness of *those Factions*, which arose during that unnatural Ferment, frighten'd the Nation back, if not into all, yet more generally perhaps than before, into most of the *Notions*, that were establish'd to justify the Excesses of former Reigns. *Hereditary, indefeizable*

Right

Right, *Passive Obedience* and *Non-Resistance* (those Corner-stones, which are an improper Foundation for any Superstructure but That of Tyranny,) were made, even by *Parliament*, the Foundation of the *Monarchy*; and all those, who declined an exact and strict Conformity to the whole Establishment of the *Church*, even to the most minute Parts of it, were deprived of the Protection, nay exposed to the Prosecution of the *State*. Thus *one Part of the Nation* stood proscribed by the *other*; the *least*, indeed, by the *greatest*; whereas a little before the *greatest* stood proscribed by the *least*. *Round head* and *Cavalier* were, in Effect, no more. *Whig* and *Tory* were not yet in Being. The only two apparent Parties were those of *Churchmen* and *Dissenters*; and *religious Differences* alone, at this Time, maintain'd the Distinction.

Such was the State of *Party*, upon the Meeting of the *first Parliament* call'd by King *Charles* the 2*d*, and for some Years afterwards, as nearly as I have been able to observe by what I have read in History, and received from Tradition.—— How the *Notions* then in Vogue began to change, and *this Spirit* to decline, some Time after the *Restoration*; how the Zeal of *Churchmen* and *Dissenters* against one another began to soften, and a *Court* and *Country Party* to form themselves; how *Faction* mingled itself again in the Contest, and renew'd the former Resentments and Jealousies; how *Whig* and *Tory* arose, the furious Off-spring of those inauspicious Parents *Roundhead* and *Cavalier*; how the Proceedings of *one Party* might have thrown us back into a *civil War*, *Confusion* and *Anarchy*; how the Success of the *other* had like to have entail'd *Tyranny* on the State, and *Popery* in the Church; how the *Revolution* did, and could alone, deliver us from the *Grievances*

We felt, and from the *Dangers* We fear'd; how *this great Event* was brought about by a formal Departure of *each Side* from the Principles objected to Them by the *other*; how *this Renewal of our Conſtitution*, on the Principles of *Liberty*, by the moſt ſolemn, deliberate, national Act, that ever was made, did not only bind at leaſt every one of thoſe, who concur'd in any Degree to bring it about; (and that Deſcription includes almoſt the whole Nation) but how abſurd it is for any Man, who was born ſince *that Æra*, or who, being born before it, hath been bound by no particular, legal Tye to any *other Settlement*, to be willing to give up the Advantages of the *preſent Conſtitution*, any more than He would give up the Privileges of the *great Charter*, which was made and ratified ſo many Ages ago; all theſe Points are to be now touch'd in that ſummary Manner, which I have preſcribed to Myſelf, and which will be ſufficient, in ſo plain a Caſe, where Men are to be reminded of what they know already, rather than to be inform'd, and to be confirm'd, not to be convinced.

I proceed therefore to obſerve that the Nation began to be indiſpoſed to the *Court*, ſoon after the *Reſtoration*. The Sale of *Dunkirk* help'd to ruin a *great* and *good Miniſter*, though it be ſtill doubtful at leaſt, notwithſtanding the Clamour raiſed, and the Negotiations with *d'Eſtrades* ſo much inſiſted upon, whether He was ſtrictly anſwerable for this Meaſure.———Who knows how ſoon the Re-eſtabliſhment of the *ſame Port and Harbour* may be laid in Form to the Charge of *thoſe two Men*, who are ſtrictly and undeniably anſwerable for it, and who ſtagger already under the Weight of ſo many other juſt Imputations?

The

The *first Dutch War*, which was lightly and rashly undertaken, and which ended ignominiously for the Nation, augmented the publick Indisposition. Nay Misfortunes, such as the *Plague* and the *Burning of London*, as well as *Mismanagement*, had this Effect. But We must place at the Head of all a *Jealousy of Popery*, which was well founded, and therefore gather'd Strength daily. This soon heated the Minds of Men to such a Degree, that it seems almost wonderful the Plague was not imputed to the *Papists*, as peremptorily as the Fire.

The Death of my Lord *Southampton*, and the Disgrace and Banishment of my Lord *Clarendon*, made Room for new Causes of Jealousy and Dissatisfaction; and the Effects increased in proportion. *These two noble Lords* had stood in the Breach against *Popery* and *foreign Politicks*; and what *one* of them said of the *other*, That is *Southampton* of *Clarendon*, may be apply'd with Justice to *Both*. *They were* true Protestants, *and* honest Englishmen. *Whilst They were in Place, our Laws, our Religion, and our Liberties were in Safety. When They were removed*, England *felt the ill Effects of the Change*; for when They were removed, all These were in Danger. How glorious a Panegyrick is This, in which the unanimous Voice of Posterity does and must agree! It is preferable surely to all the Titles and Honours and Estates, which those *illustrious Patriots* left behind them; and so I persuade Myself it is esteem'd by the *young Noblemen*, who are Heirs to their Virtues, as well as their Fortunes.

King *Charles*, and more than Him the *Duke* and the *Popish Faction* were now at Liberty to form new Schemes; or rather to pursue old ones, with less Reserve, against the Religion and Liberty of *England*. As soon as the famous *Cabal*

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had the whole Adminiſtration of Affairs, theſe Deſigns were puſh'd almoſt without any Reſerve at all.———I am not writing the Hiſtory of this Reign; nor have I undertaken any thing more than to make a few Obſervations on the ſeveral Turns of Parties in it. I need not therefore deſcend into particular Proofs of the Deſigns, which I attribute to the *Court*; nor into a Deduction of the Meaſures taken to promote them, and the Efforts made to defeat them. That theſe Deſigns were real, can be doubted of by no Man; ſince without quoting many printed Accounts, which are in the Hands of every one, or inſiſting on other Proofs, which have not ſeen the Light, (and ſuch there are) the Abbot *Primi*'s Relation of the ſecret Negotiations between the *King* and his *Siſter*, the Dutcheſs of *Orleans*, publiſh'd in 1682, as I think, and immediately ſuppreſs'd, as well as the Hiſtory of the Jeſuit *d'Orleans*, written on Memorials furniſh'd to Him by King *James* the 2*d*, put the whole Matter out of Diſpute, and even beyond the Reach of Cavil. It is ſufficient for my Purpoſe to obſerve that the Tide of Party, which had run ſo ſtrongly for the *Court*, and had been ſeldom ſo much as ſlacken'd hitherto, began now to turn, and to run Year after Year more ſtrongly the *other Way*.

When *this Parliament* ſate down, (for it deſerves our particular Obſervation that *both Houſes* were full of Zeal for the *preſent Government*, and of Reſentment againſt the *late Uſurpations*) there was but one Party in Parliament; and no other Party could raiſe its Head in the Nation. This might have been the Caſe much longer, probably as long as King *Charles* had ſate on the Throne, if the *Court* had been a little honeſter, or a little wiſer. No Parliament ever did more to gain their

their Prince than This. They seem'd, for several Years to have nothing so much at Heart as securing his Government, advancing his Prerogative, and filling his Coffers. The Grants they made Him were such as pass'd for Instances of Profusion in those Days; when 1,2 0,000 l. a *Year for the* CIVIL LIST, *the* FLEET, *the* GUARDS *and* GARRISONS, *and all the ordinary Expences of the Government*, was thought an exorbitant Sum; how little a Figure soever it would make in our Times, when *two Thirds of that Sum*, at least, are appropriated to the Use of the *Civil List singly*. But all This was to no Purpose; a *foreign Interest* prevail'd; a *Cabal* govern'd; and sometimes the *Cabal*, and sometimes a *Prime-Minister* had more Credit with the *King*, than the *whole Body of his People*. When the Parliament saw that They could not gain Him over to his own, and to their common Interest; nor prevail on Him, by Connivance, Compliance, and other gentle Methods; They turn'd Themselves to such as were rough, but agreeable to Law and the Custom of Parliament, as well as proportionable to the Greatness of the Exigency. That they lost their Temper, on some particular Occasions, must not be denied. They were Men, and therefore frail; but their Frailties, of this Kind, proceeded from their Love of their Country. They were transported, when They found that their *Religion* and *Liberty* were constantly in Danger from the Intrigues of a *Popish Faction*; and They would have been so transported, no Doubt, if *Liberty* alone had been attack'd by a *Protestant Faction*. Then it was, that this *High-Church* Parliament grew favourable to *Protestant Dissenters*, and ready to make that just Distinction, so long delay'd, between *Them* and *Popish Recusants*, that the *whole* Protestant *Interest*

tereſt might unite in the Common Cauſe. Then it was, that this Prerogative Parliament defied Prerogative, in Defence of their own Privileges, and of the *Liberties of their Country.* Then it was, that this *Paſſive-Obedience* and *Non-Reſiſtance Parliament* went the utmoſt Lengths of *Reſiſtance*, in a *Parliamentary Way*; and the neceſſary Conſequence of the Steps They made, *in this Way*, muſt have been *Reſiſtance in another*, if the King had not dropt his Miniſters, retracted his Pretenſions, redreſs'd *ſome* and given Expectation of redreſſing *other Grievances.* In fine, this *Penſioner-Parliament*, as it hath been ſtyled, with *ſome Corruption* in the Houſe, and an *Army* ſometimes at the Door of it, disbanded the *Army* in *England*, and proteſted againſt the *Militia*, ſettled in *Scotland* by Act of Parliament, and appointed to march *for any Service, wherein the King's Honour, Authority and Greatneſs were concern'd, in Obedience to the Orders of the* Privy-Council. That I may not multiply particular Inſtances, They not only did their utmoſt to ſecure their Country againſt immediate Danger, but projected to ſecure it againſt remote Danger, by an Excluſion of the Duke of *York* from the Crown, after They had endeavour'd ſtrenuouſly, but in vain, to prevent his entailing *Popery* more eaſily upon us by his Marriage with a *Popiſh Princeſs*; for he had declared himſelf a *Papiſt* with as much Affectation, as if He expected to grow popular by it; had already begun to approve his Zeal, and exerciſe his Talent in Converſions, by That of his *firſt Wife*; and was notoriouſly the Agent of *Rome* and *France*, in order to ſeduce his *Brother* into ſtronger Meaſures than King *Charles* was willing to take. King *Charles*, to uſe an Expreſſion of the Lord *Halifax* of that Age, would *trot*; but his *Brother* would *gallop.*

When

When I reflect on the Particulars here mention'd, and a great many others, which might be mention'd to the Honour of this Parliament, I cannot hear it call'd the *Pensioner-Parliament*, as it were by Way of Eminence, without a Degree of honest Indignation; especially in the *Age*, in which We live, and by some of *Those*, who affect the most to bestow upon it this ignominious Appellation. *Pensions* indeed, to the Amount of *seven or eight thousand Pounds*, as I remember, were discover'd to have been given to some Members of the *House of Commons*. But then let it be remember'd likewise, that this Expedient of *corrupting Parliaments* began under the Administration of that boisterous, over-bearing, dangerous Minister, CLIFFORD. As long as there remain'd any Pretence to say that the *Court* was in the Interest of the *People*, the Expedient of *Bribery* was neither wanted, nor practised. When the *Court* was evidently in *another Interest*, the Necessity and the Practice of *Bribing the Representatives of the People* commenced. Should a *Parliament of Britain* act in Complyance with the *Court*, against the Sense and Interest of the *Nation*, Mankind would be ready to pronounce very justly that *such a Parliament* was under the *corrupt Influence of the Court*. But, in the Case now before us, We have a very comfortable Example of a *Court* wicked enough to stand in Need of *Corruption*, and to employ it; and of a Parliament virtuous enough to resist the Force of *this Expedient*; which *Philip* of *Macedon* boasted that He employ'd to invade the *Liberties* of *other Countries*; and which had been so often employ'd by Men of less Genius as well as Rank, to invade the Liberties of *their own*. All, that *Corruption* could do in *this Parliament*, was to maintain the Appearance of a *Court-Party*, whilst

whilst the Measures of the *Court* united a *Country Party*, in Opposition to Them. Neither Places, nor Pensions could hinder *Courtiers* in this Parliament from voting, on many signal Occasions, against the *Court*; nor protect either *Those*, who drew the *King* into ill Measures, nor *Those*, who comply'd with Him in them. Nay, this *Pensioner-Parliament*, if it must be still call'd so, gave one Proof of *Independency*, besides That of contriving a *Test*, in 1675, *to purge their Members on Oath from all Suspicion of corrupt Influence*, which ought to wipe off this Stain from the most corrupt. They drove *one of their Pay-masters* out of Court, and impeach'd the *Other*, in the Fulness of his Power; even at a Time, when the *King* was so weak as to make, or so unhappy as to be forced to make, on Account of Pensions privately negotiated from *France*, the Cause of the *Crown* and the Cause of the *Minister* one, and to blend their Interests together.

What I have said to the Honour of the *long Parliament* is just; because in Fact the Proceedings of that Parliament were agreeable to the Representation I have given of Them. But now, if some severe Censor should appear, and insist that the Dame was *chaste*, only because She was not *enough tempted*; that more Pensions would have made more Pensioners; that much Money and little Prerogative is more dangerous to *Liberty* than much Prerogative and little Money; and that the *worst and weakest Minister* King *Charles* ever had might have been absolute in *this very Parliament*, whose Character I defend, if *such a Minister* had been able to inlist, with Places, Pensions and occasional Bribes, not a *slender Majority*, which the Defection of a Few might at any Time defeat, but such a *bulky Majority*, as might impose on itself;

itſelf; if any one, I ſay, ſhould refine in this Manner, and continue to inſiſt that *ſuch a Miniſter*, with *ſuch a Purſe*, would have ſtood his Ground, in the *Parliament* I ſpeak of, with how much Contempt and Indignation ſoever He might have been every where treated by the People; I ſhall not preſume to aſſert the contrary. It might have been ſo. Our Safety was owing as much, perhaps, to the *Poverty of the Court*, as to the *Virtue of the Parliament*. We might have loſt our *Liberties*. But then I would obſerve, before I conclude, that if This be true, the Preſervation of our *Religion* and *Liberty*, at that Time, was owing to theſe two Circumſtances; *firſt* that King *Charles* was not parſimonious, but ſquander'd on his Pleaſures what He might have employ'd to *corrupt this Parliament*; *ſecondly*, that the *Miniſters*, in that Reign, fingering no Money but the *Revenue*, *ordinary and extraordinary*, had no Opportunity to filch in the Pockets of every private Man, and to bribe the Bubbles very often with their own Money; as might be done now, when *Funding* hath been ſo long in Faſhion, and the *greateſt Miniſter* hath the Means of being the *greateſt Stockjobber*, did not the eminent Integrity of the *Miniſter*, and the approved Virtue of the *Age*, ſecure us from any ſuch Danger.

We have now brought the Deduction of *Parties* very near to the *Æra* of WHIG and TORY; into which the *Court* found Means to divide the Nation, and by this Diviſion to acquire in the Nation a Superiority, which had been attempted ineffectually, even by *Corruption in Parliament*.———But This I reſerve for another Letter, and am,

SIR, *Yours*, &c.

LETTER IV.

SIR,

THERE is a Paſſage in *Tully* ſo extreamely applicable to the miſchievous, but tranſitory Prevalence of *thoſe Principles of Government*, which King *James* the 1*ſt* imported into this Country, that ſince it occurs to my Memory, I cannot begin this Letter better than by quoting it to You, and making a ſhort Commentary on it, * *Opinionum Commenta delet Dies, Naturæ Judicia confirmat. Groundleſs Opinions are deſtroy'd, but rational Judgments, or the Judgments of Nature, are confirm'd by Time.* It is *Balbus*, who makes This Obſervation very properly, when He is about to prove the Exiſtence of a ſupreme Being. The ſame Obſervation might have been employ'd as properly, on other Occaſions, againſt *Balbus* himſelf; and the Truth of it might have been exemplified, by comparing the Paradoxes and ſuperſtitious Opinions of his *own Sect*, as well as the Tales of an *Hippocentaur*, or a *Chimæra*, with the eternal Truths of genuine Theiſm, and ſound Philoſophy. In ſhort, the Application of it might have been juſtly made then, and may be ſo now in numberleſs Inſtances, taken from the moſt important Subjects, on which the Thoughts of Men are exerciſed, or in which their Intereſt, as Men and Members of Society, are concern'd.

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* *L. 2. de Nat. Deor.*

The

The Authority of a *Sect*, and much more of a *State*, is able to inſpire, and *Habit* to confirm the moſt *abſurd Opinions*. Paſſion or Intereſt, can create *Zeal*. But nothing can give Stability and durable Uniformity to *Error*. Indolence, or Ignorance, may keep it floating, as it were, on the Surface of the Mind, and ſometimes hinder *Truth* from penetrating; or Force may maintain it in Profeſſion, when the Mind aſſents to it no longer. But *ſuch Opinions*, like human Bodies, tend to their Diſſolution from their Birth. They will be ſoon rejected in *Theory*, where Men can think, and in *Practice*, where men can act with Freedom. They maintain themſelves no longer, than the ſame Means of Seduction, which firſt introduced them, or the ſame Circumſtances, which firſt impoſed them, attend and continue to ſupport them. Men are drag'd into them, and held down in them, by Chains of Circumſtances. Break but theſe Chains, and the Mind returns with a Kind of intellectual Elaſticity to its proper Object, *Truth*. This natural Motion is ſo ſtrong, that Examples might be cited of Men, embracing *Truth in Practice*, before They were convinced of it in *Theory*. There are Caſes, where *Reaſon*, freed from Conſtraint, or rouzed by Neceſſity, acts in ſome Sort the Part of *Inſtinct*. We are impel'd by *one*, before We have Time to form an *Opinion*. We are often determined by the *other*, againſt our *Opinion*; That is, before We can be ſaid properly to have *changed it*. But obſerve here the Perverſeneſs of that rational Creature, Man. When This happens; when the *Judgment of Nature*, for ſo we may ſpeak after *Tully*, hath prevail'd againſt the habitual Prejudice of *Opinion*; inſtead of acknowledging the *victorious Truth*, which determined Him to act; inſtead of condemning the *erroneous Opinion*, againſt which

He acted, He is too often apt to endeavour, pievishly and pedantically, to reconcile his *Actions* to his *Error*; nay, to persist in renouncing *true* and asserting *false Maxims*, whilst He reaps the Benefit, and maintains the Consequences of the *former*.

You see whither We are brought by these general Reflections. The *absurd Opinions*, (*fictæ & vanæ* our *Roman Orator* would have call'd them) about the *Right*, *Power*, and *Prerogative of Kings*, were so little able to take a deep Root, and to stand the Blasts of Opposition, that Few of *Those*, who drew their Swords on the Side of King *Charles* the *1st*, were determined to it by them. I assert this Fact on cotemporary Authority; on the Authority even of *Some*, who were Themselves engaged in *that Cause*, from the Beginning to the End of our civil Wars. A more recent Tradition assures us, that when the *same Opinions* revived at the *Restoration*, they did not sink deep even then into the Minds of Men; but floated so superficially there, that the Parliament, (the very Parliament, who had authorized them, and imposed them, as I observed in the last Letter) proceeded a great Way, and was ready to have proceeded farther, in direct Opposition to them. A Tradition still more recent will inform us, and That is to be the Subject of this Letter, that when *these Opinions* revived again, at the latter End of the same Reign, with an Appearance of greater Strength, and of a more national Concurrence than ever, they revived but to be exploded more effectually than ever. King *Charles* made Use of them to check the Ferment raised against his Government; but did not seem to expect that they would subsist long in Force. His *wiser Brother* depended much on them; but his Dependence was vain. They were, at that Time, wearing out apace; and they wore out the faster by

by the extravagant Use, which was made of them. They were in the Mouths of many, but in the Hearts of few; for almost all Those, who had them in their Mouths, acted against them. Thus were *these wicked and ridiculous Principles of Government* twice revived, and twice destroy'd again, in less than thirty Years from the *Restoration.*

Ter si resurgat Murus aheneus,
——— *Ter pereat!*

The *second Revival of these Principles*, for enough hath been said of the *first*, happen'd soon after the Dissolution of the *long Parliament*; and there, I think, We must place the Birth of WHIG and TORY, though *these Parties* did not grow up into full Maturity, nor receive their Names, till about two Years afterwards. The Dissolution of *this Parliament* was desired by Men of very different Complexions; by *Some*, with factious Views; by *Others*, on this honest and true Maxim, *that a* STANDING PARLIAMENT, *or the* SAME PARLIAMENT LONG CONTINUED *changes the very Nature of the Constitution in the fundamental Article, on which the Preservation of our whole Liberty depends.* But whatever Motives others might have to desire *this Dissolution*, the Motives, which prevail'd on the *King*, were probably these. *This Parliament* not only grew more reserved in their Grants of *Money*, and stiff and inflexible in *other Matters*, but seem'd to have lost that *personal Regard*, which They had hitherto preserved for Him. They brought their Attacks home to his *Family*; nay, to *Himself*, in the Heats, which the Discovery and Prosecution of the *Popish Plot* occasion'd. That on the *Queen* provoked Him. That on his *Brother* embarrass'd Him. But That, which provoked and embarass'd

him

him both, was the Prosecution of the Earl of *Danby* in the Manner, in which it was carried on. I will not descend into the Particulars of an Affair, at this Time, so well understood. *This Minister* was turn'd out, and might have been punish'd, in another Manner, and much more severely than I presume any one, who knows the Anecdotes of that Age, thinks that He deserved to be. But the *Intention* of this Attack, according to *Rapin*, was to shew *that the* King, *as well as his* Brother, *was at the Head of a Conspiracy to destroy the Government, and the* Protestant *Religion.* This is a very bold Assertion, and such a one as I do not pretend to warrant. But thus much is certain; that if the Earl of *Danby's* Impeachment had been tried, He must have justified Himself by shewing, what every one knew to be true, that the secret Negotiations with *France*, and particularly That for *Money*, were the *King's* Negotiations, not his.

Now, whether the *King* hoped, by dissolving the Parliament, to stop *this Prosecution*; or to soften That of the *Popish Plot*; or to defeat the Project of excluding the Duke of *York*; his Hopes were all disappointed. The *following Parliaments* tred in the Steps of This. How, indeed, could They do otherwise in those Days, when the Temper of the People determined the Character of the Parliament; when an *Influence on Elections*, by Prerogative, was long since over, and private, indirect Means of gaining *another more illegal Influence* were not yet found, or the necessary Supports of such Means were not yet acquired; when any Man, who had desired People, who knew neither his Fortune, his Character, nor even his Person, to chuse Him *their Representative in Parliament*, (That is, to appoint Him *their Trustee*) would have been look'd upon and treated as a Madman; in short, when

when a Parliament, acting against the *declared Sense of the Nation*, would have appear'd as surprizing a Phænomenon in the moral World, as a retrograde Motion of the Sun, or any other signal Deviation of Things from their ordinary Course, in the natural World.

There was indeed one Point, which *this Parliament* had taken extremely to Heart, and which was no longer open to the Parliaments, that follow'd; I mean the *Conduct of the* King *in foreign Affairs*, during the War between *France*, and *Holland* and her *Allies*, which ended by the Treaty of *Nimighen*. This War was not made in remote Countries. It was made at our Door. The Motives to it, on the Part of the *Aggressor*, were neither Injuries received, nor Rights invaded; but a Spirit of Conquest, and baretaced Usurpation. The Interest *We* had in it was not such as depended on a long Chain of Contingencies, and required much Sublety to find out, but plain and immediate. The Security and, at one Time, the very Existence of the *Dutch Commonwealth* depended on the Event of it. No Wonder then, if the Conduct of the *King*, who join'd openly with *France* at first, and served Her privately to better Purpose at last, furnish'd ample Matter to the publick Discontent, and help'd to increase the ill Humours of succeeding Parliaments on *two other Points*, which were still open, and continued to draw their whole Attention as long as King *Charles* suffer'd any to sit, during the rest of his Reign.

These two Points were the Prosecution of Persons, involved in the *Popish Plot*, and the Exclusion of the Duke of *York*. The *first* of these had prepared Mankind for the *second*. The Truth is, that if nothing, which affected the *Duke*, had been produced, besides *Coleman*'s Letters, these Proofs of his

his Endeavours to ſubvert the Religion and Liberty of the People He pretended to govern, join'd to ſo many others of publick Notoriety, which ſhew'd the whole Bent of his Soul, and the whole Scheme of his Policy, would have afforded Reaſon more than ſufficient for ſacrificing the *Intereſt*, or even the *Right* (if you will call it ſo) of *one Man* to the Preſervation of *three Kingdoms*. I know how partial We are in the Judgments We make, concerning ourſelves, and our own Intereſts. I know that this Partiality is the immediate Effect of Self-Love, the ſtrongeſt Spring in the human, nay in the whole animal Syſtem; and yet I cannot help being ſurprized that a Man ſhould expect to be truſted with a *Crown*, becauſe He is born a Prince, in a Country, where he could not be truſted by Law and ought not to be truſted in Reaſon, with a *Conſtables Staff*, if He was born a *private Perſon*. Let me add, that ſuch an Expectation muſt be deem'd more unreaſonable in a Deſcendant of *Henry* the *4th* of *France*, if poſſible, than in any other Man. The hereditary Title of the Houſe of *Bourbon*, on the Extinction of That of *Valois*, was certainly as clear, and much better eſtabliſh'd by the Laws and Uſages of *France*, than the hereditary Right of any Prince of the Houſe of *Stuart* to the Crown of *England*; and yet *Henry* the *4th*, with all the perſonal Qualifications, which could recommend a Prince to the Eſteem and Love of his Subjects, would never have been received into the Throne by the *French Nation*, if He had not been of the *Religion of that Nation*. On what Foundation then could it be expected that a *Proteſtant* and a *free People* ſhould be leſs animated by *Religion* and *Liberty both*, than their Neighbours had been by *Religion alone*; for *Liberty* had nothing to do in that Conteſt? Our Fathers were thus animated

mated, at the Time I am ſpeaking of. The *long Parliament* projected the *Excluſion*; and if the Deſign had been carried on, in the Spirit of a *Country Party*, it would probably have been carried on with a national Concurrence, and would conſequently have ſucceeded in Effect, though not perhaps at once, nor in the very Form at firſt propoſed.

The violent and ſanguinary Proſecution of the *Popiſh Plot* was intended, no Doubt, to make the Succeſs of the *Excluſion* more ſecure, by raiſing the Paſſions of Men ſo high, that no Expedient but an *abſolute and immediate Excluſion*, in the Terms of the *Bill*, ſhould be thought ſufficient. I cannot help ſaying, on this Occaſion, that I wiſh this laudable and juſt Deſign had not been purſued, by wading through the Blood of ſo many Men; Enemies to our *Religion* and *Liberty*, indeed; but convicted, for the moſt Part, on Evidence, which could hardly have paſs'd, at any other Time. I wiſh we had done nothing, which might be interpreted to the Diſrepute of our *own Religion*, whilſt We attempted to proſcribe *theirs*. In fine, I wiſh, for the Honour of my Country, that the Proſecutions, on Account of *this Plot*, and much more on Account of *another*, which was ſet up as a Kind of Retaliation for *This*, and which cauſed ſome of the nobleſt, as well as ſome of the meaneſt Blood in the Nation to be ſplit, could be erazed out of the Records of Hiſtory. But there is ſtill a farther Reaſon to wiſh that greater Temper had been join'd, at this Time, to the ſame Zeal for *Religion* and *Liberty*. Men were made to believe that the *King*, who had yielded on ſo many *other Occaſions*, would yield on *This*; that *He*, who had given up ſo many *Miniſters*, would give up his *Brother* at laſt; and that if the *Parliament* would accept nothing leſs than the *Excluſion*, in their own Way, it would

be extorted from Him. Now in *This* they were fatally deceived; and I must continue to suspect, till I meet with better Reasons than I have yet found to the contrary, that they were so deceived by the Intrigues of *two very opposite Cabals*; by the Duke of *York*'s, who were averse to *all Exclusions*, whether *absolute*, or *limited*, but most to the *last*; and by the Duke of *Monmouth*'s, who could not find their Account in any but an *absolute Exclusion*; nor in This neither, unless the *Bill* pass'd without any Mention of the *Duke's Daughters*, as next in Succession; to which, as Bishop *Burnet* tells us, the Prince of *Orange* was willing to comply, on the Faith of Assurances He had received from hence; a Fact, which the *Bishop* might know, and We may therefore take on his Word, as extraordinary as it seems. I would only observe that King *William*, then Prince of *Orange*, could have no Reason for consenting that his *Wife's Pretensions to the Crown* should not be confirm'd by an *Act*, which excluded her *Father*, except one; and That was the Necessity, real, or apparent, of uniting different private Interests in the publick Measure of excluding the Duke of *York*. Now, if This was his Reason, the same Reason proves, what shall be farther confirm'd in the next Letter, that a *Spirit of Faction* ran through the Proceedings of Those, who promoted the *Bill of Exclusion*; and when *Faction* was opposed to *Faction*, there is no Room to wonder, if That of the *Court* prevail'd. The *King*, who had not used to shew Firmness, on *other Occasions*, was firm on *This*; and the Consequence of pushing the *Exclusion*, in this Manner, was giving Him an Opportunity of breaking the *Country Party*; of dividing the Nation into *Whig* and *Tory*; of governing Himself, without *Parliaments*; and of leaving the Throne open to his *Brother*, not only without

out Limitations, or Conditions, but with a more absolute Power establish'd, than any Prince of his Family had enjoy'd.

As soon as the *Court* had got, by Management, a plausible Pretence of objecting a *Spirit of Faction* to Those in the *Opposition*, the Strength of the *Opposition* was broken, because the *national Union* was dissolved. A *Country Party* must be authorized by the *Voice of the Country*. It must be form'd on Principles of *common Interest*. It cannot be united and maintain'd on the particular Prejudices, any more than it can, or ought to be, directed to the particular Interests of *any Set of Men whatsoever*. A Party, thus constituted, is improperly call'd Party. It is the *Nation*, speaking and acting in the Discourse and Conduct of *particular Men*. It will prevail in all Struggles sooner, or later, as long as our *Constitution* subsists; and nothing is more easy to demonstrate than This; that whenever *such a Party* finds it difficult to prevail, our *Constitution* is in Danger; and when They find it impossible, our *Constitution* must, in Fact, be alter'd. On the other Hand, whenever the Prejudices and Interests of *particular Sets of Men* prevail, the Essence of a *Country Party* is annihilated, and the very Appearance of it will soon be lost. Every Man will resort in this Case to that Standard, under which he hath been marshal'd in *former Divisions*; to which his Inclinations lead Him; or which, though He does not intirely approve, yet disapproves the least.

Such a Dissolution of a *Country-Party* was brought about at the Period, to which We are now come in our Deduction of *Parties*, by the Passions, the publick Pique, and private Interest of *particular Men*, and by the wily Intrigues of the *Court*. The Dissolution of *this Party*, and the new Division of

the Nation into *Whig* and *Tory*, brought us into extreme Danger. This extreme Danger reunited the Nation again, and a *Coalition of Parties* ſaved the whole. Such an Experience might have ſhew'd Them, that how oppoſite ſoever their *Profeſſions* were, yet They really differ'd more on *negative* than on *poſitive Principles*; that They ſaw one another in a *falſe Light*, for the moſt Part, and fought with *Phantoms*, conjured up to maintain their *Diviſion*, rather than with *real Beings*. Experience had not this happy Effect ſoon. The Swell of the Sea continued, long after the Storm was over; and we have ſeen *theſe Parties* kick and cuff like drunken Men, when They were both of the ſame Side,——— Let us hope that this Scene of tragical Folly is over, to the Diſappointment of *Thoſe*, who are conſcious of *paſt Iniquity*, or who meditate *future Miſchief*. There are no Others, who wiſh and endeavour to prolong it.

I am, SIR, &c.

LETTER V.

SIR,

NOTHING is more uſeful, nothing more neceſſary, in the Conduct of publick Affairs, than a *juſt Diſcernment of Spirits*. I mean here not only that *natural private Sagacity*, which is converſant about Individuals, and enables ſome Men to pry, as it were, into the Heads and Hearts of Others,

Others, and to discover with Them those latent Principles, which constitute their true Characters, and are often disguised in outward Action; but I mean principally that *acquired, publick, political Sagacity*, which is of the same Kind, though I think not altogether the same Thing, as the *former*; which flows from Nature too, but requires more to be assisted by Experience, and form'd by Art. This is that superior Talent of *Ministers of State*, which is so rarely found in Those of *other Countries*, and which abounds so happily at present in Those of *Great Britain*. It is by This, that they discover the most secret Dispositions of *other Courts*; and, discovering those Dispositions, prevent their Designs, or never suffer Themselves to be surprized by them. It is by This, that They watch over the publick Tranquility *at home*; foresee what Effect every Event, that happens, and much more every Step They make Themselves, will have on the Sentiments and Passions of Mankind. This Part of human Wisdom is therefore every where of Use; but is of indispensable Necessity in *free Countries*, where a greater Regard is to be constantly had to the various Fluctuations of *Parties*; to the Temper, Humour, Opinion and Prejudices of the People. Without such a Regard as This, those Combinations of peculiar Circumstances, which We commonly call *Conjunctures*, can never be improved to the best Advantage, by acting in Conformity, and in Proportion to them; and without improving *such Conjunctures* to the best Advantage, it is impossible to atchieve any great Undertaking; or even to conduct Affairs successfully, in their ordinary Course.

A Want of this *just Discernment of Spirits*, if I am not extremely mistaken, defeated the Designs of Those, who prosecuted with so much Vigour the

the *Popiſh Plot*, and the *Excluſion of the Duke of York*. Several of Them were Men of very great Abilities; and yet we ſhall have no Reaſon to be ſurprized that They fail'd in this Point, if We reflect how unfit even the greateſt Genius is to *diſcern the Spirit of others*, when He hath once *overheated his own*. All Men are fallible; but here lies the Difference. *Some Men*, ſuch as I have juſt mention'd, croſs'd by Difficulties, preſs'd by Exigencies, tranſported by their own Paſſions, or by the Paſſions of Thoſe, who fight under their Banner, may now and then deviate into Error, and into Error of long and fatal Conſequence. But there are *ſome Men*, ſuch as I ſhall not mention upon this Occaſion, (becauſe I reſerve Them for another and a better) who never deviate into the Road of good Senſe; who, croſs'd by no Difficulties, preſs'd by no Exigencies, meeting ſcarce Oppoſition enough to excite their Induſtry, and guiding a tame well-tutor'd Flock, that follow their *Bell-weather* obſtinately, but never tread on his Heels; there are *Men*, I ſay, whoſe ſpecial Privilege it is to proceed with all theſe Advantages, deliberately and ſuperciliouſly, from Blunder to Blunder, from Year to Year, in one perpetual Maze of confuſed, incoherent, inconſiſtent, unmeaning Schemes of Buſineſs.

But having nothing to do with the *Men of this Character* at preſent, I return to Thoſe of the *former Claſs*; to the *Men*, who led the *Whig-Party*, at its firſt Appearance, in the Time of King *Charles* the 2*d*. The Foundation, upon which They built all their Hopes of Succeſs, was This; that They ſhould frighten and force the *King* into a Complyance with Them; but They did not enough conſider that the Methods They took were equally proper to frighten and force a great Part of the Nation from Them,

Them, by Reason of the particular Circumstances of that Time. They did not enough consider that when they began to put their Designs in Execution, scarce twenty Years had pass'd from the *Restoration*; and that the highest Principles, in Favour of the *Church* and the *Monarchy*, had prevail'd almost universally, during one half of that Time, and very generally, during the other half; that They had the accidental Passions of the People for Them, but the settled Habits of Thinking against Them; that They were going off from a *broad* to a *narrow Bottom*; from the *Nation* to a *Part of the Nation*; and This at a Time, when they wanted a more than ordinary Concurrence of the *whole Body*. They did not enough consider that They were changing the very Nature of their *Party*, and giving an Opportunity to the *Court*, which was then become, in the strict Sense of the Word, a *Faction*, to grow up into a *Party* again, and *such a Party* as would divide, at least, the People with Them, upon *Principles*, plausible in those Days, and sufficient to raise a Spirit, capable to disappoint all their Endeavours.

The same Resentments and Prejudices, the same Jealousies and Fears, which burst out with Violence, upon many Occasions a few Years before, lay still in the Hearts of Men; latent and quiet, indeed, and wearing out by Degrees; but yet easy to be revived, and to be blown up anew. If We compare the Conduct of the *long Parliament*, in 1674 and 1675, with the Attempts, which had been lately made, during the Administration of the *Cabal*; with the Secret of the *second Dutch War*, and many other Designs and Practices of the *Court*, which were then come lately and very authentically to Light; with the State of *Scotland*, which was then subdued under a *real Tyranny*, and with That of

Ireland

Ireland, where, to ſay no more, the *Act of Settlement* was but ill obſerved; if We make this Compariſon, it will not yet appear that the Proceedings of the *Houſe of Commons* were immoderate, though they were warm; nor factious, though they were vigorous; nor that any Danger could be then reaſonably apprehended from them, except to the Enemies of the Conſtitution in Church and State; and yet even then the old Reſentments, Prejudices, Jealouſies and Fears began to revive; and an Apprehenſion of falling back under the Influence of *Presbyterian* and *Republican Principles* began to ſhew itſelf in the Houſe of Lords, and in the Nation. It is true that This had no immediate Conſequence; becauſe the *Popiſh Plot* broke out ſoon afterwards like a mighty Flame, in which theſe little Fires, that began to burn anew, were loſt. This great Event made the *Church* and the *Diſſenters* continue to run into one, as They had begun to do before; and the ſole Diviſion of *Parties* was That of the *Court* and the *Country*, as long as *this Parliament* laſted. But ſtill it was evident with how delicate an Hand every Thing, that related to our *former Diſputes*, required to be touch'd. It was evident that the leaſt Alarm given to the *Church*, or to Thoſe, who valued Themſelves on the Principles of *Loyalty* then in Faſhion, would be ſufficient to open thoſe Wounds, which where juſt skin'd over, and to raiſe *two new Parties* out of the Aſhes of the *old*.

Theſe Parties were not raiſed, whilſt the *long Parliament* ſate; becauſe a general Opinion prevail'd, and well enough founded on their precedent Conduct, that however angry the King might be with the Parliament, or the Parliament with the King, a few popular Steps made on *one Side*, and a little Money granted on the *other*, would ſoften

Matters

Matters between Them, and dispose Them to forget all former Quarrels. As hot therefore as the *Parliament* grew, and as much as some People might think that They exceeded their Bounds; yet still it was difficult to persuade even these People that a *Parliament*, like This, would push Things to the last Extremity; destroy the Constitution They had settled and supported with so much Zeal; or draw the Sword against a *Prince*, to whom They had borne so much Affection. But in the *Parliaments*, which follow'd, the Case was not the same, and I will state as shortly as I can, upon Authorities, which no Man likely to contradict Me must refuse, what made the Difference. These Authorities shall be That of *Burnet*, and That of *Rapin*; whom I quote, on this Occasion, for the same Reason as I would quote my Lord *Clarendon* against King *Charles* the 1*st*, or *Ludlow* for Him.

In the Year 1676, before We have Grounds sufficient to affirm that the Design of (*a*) *excluding the Duke of York* was form'd, but not before We have Reason to suspect that it might be in the Thoughts of several, Those, who stood foremost in the Opposition to the *Court*, were very industrious to procure a Dissolution of the *long Parliament*; so industrious, that They (*b*) negotiated the Affair with the *Duke*, who had concur'd in a Vote for an Address to dissolve it; and They undertook (*c*) *that a new Parliament should be more inclineable to grant the* Papists *a Toleration, than They would ever find This would prove.* The *Papists* were in Earnest for this Measure; since *Coleman drew a Declaration for justifying it, and since their Design in it was*

(*a*) *Burnet's History of his own Times, Vol. I. p.* 393.
(*b*) *Ibid.* (*c*) *Ibid.*

to divide the (a) King and his People. It is fair to conclude that the *Proteſtants*, who had been in it at the Time I mention, upon *Party Views* were at leaſt as much ſo, when their Views, roſe higher. *This Parliament* had puſh'd a ſtrict and thorough Examination into the *Popiſh Plot*, with great Sincerity and Zeal. Nay, the Project of the *Excluſion* had been ſtarted, though not proſecuted, in the laſt Seſſion. May We not take it for granted however that They, who were now reſolved to carry the *Excluſion* in a Manner, in which They ſoon attempted to carry it, and who foreſaw by Conſequence the Difficulties, that would be oppoſed to Them, and the ſtrong Meaſures They ſhould be obliged to purſue, in order to overcome theſe Difficulties; I ſay, might not They think *this Parliament* much leſs proper than any other to engage and perſiſt in ſuch Meaſures? They thought thus, without Doubt; and ſo far They judged better than the *King*, who came into the *Diſſolution*, upon very different Motives. But as to the Conſequence of engaging a *new Parliament* in ſuch ſtrong Meaſures, the Event ſhew'd that the *King* judged better than They, in the Progreſs of this Affair.

The *Diſſenters*, who had been long perſecuted by the *Parliament*, and banter'd and abuſed by the *Court*, were encouraged by the Conjuncture to lift up their Heads. They took Advantage of the Horror and Indignation, which the Diſcovery of the *Popiſh Plot*, and the Uſe made of this Diſcovery had raiſed all over the Kingdom. They could not be more zealous in this Cauſe than the Members of the *eſtabliſh'd Church* had ſhewn Themſelves to be; but They cried, perhaps, louder for it. In ſhort, whatever their Management was, or however

(a) *Burnet's Hiſtory of his own Times, Vol. I. p.* 393.

They

They were abetted, certain it is that They were very active, and very successful too, in the Elections of the *Parliament*, which follow'd the *long Parliament*, according to *Rapin*, who asserts that many of the Members, chosen in this House of Commons, were *Presbyterians*. He might have said as much, upon just as good Grounds, of the *two Parliaments*, which follow'd This, and I shall speak of Them indiscriminately. The Leaders, who muster'd all their Forces, in order to push the *Bill of Exclusion*, look'd on this Turn in the *Elections* as an Advantage to Them; and it might not have been a Disadvantage, if They and the *Dissenters* had improved it with more Moderation. But They were far from doing so, as *Rapin* Himself seems to own a little unwillingly, when He says, that *Complaisance for the* Presbyterians *was carried, perhaps, too far in the Bill for the Comprehension of Protestant Dissenters.* Bishop *Burnet* speaks more plainly. He owns that many began *to declare openly in Favour of the* Non-Conformists; *that upon This the* Non-Conformists *behaved Themselves very indecently*; that *They fell severely on the Body of the Clergy*; and that *They made the Bishops and Clergy apprehend that a* Rebellion, *and with it the pulling the* Church *to Pieces, was design'd.* Several other Passages of the same Strength, and to the same Purpose, might be collected from *this Historian*; and He, who reads them, will not be surprized, I think, to find that such Proceedings as These, both in *Parliament* and out of it, gave an Alarm to the *Clergy*, and *set them to make Parallels between the late and the present Times*; and to infuse the Fears and the Passions, which agitated *Them*, into the *Nation*. The *Bishop* accuses Them, indeed, of doing This with much *Indecency*. But They, who are frighten'd out of their Wits, will

be apt to be *indecent*; and *Indecency* begets *Indecency*.

At the ſame Time, that the Jealouſies of a Deſign to deſtroy the *Church* prevail'd, others prevail'd likewiſe of a Deſign to alter the *Government of the State*; of a Deſign not only againſt the *Succeſſor*, but againſt the *Poſſeſſor of the Crown*. *Many well-meaning Men*, ſays Biſhop *Burnet* upon one Occaſion, *began to diſlike theſe Practices, and to apprehend that a* Change of Government *was deſign'd.*———*The* King *came to think Himſelf*, ſays the *ſame Author* upon another Occaſion, *levell'd at chiefly, though for Decency's Sake his* Brother *was only named.* *Rapin* goes farther; for, ſpeaking of the ſame Time, He uſes this remarkable Expreſſion; that *Things ſeem'd to be taking the ſame Courſe as in the Year* 1640; *and there was Reaſon to think that the* oppoſing Party *had no better Intentions towards the* King *now than the Enemies of King* Charles *the* 1ſt *had towards Him.* But whatever ſome particular Men, who knew Themſelves irreconcileable with the *King*, as well as the *Duke*, or ſome others, who had ſtill about them a Tang of religious Enthuſiaſm and Republican Whimſies, might intend; I am far from thinking that the *Party*, who promoted the *Excluſion*, meant to deſtroy, on the contrary it is plain that They meant to preſerve, by that very Meaſure, the *Conſtitution in Church and State.* The Reaſon why I quote theſe Paſſages, and refer to others of the ſame Kind, is not to ſhew what was really deſign'd, but what was apprehended; for as the Diſtinction of *Whig* and *Tory* ſubſiſted long after the real Differences were extinguiſh'd, ſo were *theſe Parties* at firſt divided, not ſo much by *Overt-acts* committed, as by the *Apprehenſions*, which each of them entertain'd of the Intentions of the other. When the

Reſolution

Resolution was once taken of rejecting all Limitations, on the Beleif artfully and, I think, knavishly propagated, that the *King* would yield, if the *Parliament* persisted; the necessary Consequences of the *King*'s adhering inflexibly to his *Brother* were Those, which follow'd; those *Fulmina Parliamentaria*, harsh Votes, angry Proceedings, Addresses, that were in Truth Remonstrances, Projects of Associations, Pretensions to a Power of DISPENSING *with the Execution of Laws*, (that very *Prerogative* They had so justly refused to the *Crown*,) and many others, which I omit. All These would have been Blasts of Wind, *Bruta Fulmina*, no more, if the King had yielded; and that they were push'd in this Confidence by the Bulk of the *Party*, who push'd them, cannot be doubted; since it cannot be doubted that the Bulk of the *Party* depended on the *King*'s yielding almost, perhaps, even to the last. Some few might be willing, nay desirous, that He should not yield, and hope to bring Things into a State of Confusion; which none but Madmen, or Those, whom their Crimes, or their Fortunes render desperate, can ever wish to see. But it would be hard indeed, if *Parties* were to be characterized, not by their common View, or the general Tenour of their Conduct, but by the private Views imputed to Some amongst Them, or by the particular Sallies, into which Mistake, Surprize, or Passion, hath sometimes betray'd the best-intention'd, and even the best-conducted Bodies of Men. *Whig* and *Tory* were now form'd into *Parties*; but I think They were not now, nor at any other Time, what They believed one another, nor what They have been represented by their Enemies, nay by their Friends. The *Whigs* were not *Roundheads*, tho' the Measures They pursued, being

being ſtronger than the Temper of the Nation would then bear, gave Occaſion to the Suſpicions I have mention'd. The *Tories* were not *Cavaliers*, though They took the Alarm ſo ſudden and ſo warm for the *Church* and the *King*; and tho' They carried the Principles in Favour of the *King*, at leaſt, whilſt the Heat of their Conteſts with the *oppoſity Party* laſted, higher than They had been ever carried before. The *Whigs* were not *Diſſenters*, nor *Republicans*, though They ſavour'd the *former*, and though ſome inconſiderable Remains of the *latter*, might find Shelter in their Party. The *Tories* had no Diſpoſition to become *Slaves*, or *Papiſts*, tho' They abetted the Exerciſe of an exorbitant Power by the *Crown*, and tho' They ſupported the Pretenſions of a *Popiſh Succeſſor* to it.——— Thus I think about the *Parties*, which aroſe in the Reign of King *Charles* the 2*d*; and as I deliver my Thoughts with Frankneſs, I hope they will be received with Candour. Some farther and ſtronger Reaſons for receiving them ſo may, perhaps, appear in a ſubſequent Letter.

I am, SIR, Yours, &c.

LETTER VI.

SIR,

IF King *Charles* the 2*d*. could have been prevail'd upon to ſacrifice the chimerical divine Right of his *Brother* to the real Intereſt, and Right too, of his *People*; that happy Event would have made him ample Amends in future Eaſe and Quiet, and

and the Nation in future Security, for all precedent Disorders, Dangers and Fears of Danger. But instead of This, he was every Day confirm'd in the Resolution of not giving up, directly and in Terms, that Right to his *Brother*, which He thought reflected Strength on his own. The very Measures, taken to force Him to submit, enabled Him to resist. The *opposite Spirit* spent itself in Blood and Violence. The *Spirit of Him* rose visibly in the Nation; and He saw very soon the Time approach, when He might venture to appeal to his *People* against his *Parliament*. This Time was come, when Men were once convinced that a *Country Party* prevail'd no longer, but that *Faction* had taken its Place. Many Appearances, which I have not Room to enumerate, served to propagate this Opinion; particularly the Behaviour and almost avow'd Pretensions of the Duke of *Monmouth*; which were carried on even in Defyance of the solemn Declaration made by the King, *that He had never married the* Duke's *Mother*.

Some of the worthiest and warmest Men, who were engaged *for the Exclusion*, complain'd Themselves, even from the first, of the private Interests and factious Intrigues, which prevail'd amongst Them. *I must confess* (says a very *considerable Man*, who laid down his Life for this Cause afterwards, and whose original Letter is still extant) *I must confess, I do not know three Men of a Mind; and that a Spirit of Giddiness reigns amongst us, far beyond any I have ever observed in my Life*; and yet He had lived and acted in as factious a Time as this Nation ever saw. He proceeds; *Some look who is fittest to succeed.—They are for the most Part divided between the Prince of* Orange, *and the Duke of* Monmouth. *The first hath plainly the most plausible Title.——I need not tell you the Reasons against*

gainst Monmouth. *The strongest for Him are, that whoever is opposed to* York *will have a good Party; and all* Scotland, *which is every Day like to be in Arms, doth certainly favour Him, and may probably be of as much Importance in the Troubles, that are now likely to fall upon us, as They were in the Beginning of the last. Others are only upon Negatives*, &c.

I could easily multiply Proofs of this Kind; but I think I need not take any Pains to shew that there was *such a Faction* form'd at this Time; nor to refute *Welwood*, who asserts *that the Duke of* Monmouth *was not ambitious to the Degree of aspiring to the Crown, till after his landing in the West.* I will only remark that the Efforts of *this Faction* amongst Those, who drove on the *Bill of Exclusion*, furnish'd another Motive to the Division and Animosity of *Parties*. The *Tories*, who had divided from the *Others*, on Jealousies of Designs to change the *Constitution in Church and State*, began now to apprehend that the *opposite Party* might succeed in another View, and set up a *King of their own Nomination*. A Notion then entertain'd by many, *that the* worse Title *a Man had, the* better King *He was likely to make*, did not persuade Them. They had suffer'd under the Tyranny of a *Party*; many of Them had been Themselves the Abetters of a *Party-Administration*; and They fear'd with Reason a *Party-King*. Thus personal Interests were mingled on *both Sides* with publick Considerations; and the Duke of *York* gain'd a great Number of Adherents, not by Affection to *Him*, but by an Aversion to *Monmouth*; which increased among the *Tories*, in Proportion as the *Duke's* Popularity increased among the *Whigs*; not by any favourable Disposition in the *Tories* to *Popery* and *arbitary Power*; but by a *Dread*, as I have observed already, of returning in the least Degree under the In-

Influence of *those Principles*, and the Power of *those Men*, whose Yoke had gall'd the Necks of many that were still alive and active on the Stage of publick Affairs. *Men grew jealous of the Design* (says Bishop *Burnet*, speaking of *Monmouth*'s Popularity) *and fancy'd here was a new civil War to be raised. Upon this, They join'd with the* Duke's *Party*; meaning the Duke of *York*'s.

I say nothing of the Apprehensions entertain'd on *one Side*, and the Expectations entertain'd on the *other* from *Scotland*; because though there was, even in the Beginning of these Struggles, a Concert between Those, who were oppress'd by the *Court* there, and Those, who opposed it here, which grew afterwards into a closer Correspondence, and became riper for Action; yet the seditious Spirit, that gave Occasion to these Apprehensions and Expectations, was rouzed and exasperated by the Inhumanity of the Duke of *Lauderdale*; who, though a *Presbyterian* himself, was the Butcher of *that Party*; push'd the warmest of Them into unjustifiable Excesses; revived their silly Zeal for the *Covenant*; and wrought up their Enthusiasm even to *Assassination* and *Rebellion*. Let me only observe that This was plainly the Fault of the *Court*, and could not therefore be imputed to the *Whigs*, whatever Use some of *that Party* might propose to make of such a Disposition. The Violence of the *Conventiclers* was founded high, in order to palliate the Severities exercised in the Government of *that Kingdom*. But the reasonable Men of *all Parties* thought then, as They think now, and always will think, that it is the Duty of *Those*, who govern, to discern the *Spirit of the People*; to consider even their *Passions*; to have a Regard to their *Weaknesses*; and to shew Indulgence to their *Prejudices*; and that *Ministers*,

 who

who punish what They might prevent, are more culpable than *Those*, who offend.

As the *two Parties* were form'd, so was their Division maintain'd by mutual Jealousies and Fears; which are often sufficient to nourish themselves, when they have once taken Root in the Mind; and which were, at this Time, water'd and cultivated with all the factious Industry possible. The most improbable Reports, the most idle Surmises, carried about in Whispers, were sufficient (as I might easily shew in various Instances) to raise a panick Terror in *one Party*, or the *other*. In *both*, there were but too many Persons on the Watch, to improve and to propagate these Terrors, and by a frequent Repetition of such Impressions to raise the Alarm and Hatred of *Parties* to the highest Pitch. He, who went about to allay this extravagant Ferment, was call'd a *Trimmer*; and He, who was in Truth a common Friend, was sure of being treated like a common Enemy. Some, who voted *for the Bill of Exclusion*, were very far from being *heartily for it*; but I have seen good Reasons to believe, and such there are even in our publick Relations, that some of Those, who voted *against it*, and declared for *Limitations*, concur'd in the *End*, tho' They differ'd in the *Means*, with Those, who promoted the *Bill*. And yet *such Men* were constantly mark'd out as *Favourers of Popery* and *Enemies to their Country*. Thus in the *other Party*, Men, who had no other View but That of securing their *Religion* and *Liberty*, and who meant nothing more than to force the *Court* into such Complyances, as They judged necessary to establish this Security, were stigmatized with the opprobrious Names of *Fanatick* and *Republican*. Thus it happen'd in those Days; and thus it happens in ours; when any Man, who declares against a *certain Person*, against whom the

Voice

Voice of the Nation hath already declared, or complains of *Things*, which are so notorious, that no Man in the Nation can deny them, is sure to be follow'd by the Cry of *Jacobitism*, or *Republicanism*. But there is a great Difference, God be praised, between the *two Cases*. The *present Cry*, being void of *Pretence*, is therefore without *Effect*. It is heard in *few Places*, and believed only in *one*. ———But to return;

When the Nation was divided in this Manner, the Heat of the *Parties* increased as their Contest lasted, according to the usual Course of Things. New Engagements were daily taken; new Provocations and Offences were daily given. Publick Disputes begot private Pique; and private Pique supported publick Disputes with greater Rancour and Obstinacy. The *opposite Principles*, advanced by the *two Parties*, were carried higher and higher, as They grew more inflamed; and the *Measures* They pursued, in order to get the better each of his *Adversary*, without overmuch Regard to any other Consequence, became stronger and stronger, and perhaps equally dangerous. The Meeting of the Parliament at *Oxford* had a Kind of hostile Appearance; and as soon as *Parliaments were laid aside*, which happen'd on the sudden and indecent Dissolution of This, the Appearance grew worse. No Security having been obtain'd, by *Parliamentary Methods*, against the Dangers of a *Popish Succession*, it is probable that They, who look'd on these Dangers as nearest and greatest, began to cast about how They might secure Themselves, and their Country against them, by *Methods of another Kind*; such as extreme Necessity, and nothing but extreme Necessity can authorize. *Such Methods* were happily pursued and attended with glorious Success, a few Years afterwards, when *this Succession* had

taken Place; and, by taking Place, had justify'd all, that had been said against it, or foreboded of it; when the Nation was ripe for *Resistance*, and the Prince of *Orange* ready and able, from a Multitude of fortunate, concurring Circumstances, to support so great an Enterprize. But the Attempts, which were wise at *one Time*, would have been desperate at the *other*; and the Measures, which produced a *Revolution*, in the Reign of King *James*, would have produced, in the Reign of King *Charles*, a *civil War* of uncertain Event at best; I say of uncertain Event at best; because it seems to Me that whoever revolves in his Thoughts the State of *England* and *Scotland*, as well as the Situation of our *Neighbours on the Continent*, at that Time, must be of Opinion that if the Quarrel about the *Exclusion* had broke out into a War, the *best Cause* would have been the *worst supported*. The *King*, more united than ever with his *Brother*, would have prevail'd. What was projected in 1670, and perhaps more than was then intended, would have been effected; and the *Religion* and *Liberty* of *Great Britain* would have been destroy'd by Consequence. We cannot say, and it would be Presumption to pretend to guess, how far the *Heads of Party* had gone, in *Scotland*, or in *England*, into Measures for employing *Force*. Perhaps, little more had pass'd, in which *They*, who became the *principal Sacrifices*, were any Way concern'd, than rash Discourse about dangerous, but rude, indigested Schemes, started by Men of wild Imaginations, or desperate Fortunes, and rather hearken'd to than assented to; nay, possibly, despised and neglected by Them. But the *Court*, who wanted a *Plot* to confirm and increase their *Party*, and to turn the popular Tide in their Favour, took the first Opportunity of having one; which was soon furnish'd to Them by the imprudent

dent, but honeſt Zeal of *Some*, and by the Villany as well as Madneſs of *Others*; and They proſecuted it ſo ſeverely, with the Help of * *forward Sheriffs*, *willing Juries*, *bold Witneſſes* and *mercenary Judges*, that it anſwer'd all their Ends. The Deſign of aſſaſſinating the *King* and the *Duke* was certainly confined to a few deſperate Villians; but † *too many had heard it from Them, who were both ſo fooliſh and ſo wicked, as not to diſcover Them*; and This reflected great Prejudice, though I doubt not in many Caſes very unjuſtly, againſt all Thoſe, who had acted upon better Principles, but yet were involved in theſe Proſecutions.

As *this Event* diſarm'd, diſpirited and broke *one Party*; ſo it ſtrengthen'd, animated and united the *other*. The *Tories*, who look'd on the Dangers They apprehended from the *Whigs* to be greater and nearer than Thoſe, which They had apprehended, as well as the *Whigs*, before this new Diviſion of *Parties*, from a *Popiſh Succeſſion*, were now confirm'd in their Prejudices. Under this Perſuaſion, They ran headlong into all the Meaſures, which were taken for *enlarging the* KING's *Authority*, and *ſecuring the Crown to the Duke of* York. The Principles of *divine hereditary Right*, of *Paſſive-Obedience*, and *Non-Reſiſtance*, were revived and propagated with greater Zeal than ever. Not only the wild Whimſies of *Enthuſiaſts*, of *Schoolmen* and *Philoſophers*, but the plaineſt Dictates of *Reaſon* were ſolemnly condemn'd, in Favour of them, by *learned* and *reverend Bodies of Men*; who little thought that in five Years Time, That is in 1688, They ſhould act conformably to ſome of the very *Propoſitions*, which at this Time They declared *falſe*, *ſeditious* and *impious*.

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* *Burnet.* † *Id.*

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In ſhort, the *Guelphs* and *Gibellines* were not more animated againſt each other, at any Time, than the *Tories* and *Whigs* at This; and in ſuch a national Temper, conſiderable Steps were made, as they well might be, towards the Deſtruction of our Conſtitution. One of Thoſe, which *Rapin* enumerates, and inſiſts upon very gravely, can ſcarce be mention'd without ſmiling. *The King*, ſays He, *in order to make his* People *feel the Slavery He had newly impoſed on Them, affected to review his* TROOPS; *and theſe Troops amounted, by the Return of the Garriſon of* Tangier, *to* 4000 *Men, effective, and well-arm'd.* The *Whigs*, indeed, in thoſe Days, were ſo averſe to STANDING ARMIES, that They thought even thoſe Troops, commonly call'd *Guards*, unlawful; and Biſhop *Burnet* argues, in his Reflections on my Lord *Ruſſel*'s Tryal, that *a Deſign to ſeize on Them amounted to no more than a Deſign to ſeize on a Part of the King's Army.* But it is poſſible that the *Tories*, who had ſhew'd their Diſlike of *ſtanding Armies* ſufficiently in the *long Parliament*, might think it however no unreaſonable Thing, when Deſigns of *Inſurrections*, and even of *Aſſaſſinations* had come ſo lately to Light, that a Number of *regular Troops*, ſufficient to defend the *Perſon of the King*, but not ſufficient to oppreſs the *Liberties of the People*, and five Times leſs than We have ſince ſeen kept up, in the Midſt of the moſt ſecure Tranquility, ſhould be wink'd at, till *theſe Diſtempers* were intirely over.

Another Step, which the *ſame Author* mentions, was indeed of the greateſt Conſequence, and laid the Ax to the Root of all our Liberties at once, by giving the CROWN *ſuch an Influence over the Elections of Members to ſerve in Parliament*, as could not fail to deſtroy *that Independency*, by which alone the Freedom of our Government hath been, and can

can be ſupported. I mean the Proceedings by *Quo Warranto*, and the other Methods taken to force, or perſuade, the Corporations to ſurrender their *old Charters*, and accept *new ones*, under ſuch Limitations and Conditions, as the *King* thought fit to innovate. *Theſe Proceedings* were violent, the *Judgments* upon them arbitary, and the *other Methods* employ'd ſcandalous. But ſtill it was the *End*, it was the *Conſequence*, that alarm'd and terrify'd all thoſe, who had not ſold themſelves to the *Court*, or who had not loſt, in their Zeal for *Party*, all Regard to their *Country*, much more than the *Means*, that were employ'd upon this Occaſion. If inſtead of garbling Corporations by *Prerogative*, the *Court* could have purchaſed their Elections by *Money*, We may reaſonably believe that the *ſurer* and *more ſilent Way* would have been taken. But would the Alarm have been leſs among all the *Friends of Liberty*? Certainly not. They would have ſeen that the *End* was the ſame, and have diſliked *theſe Means* the more, for being leſs liable to Obſervation and Clamour. A *Prince*, aſſerting an *illegal* and *dangerous Prerogative*, and applauded for doing ſo, and ſeconded in the Attempt by a *numerous Party* in the Nation, carried no Doubt a very terrible Aſpect. But ſtill there was Room to hope, the violent Character of the Duke of *York* conſider'd, (and that Hope was actually entertain'd by many) that the *Party*, who abetted theſe Uſurpations of the *Prerogative*, might be ſoon frighten'd back again from a *Court* to a *Country Intereſt*; in which Caſe, there was Room to hope likewiſe, the milder Character and better Underſtanding of the *King* conſider'd, that the *Evil* might be in ſome Degree redreſs'd, and the *Conſequences* of it prevented. It was reaſonable for the *Friends of Liberty* to expect that Men, who

were

were injured, would complain and seek Relief, on the first favourable Opportunity. But if they had been *corrupted*, and the Practice of *selling Elections* had been once establish'd, I imagine that the *Friends of Liberty* would have thought the Case more desperate.——— It is certainly an easier Task, and there is somewhat less provoking, as well as less dangerous in it, to struggle even with a *great Prince*, who stands on *Prerogative*, than with a *weak*, but *profligate Minister*, if He hath the Means of *Corruption* in his Power, and if the *Luxury* and *Prostitution* of the Age have enabled Him to bring it into *Fashion*. Nothing surely could provoke Men, who had the *Spirit of Liberty* in their Souls, more than to figure to Themselves *one of these saucy Creatures of Fortune*, whom She raises in the Extravagance of her Caprice, dispatching his Emissaries, ecclesiastical and secular, like so many evil Dæmons, to the North and to the South, to buy the Votes of the People with the Money of the People, and to chuse a *Representative Body*, not of the *People*, but of the *Enemy of the People*, of *Himself*.

This was not the Case at the Time We are speaking of. It was *Prerogative*, not *Money*, which had like to have destroy'd our *Liberties* then. Government was not then carried on by *Undertakers*, to whom *so much Power* was farm'd out for Returns of *so much Money*, and *so much Money* intrusted for Returns of *so much Power*. But though the Case was not so desperate; yet was it bad enough in all Conscience; and among all the Excesses, into which the *Tories* ran, in Favour of the *Crown*, and in Hopes of fixing Dominion in their *own Party*, their Zeal to support the Methods of *garbling Corporations* was, in my Opinion, That, which threaten'd *publick Liberty* the most. It hath been

been reproach'd to them by many; but if among *Those*, who reproach'd them, there ſhould be *Some*, who have ſhared ſince that Time in the more dangerous Practice of *corrupting* Corporations; *ſuch Men* muſt have Fronts of Braſs, and deſerve all the Indignation, which is due to Iniquity, aggravated by Impudence. The *Others* abetted, in Favour of a *Prerogative*, ſuppoſed *real* by many in thoſe Days, and under the Pretence at leaſt of *Law*, a Power, which gave the *Crown* too much Influence in the *Elections of Members of the Houſe of Commons*; but *theſe Men*, if there are any ſuch, have been concern'd in a Practice, for the Sake of their own vile Intereſt, which ſpreads like a Gangrene over the whole Body of a Nation, and to every Branch of Government; and which hath never fail'd, in any one Inſtance, where it hath been ſuffer'd, to become the Bane of *Liberty*.

We have now carried the *two Parties* through that Period of Time, when the Conduct of *both* was moſt liable to the Objections made to them by their *Adverſaries*.——The *Tories* acted on the *moſt abject Principles of Submiſſion to the King*; and, *on Thoſe of hereditary Right*, were zealous for the Succeſſion of a Prince, whoſe Bigotry render'd Him unfit to rule a *Proteſtant* and a *free People*.— The *Whigs* maintain'd the *Power of Parliament to limit the Succeſſion to the Crown*, and avow'd the *Principle of Reſiſtance*; in which they had *Law*, *Example* and *Reaſon* for them. But then the Fury of *Faction* was for doing That *without Parliament*, which could only be legally done *by it*; and, in order to This, the *Principles of Reſiſtance* were extended too far; and the hotteſt Men of the *Party* taking the Lead, they acted in an *extravagant Spirit of Licence*, rather than a *ſober Spirit of Liberty*; and the *Madneſs of a Few*, little inferior to

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That of *Cromwell's Enthusiasts*, dishonour'd the whole Cause for a Time.———My Intention was not to have left them here; but to have carried these Observations on so far as to justify, notwithstanding these Appearances, what is said at the Conclusion of my *last Letter*, concerning the true Characters of *both Parties*. But either the Abundance of Matter hath deceived Me, or I have wanted Skill and Time to abridge it; so that I must defer this Part of my Task, and crave your Indulgence, as well as That of your Readers, for my Prolixity.

I am, SIR, &c.

LETTER VII.

SIR,

I Advanced, in the *first* of these Essays, something to this Effect; that every *clumsy*, *busy*, *bungling Child of Fortune*, on whom She bestows the Means and the Opportunity of *corrupting*, may govern by this infamous Expedient; and, having gratified his Ambition and Avarice, may have a Chance to secure himself from Punishment, by destroying the *Liberties of his Country*. It was advanced likewise, in the *same Paper*, that every Character is not equally fit to govern a People, by *dividing* them; because some Cunning, some Experience, nay, some Skill to form, and some Address to conduct a *System of Fraud*, are necessary in this Case. I persuade Myself that no Man, who read that Paper, was at a Loss to find an Instance to confirm the Truth of the *first of these Propositions*;

tions; and We have now before us another, which may ſerve to confirm the Truth of the *ſecond*.

Though I do not think the Deſigns of King *Charles* the 2*d* either deeply laid, or deeply fix'd in his own Mind; yet in general they were founded on *bad Principles*, and directed to *bad Ends*. He deſired indeed to be eaſy, and to make his People ſo; but then He deſired both Theſe on ſuch Conditions, as were inconſiſtent with good Government, during the whole Courſe of his Reign, and with the Security of Religion and Liberty, during the latter Part of it. We have ſeen how the intemperate Conduct of many, and the flagitious Deſigns of ſome among the *Whigs*, weaken'd their *own Party*, and gave new Strength and new Provocations to the *other*. But we have not yet conſider'd ſome other Advantages, without which *theſe Diviſions* could neither have been fomented, nor ſupported as they were. Now theſe Advantages aroſe chiefly from the Character and Conduct of the *King* himſelf. If King *Charles* had found the Nation plunged in *Corruption*; the People chuſing their Repreſentatives for *Money*, without any other Regard; and theſe Repreſentatives of the People, as well as the Nobility, reduced by Luxury to beg the unhallow'd Alms of a *Court*; or to receive, like miſerable Hirelings, the Wages of Iniquity from a *Miniſter*; if he had found the Nation, I ſay, in this Condition, (which extravagant Suppoſition one cannot make without Horrour) He might have diſhonour'd Her abroad, and impoveriſh'd and oppreſs'd Her at home, tho' He had been the weakeſt Prince on Earth, and his *Miniſters* the moſt odious, and contemptible Men, that ever preſumed to be ambitious. Our Fathers might have fallen into Circumſtances, which compoſe the very Quinteſſence of political Miſery. They might

 have

have *sold their Birth-right for Porridge*, which was their own. They might have been bubbled by the foolish, bullied by the fearful, and insulted by those, whom They despised. They would have deserved to be *Slaves*, and they might have been treated as such. When a *free People* crouch, like Camels, to be loaded, the next at Hand, no Matter who, mounts Them, and They soon feel the Whip, and the Spur of their *Tyrant*; for a *Tyrant*, whether *Prince*, or *Minister*, resembles the *Devil* in many Respects; particularly in This. He is often both the *Tempter* and *Tormentor*. He makes the *Criminal*, and he punishes the *Crime*.

But This was not the State of the *English* Nation, at the Time we speak of. We were not yet *corrupted*, nor even quite ripe for *Corruption*. *Parties* there were; and the Contests of *these Parties* gave Occasion to the Rise and growth of *Factions*; some of which ran into the most seditious Practices against the Government, and others into the vilest Submission to it. But still a *Spirit of Liberty* remain'd in many, uncorrupted and unextinguish'd, and such as work'd our national Deliverance in the Days of Distress, that soon follow'd. We were *Freemen* then, in the proper Sense, and full Extent of the Words; because not only the *Laws*, which asserted our common Rights, were maintain'd and improved, but *private Independency*, which can alone support *publick Liberty*, under such a Government as ours, was itself supported by some of that *antient Oeconomy* and *Simplicity of Manners*, that were growing, but not grown, out of Fashion. *Such a People*, as We then were, could neither be *bought*, nor *driven*; and I think King *Charles* could not have *divided* and *led* Them, if He had wanted any of the Qualities He possess'd, or had held another Conduct than He held,

held. Far from being proud, haughty, or brutal, * *He had not a Grain of Pride*, or *Vanity*, *in his whole Compoſition*; but was the moſt affable, beſt-bred Man alive. He treated his Subjects like *Noblemen*, like *Gentlemen*, like *Freemen*; not like *Vaſſals*, or *Boors*. Whatever Notion He had of his *hereditary Right*, He own'd his Obligation for the Crown He wore to his *People*, as much as He would have been bound to do, in Reaſon, in Juſtice, in Honour, and in Prudence, if He had ſtood at the greateſt Diſtance from it, in the Courſe of lineal Succeſſion, and had been call'd to it from the low State, in which He was before, by the free Gift and Choice of the Nation. His Profeſſions were plauſible, and his whole Behaviour engaging; ſo that He won upon the Hearts, even whilſt He loſt the good Opinion of his Subjects, and often ballanced their Judgment of Things, by their perſonal Inclination. Theſe Qualities and this Part of his Conduct went a great Way to give Him Credit with his People, and an Hold on their Affections. But This was not all. He obſerved their Temper, and He comply'd with it. He yielded to Them in Points, from which he had determined, and declared too, that he would never depart. To know when to yield, in *Government*, is at leaſt as neceſſary, as to know when to loſe in *Trade*; and He, who cannot do the *firſt*, is ſo little likely to *govern a Kingdom well*, that it is more than probable He would *govern a Shop ill*. King *Charles* gave up to the Murmurs of his People, not *one* or *two ſuch Miniſters* as may be found almoſt behind every Desk; thoſe aukward Pageants of Courts, thoſe wooden Images, which Princes gild and then wor-

* Sir *William Temple*.

ſhip;

ſhip; but ſeveral *great* and *able Men*; nay, *whole Cabals of ſuch*, who had Merit with *Him*, though they had none with the *Nation*. He ſtarted often out of the true Intereſt of his People; but the Voice of his People almoſt as often reclaim'd Him. He made the *firſt Dutch War*; but He made the *Triple Alliance* too. He engaged with *France* in the War of 1672; but He made a ſeparate Peace with *Holland*. True it is, indeed, that neither the Repreſentations of his Parliament, nor the Deſires of his People, could prevail on Him to go farther, and to enter in earneſt into the War againſt *France*. But the Confidence between *Him* and his *Parliament* was ſo broken at that Time, that they would not truſt Him, nor He Them. At This I am not ſurprized, and for that very Reaſon, I confeſs, I have always been ſo at the ſtrong and repeated Inſtances made to force Him into *that War*; ſince it cannot ſurely be better Policy to drive a Prince into a War, which He has no Inclination to make, than it would be to be drawn by Him into a War, if He had no Ability to conduct it. In *Home-Affairs*, beſides his frequent Conceſſions, whenever the Nation took Umbrage at his Proceedings, He paſs'd the *Teſt* and the *Habeas Corpus Bills*, and many others for the publick Benefit; and I ſcarce remember any *popular Act*, which ſtop'd at the Throne in his Time, except That about the *Militia*, which He apprehended to be a dangerous Encroachment on his Prerogative, and another in Favour of the *Diſſenters*, which was contrived, meanly enough to be ſtolen off the Table in the *Houſe of Lords*.

What has been touch'd here, and in former Papers, will be ſufficient to ſhew, in ſome Meaſure, how King *Charles* was enabled to *divide a Nation* ſo united and ſo heated as this Nation was, on the Diſ-

Discovery of the *Popish Plot*; to oppose so avowedly and so resolutely the *Exclusion of his Brother*; the Prospect of whose succeeding to the Crown was become still more dreadful, even by that small Part of *Coleman's* Correspondence, which had come to Light; and yet to attach so numerous a Party to *Himself*, nay to his *Brother*; to lay aside Parliaments for several Years, and not only to stand his Ground, but to gain Ground in the Nation, at the same Time. But there is still something more to be added. He had not only prepared for the Storm, but he acquired new Strength in the Midst of it; That is, in the Proceedings on the *Popish Plot*, and the *Bill of Exclusion*. He would gladly have kept the *former* out of Parliament; but when it was once there, He put on the Appearances of great Zeal for the Prosecution of it. These Appearances help'd him to screen his *Brother*; as the ill Success of the *Exclusion Bill in the House of Lords*, where it was rejected by *Sixty-Three* against *Thirty*, help'd to screen Himself from the Violence of the *House of Commons*. But That, which gave Him the principal Advantage, in the present Contests, was another Management. As soon as the first preparatory Steps were made to the *Bill of Exclusion* in 1678, he declared Himself, in a Speech to his Parliament, ready to pass any Bills to make his People safe in the Reign of his *Successor*, *so they tended not to impeach the Right of Succession, nor the Descent of the Crown in the true Line.* He persisted in his Declaration to the last; and if He had done nothing else, I imagine that He would have gain'd no great Popularity. When a *free People* lye under any *Grievance*, or apprehend any *Danger*, and try to obtain their Prince's Consent to deliver Them from *one* or prevent the *other*; a flat Refusal, on his Part, reduces Them to the melancholy Alternative of

continuing

continuing to ſubmit to *one*, and to ſtand expoſed to the *other*, or of freeing Themſelves from *both*, without his Conſent; which can hardly be done by Means very conſiſtent with his and their common Intereſt. King *Charles* was too wiſe to puſh the Nation to ſuch an Extremity. He refuſed what his Parliament preſs'd on Him, in the *Manner* and on the *Principle* they preſs'd it; but then his *Refuſal* was follow'd by *Expedients*; which vary'd the *Manner*, and yet might have been managed ſo as to produce the *Effect*; and which ſeem'd to ſave, rather than actually ſaved, the *Principle*. Numbers concur'd, at that Time, in avowing the *Principle*; and the *Teſts* had made many Perſons think *Religion* ſafe; as the *King's Offers* made Them think it no Fault of his, if it was not made ſafer. The *Council* had prepared *ſome Expedients*; and the *Limitations*, and *other Proviſions* againſt a *Popiſh Succeſſor*, propoſed directly from the Throne by the *Chancellor* in 1679, went a great Way towards binding the Hands of *ſuch a Succeſſor*, and lodging the Power, taken from *Him*, in the Parliament. But the Scheme of *Expedients*, debated in the *Oxford* Parliament, was a real Excluſion from every Thing, but the *Title of King*. The *firſt Article* baniſh'd the Duke of *York*, during his Life, to the Diſtance of 500 Miles from *England*, *Scotland* and *Ireland*; and the *Tenth*, to mention no more, excluded him *ipſo facto*, if He came into any of theſe Kingdoms; directed that he ſhould ſuffer, in this Caſe, as by the *former Bill*, and that the Sovereignty ſhould veſt forthwith in the *Regent*; That is, in the Princeſs of *Orange*. Surely This was not to vote the *Lyon in the Lobby into the Houſe*. It would have been to vote Him *out of the Houſe*, *and Lobby both*, and only to ſuffer Him to be call'd *Lyon* ſtill. I am not ignorant of the Refinements, urged by

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Sir *William Jones* and Others against *this Scheme*; but I know that Men run into Errors from both Extremes; from That of seeing too much, as well as That of seeing too little; and that the most subtle Refiners are apt to miss the true Point of political Wisdom, which consists in distinguishing justly between what is absolutely best in Speculation, and what is the best of Things practicable in particular Conjunctures. The *Scheme*, no Doubt, was built on a manifest Absurdity, and was liable to many Inconveniencies, Difficulties and Dangers; but still it was the utmost, that could be hoped for at that Moment; and the single Consideration, one would think, should have been This; whether, united under such an Act of Parliament, They would not have opposed the Succession of the Duke of *York*, with less Inconveniency, less Difficulty and Danger, than disunited, and with the Laws against Them. The Truth is, that as there were Men at this Time, desirous that the *King* should be on desperate Terms with his *Parliament*, because *They* were so Themselves; in like Manner, there were Others, who desired, for a Reason of the same Nature, that the Parliament should be on desperate Terms with the King. These where *factious Interests*, and they prevail'd against the *national Interest*; which required that the *King* should be separated at any Rate from his *Brother*, instead of being united to Him by a Fear made common to *both*. But the Dye was thrown; and the Leaders of the *Whig-Party* were resolved * *to let all lye in Confusion, rather than hearken to any Thing, besides the Exclusion.* Obstinacy provoked Obstinacy. The *King* grew obstinate, and severe too, against his natural Easiness aud former Clemency of Temper. The

* *Burn. Hist.*

Tory Party grew as obſtinate, and as furious on their Side, according to a natural Tendency in the Diſpoſition of all *Parties*; and thus the Nation was deliver'd over, on the Death of King * *Charles, à la Sottiſe de ſon Frere; to the Folly and Madneſs of his* Brother.

It was *this Folly* and *Madneſs* however, that cured the *Folly and Madneſs of Party.* As the common Danger approach'd, the Impreſſions of Terror, which it made, increaſed. *Whig* and *Tory* then felt them alike, and were brought by them, as drunken Men ſometimes are, to their Senſes. The Events of King *James*'s Reign, and the Steps, by which the *Revolution* was brought about, are ſo recent and ſo well known, that I ſhall not deſcend into any particular Mention of them. A few general Remarks on the Behaviour of *this Prince*, and on the Behaviour of *Parties*, in his Reign, and at the *Revolution*, will be ſufficient to wind up the Hiſtory of *Whig* and *Tory*, and to prove what I have ſo often aſſerted, that *both Sides* purged Themſelves on this great Occaſion, of the Imputations laid to their Charge by their *Adverſaries*; that the proper and real Diſtinction of the *two Parties* expired at this *Æra*, and that although their Ghoſts have continued to haunt and divide us ſo many Years afterwards, yet there neither is, nor can be any Diviſion of *Parties* at this Time, reconcileable with common Senſe, and common Honeſty, among Thoſe, who are come on the Stage of the World, under the *preſent Conſtitution*; except Thoſe of *Churchmen* and *Diſſenters*; Thoſe of *Court* and *Country.*

The Behaviour and Conduct of King *James* the 2*d* would be ſufficient, if there was no other In-

* *An Expreſſion uſed by King* Charles *on many Occaſions.*

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ſtance, and there are Thouſands, to ſhew that as ſtrong Prejudices, however got, are the Parents, ſo a weak Underſtanding is the Nurſe of *Bigotry*, and Injuſtice, and Violence and Cruelty its Off-ſpring. *This Prince* was above *Fifty*, when He came to the Throne. He had great Experience of all Kinds; particularly of the Temper of *this Nation*, and of the Impoſſibility to attempt introducing *Popery*, without hazarding his Crown. But his *Experience* profited him not. His *Bigotry* drew falſe Concluſions from it. He flatter'd himſelf that He ſhould be able to play *Parties* againſt one another, better than his *Brother* had done; (which, by the Way, was the leaſt of his little Talents;) and to compleat his Deſigns by an *Authority*, which was but too well eſtabliſh'd. He paſs'd, I think, for a ſincere Man. Perhaps, He was ſo, and He ſpoke always with great Emphaſis of the *Word of a King*; and yet never was the meaneſt Word ſo ſcandalouſly broken as his. In the Debate in 1678, about the *Teſt*, when he got a Proviſo put in for accepting Himſelf, it has been advanced in Print, and not denied that I know of, that ſpeaking with * *great Earneſtneſs and with Tears in his Eyes, He ſolemnly proteſted that whatever his Religion might be, it ſhould only be a private Thing between God and his own Soul; and that no Effect of it ſhould ever appear in the Government.* At his Acceſſion to the Throne, in *Council* firſt, and after That in *full Parliament*, in the Face of the Nation, He made the ſtrongeſt Declaration in Favour of the Conſtitution in Church and State, and took the moſt ſolemn Engagements to defend and ſupport it. But *Bigotry* burſt thro' all theſe Cobwebs; for ſuch they are to Men, tranported by a *religious Delirium*, who acquire a Strength

* *Burnet's Hiſtory.*

that Those, who are well, have not, and conscienciously break all the Obligations of Morality. These admirable Dispositions in the *King* were encouraged by the State, in which his *Brother* left and He found the Nation, and by the Complaisance of the Parliament, which he call'd soon after his Accession. They were confirm'd, and He was determined to pull off the Mask entirely, by the ill Success of the Duke of *Monmouth* and the Earl of *Argyle*, Bishop *Burnet* speaks of this Parliament very indecently, and I think very untruly. *They were neither Men of Parts, nor Estates*, according to Him. The Truth is, that the Circumstances, under which We were brought, by the factious Proceedings of *both Parties*, in the late Reign, for and against the *Court*, were such as might perplex the best Parts, and puzzle the Heads even of the wisest Men. A *profess'd, zealous Papist*, in full and quiet Possession of the Throne, and, instead of any Provision made, or any Measures taken against Him, the Notion and the Exercise of the Prerogative establish'd at an extravagant Height, were such Circumstances, as laid the Nation almost at the Mercy of the *King*. They therefore, who were the most determined not to part with either their *Religion*, or their *Liberty*, and yet had more to lose in the Fray than Dr. *Burnet*, might be willing to look round Them; to wait Opportunities; and not undertake rashly what can seldom be undertaken twice. It is impossible to believe that their Confidence in the *King's Word* was such as They affected. But like drowning Men, who saw nothing else to catch at, They caught at a Straw. The Duke of *Monmouth*'s Expedition into *England* and the Earl of *Argyle*'s into *Scotland*, were so far from affording the Nation any Opportunity of mending their Condition, that the Declaration of the *former* might

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draw ſome of the *Diſſenters* to his Standard, as it did; but was calculated to drive the *Tory Party*, moſt of the *Whigs*, and in ſhort the *Bulk of the People* from Him. The Declaration of the *latter* was founded in the *ſolemn League and Covenant*; and gave ſo much Reaſon to apprehend that a Revival of the *ſame Principles*, and a Renewal of the *ſame Tyranny* was intended, that We cannot wonder it had no better an Effect; though We lament the Fate of a *worthy* and *gallant Man*, whoſe Crime was refuſing a *Teſt*, that ſhould never have been impoſed on *Proteſtants* and *Freemen*, and who had been driven into theſe extreme Reſolutions by a Series of *unjuſt* and *tyrannical Uſage*.

Thus were *theſe Invaſions*, in the very Beginning of his Reign, favourable in ſome Reſpects to the Deſigns of King *James*. They fortified, in the Minds of Men, the Jealouſies and Fears, which had a few Years before form'd the *Tory Party*; and diſpoſed Them by Conſequence, at leaſt, to keep Meaſures and not break with the *King*. They gave Him the Pretence, which He ſeized very readily, of raiſing and keeping up a *ſtanding Army*. But, in the Event, they forwarded our Deliverance from all the Dangers, to which We were expoſed, under his Government, by precipitating his Attempts againſt our *Religion* and *Liberty*. The ſame Day, that the News of the Invaſion in *Scotland* was communicated to the *Parliament* here, the *Commons* voted that great Revenue, which they gave Him, and gave Him for Life. After *theſe Invaſions* were over, They voted a Supply, which was intended for the Charge of maintaining the *additional Forces*. They offer'd to paſs a Law for indemnifying his *Popiſh Officers* from the Penalty They had incur'd; and to capacitate *ſuch Others* as He ſhould name in a Liſt to be given to the *Houſe*. In ſhort, They

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ſuffer'd Themſelves to be drawn to the Brink of the Precipice; but there They ſtop'd. They would neither give Him the whole Supply of 1,200,000 *l.* which He ask'd, nor ſanctify, by the Authority of *Parliament*, the Practice of keeping up a *ſtanding Army in Time of Peace*; but rejected the Words moved for that Purpoſe. They would neither repeal the *Teſt* and *penal Laws*; nor ſubmit to his *diſpenſing*, or *ſuſpending*, which was in Effect a *repealing Power*; That is, they would not caſt Themſelves headlong down the Precipice; and becauſe They would not, He quarrel'd with Them, loſt the 700,000 *l.* They had voted, rather than ſuffer Them to ſit any longer; and never met Them more.

Things haſten'd now to a Deciſion. The *King*'s Deſigns were openly avow'd, and deſperately puſh'd. The Church of *England* oppoſed them, with the utmoſt Vigour. The *Diſſenters* were cajoled by the *Court*; and They, who had been ready to take Arms againſt King *Charles*, becauſe He was unwilling to exclude his *Brother*, and who had taken Arms againſt *this Prince*, ſince He was on the Throne, became Abetters of his Uſurpations. It were eaſy to prove This, even by Biſhop *Burnet*'s Account, as much as That is ſoften'd; and if the Excuſes, which have been made for their Silence againſt *Popery* in this critical Moment, or for their approving and encouraging the Exerciſe of a *diſpenſing Power*, are to be received, one may undertake to excuſe, on the ſame Principles of Reaſoning, all thoſe Inſtances of Miſconduct in the *Church Party*, which I have preſumed to cenſure ſo freely. But the Truth is, theſe Excuſes are frivolous. I could quote ſome, that are even burleſque. Let us reverence Truth therefore, and condemn the *Diſſenters* as frankly, on this Occaſion, as We have con-

condemn'd the Members of the *Church of England* on others.

The *Revolution* ſoon follow'd. Many of the moſt diſtinguiſh'd *Tories*, ſome of thoſe, who carried higheſt the Doctrines of *Paſſive Obedience* and *Non-Reſiſtance*, were engaged in it; and the whole Nation was ripe for it. The *Whigs* were zealous in the ſame Cauſe; but their Zeal was not ſuch as, I think, it had been ſome Years before, *a Zeal without Knowledge*; I mean, that it was better temper'd, and more prudently conducted. Though the *King* was not the better for his Experience, *Parties* were. Both ſaw their Errors. The *Tories* ſtop'd ſhort in the Purſuit of a *bad Principle*. The *Whigs* reform'd the Abuſe of a *good one*. Both had ſacrificed their *Country* to their *Party*. Both ſacrificed, on this Occaſion, their *Party* to their *Country*. When the *Tories* and the *Whigs* were thus coalited, the *latter* ſtood no longer in Need of any adventitious Help. If They did not refuſe the Aſſiſtance of Thoſe, who had weaken'd their Cauſe more, by the Jealouſies and Fears, to which They gave both Occaſion and Pretence, than They had ſtrengthen'd it by their Number; yet They ſuffer'd Them to have no Influence in their Councils, no Direction of their Conduct. The Cauſe of *Liberty* was no longer made the Cauſe of a *Party*, by being ſet on ſuch a Bottom, and puſh'd in ſuch a Manner, as *one Party* alone approved. The *Revolution* was plainly deſign'd to reſtore and ſecure our Government, Eccleſiaſtical and Civil, on true Foundations; and whatever might happen to the *King*, there was no Room to ſuſpect any Change of the *Conſtitution*. There were Some, indeed, concern'd in this great and glorious Undertaking, who had obſtinately preſerved, or lightly taken up the *Republican* and *other Whimſies*, that reign'd in the

Days

Days of Usurpation and Confusion. If they could have prevail'd, and it was no Fault of theirs they did not, the *Coalition of Parties* had been broken; and instead of a *Revolution*, we might have had a *civil War*; perhaps not even that sad Chance for our *Religion* and *Liberty*. But *this Leaven* was so near worn out, that it could neither corrupt, nor seem any longer to corrupt the Mass of the *Whig-Party*. The *Party* never had been *Presbyterians*, nor *Republicans*, any more than They had been *Quakers*; any more than the *Tory Party* had been *Papists*, when, notwithstanding their Aversion to *Popery*, they were undeniably under the accidental Influence of *Popish Councils*. But even the Appearances were now rectified. The *Revolution* was a Fire, which purged off the Dross of *both Parties*; and the Dross being purged off, They appear'd to be the same Metal, and answer'd the same Standard.

I shall deliver my Thoughts, on some other Occasion, concerning the Disputes, that arose about the *Settlement of the Crown*, after the *Revolution*; and shew, if I do not very much deceive Myself, that no Argument can be drawn from thence against any Thing I have advanced.

I am, SIR, &c.

LETTER VIII.

SIR,

THE ſlaviſh Principles of *Paſſive-Obedience* and *Non-Reſiſtance*, which had ſculk'd perhaps in ſome old Homily before King *James* the 1*ſt*, but were talk'd, written and preach'd into Vogue in that inglorious Reign, and in Thoſe of his three Succeſſors, were renounced at the *Revolution* by the *laſt of the ſeveral Parties*, who declared for them. Not only the *Laity*, but the *Clergy* embraced and co-operated in the Deliverance, which the Prince of *Orange* brought Them. Some of our *Prelates* join'd to invite Him over. Their Bretheren refuſed to ſign an Abhorrence of this Invitation. The Univerſity of *Oxford* offer'd Him their Plate, and aſſociated for Him againſt their *King*. In one Word, the Conduct of the *Tories*, at this Criſis, was ſuch as might have inclined a Man to think They had never held *Reſiſtance* unlawful, but had only differ'd with the *Whigs* about the Degree of Oppreſſion, or of Danger, which it was neceſſary to wait, in order to ſanctify *Reſiſtance*. Now, it may appear at firſt a little ſtrange that *Theſe Principles*, which had always gone Hand in Hand with Thoſe of the *divine*, *hereditary*, *indefiezeable Right of Kings*, that were juſt as well founded in Reaſon, in Support of which the Example of the primitive *Chriſtians* might be pompouſly cited, and to countenance which ſome Texts

of the Bible might be piouſly ſtrain'd, ſhould not keep their Hold, and maintain their Influence, as well as the *others*.

This Attachment to *hereditary Right* will appear the more ſtrange, if We conſider what Regard was ſhewn, at this Time, to the Difficulties They, who had pawn'd themſelves, as it were for the *Principles*, would be under, when they came to concur in eſtabliſhing a *Settlement* repugnant to it. That great and ſolemn Reſolution, about the *Abdication of King James*, and the *Vacancy of the Throne*, might have been expreſs'd in Terms much ſtronger and plainer than it was. I have heard there were Perſons, who had a Mind it ſhould be ſo; and who, more attach'd to the Honour, That is the Humour of *Party*, than to the *national Intereſt*, in this great Event, would have turn'd this Reſolution, as well as the Declaration of the Prince of *Orange*, to a more expreſs Approbation of the *Whig*, and a more expreſs Condemnation of the *Tory* Tenets and Conduct. But a wiſer and honeſter Conſideration prevail'd. Inſtead of erecting the *new Government* on the narrow Foundations of *Party Syſtems*, the Foundations of it were laid as wide, and made as comprehenſible, as They could be. No Man, I believe, at this Time, thinks that the Vote aſſerted too little; and ſurely there was no Colour of Reaſon on the Side of *Thoſe*, who cavil'd againſt it, at that Time, for aſſerting too much.

The Diſputes about the Words *abdicate*, or *deſert*, and about the *Vacancy of the Throne*, were in Truth fitter for a *School* than a *Houſe of Parliament*, and might have been expected in ſome Aſſembly of *Pedants*, where young Students exerciſed themſelves in Diſputation, but not in ſuch an auguſt Aſſembly as That of the *Lords* and *Commons*, met in

in ſolemn Conference upon the moſt important Occaſion. The Truth is that They, who form'd the Oppoſition, were reduced to maintain ſtrange Paradoxes; ſtranger, in my Opinion, than moſt of Thoſe, which caſt ſo much Ridicule on the *Stoics* of old. Thus, for inſtance, They were forced to admit that an *oppreſs'd People* might ſeek their Remedy in *Reſiſtance*, for They had ſought it there themſelves, and yet they oppoſed making Uſe of the *only Remedy*, which could effectually ſecure them againſt Returns of the *ſame Oppreſſion*, when *Reſiſtance* had put it in their Power, as *Oppreſſion* had given them a Right to uſe this *Remedy*. Surely This muſt appear a Paradox, and a very abſurd one too, if We conſider that *Reſiſtance*, in all ſuch Caſes, is the *Mean*, and *future Security* the *End*; and that the *former* is impertinent, nay wicked in the higheſt Degree, if it be not employ'd to obtain the *latter*. Thus again, the *ſame Men* declared themſelves willing to ſecure the Nation againſt the Return of King *James* to that Throne, which He had *abdicated*; or according to Them, *deſerted*; nay, ſome of them were ready, if We may credit the Ancedotes of that Time, to proceed to ſuch extreme Reſolutions, as would have been more effectual, than juſtifiable in the Eyes of Mankind; and yet they could not prevail on their ſcrupulous Conſciences to declare *the Throne vacant*. They had concur'd in the Vote, that it was *inconſiſtent with the Laws, Liberties and Religion of* England *to have a* Papiſt *rule over the Kingdom*. King *James* had follow'd the pious Example of *Sigiſmond*, who, not content to loſe the Crown of *Sweden* *Himſelf* for his Religion, had carried his *Son* away, that He might be bred a *Papiſt*, and loſe it too; and yet They maintain'd, though They did not expreſly name Him, that if the Throne was then,

or ſhould be at any Time vacant of the *Father*, it muſt be reputed inſtantaneouſly full of the *Son*, upon the Foundation of this ſilly Axiom, that the *King never dies*. According to this Law, and theſe Politicks, King *James* and his Succeſſors, to the twentieth Generation, might have continued abroad, a Race of Royal Exiles, preſerving their *indefiezable Right* to govern, but debar'd from the *Exerciſe* of it; whilſt the Nation continued, during all this Time, from Century to Century, under the Dominion of *Regents*, with *regal Authority*, but without any *regal Right*; an excellent Expedient ſure to keep the Monarchy in an *hereditary Succeſſion!* But there remain'd none better, on the Principles of *theſe Men*, ſince the Prince of *Orange* had committed the fatal Overſight of neglecting to *conquer* the Nation. His Sword would have cut the gordian Knot of *hereditary Right*, and They could have ſubmitted with ſafe Conſciences to a *Conqueror*. But to *give* the Crown to a *Prince*, though They had put the *whole Adminiſtration* into his Hands; which, by the Way, was *High Treaſon*, unleſs the Throne was, what they deny'd it to be, actually *vacant*; to *give* the Crown, I ſay, to a *Prince*, who would not *take* it, when it was in his Power to *take* it, without their *Conſent*; to ſettle a new Government by *Agreement* and *Compact*, when the glorious Opportunity of eſtabliſhing it by *Force* and *Conqueſt* had been unhappily loſt; Theſe were Propoſitions, to which they could not conſent. King *James* had violated the fundamental Laws, which He had promiſed over and over and ſworn to maintain. He had ſhewn by his *firſt Eſcape*, when nothing was more impoſed on Him than to wait the Reſolution of a *free Parliament*, that He would renounce his Crown rather than ſubmit to ſecure effectually the Obſervation

ſervation of theſe Laws. He had made a *ſecond Eſcape*, which was voluntary as well as the *firſt*, and made on the ſame Principle, againſt the Intreaties of his Friends, and the Inſtigations of the *ſame Council* as had directed his former Conduct, and on a Letter from the *Queen*, claiming his Promiſe to do ſo. Notwithſtanding all theſe Reaſons, They, who maintain'd the *hereditary Right of our Kings*, reduced Themſelves, and would have reduced their Country, to the abſurd Neceſſity of altering the *Conſtitution*, under Pretence of preſerving it. No *King*, except a *Stuart*, was to reign over Us. But we might eſtabliſh a *Doge*, a *Lord Arckon*, a *Regent*; and thus theſe warm Aſſertors of *Monarchy*, refuſing to be *Slaves*, contended to be *Republicans*. Many more Paradoxes of equal Extravagance might be cited, which were advanced directly, or which reſulted plainly, from the Arguments employ'd on one Side of the Queſtion in thoſe Diſputes. But the Inſtances I have cited may ſuffice for our preſent Purpoſe, and may ſerve to ſhew that although Difficulties hard to ſolve in Speculation, or to remove in Practice, will ariſe in the Purſuit of the moſt rational Principles; yet ſuch Abſurdities as theſe can never ariſe, except from the moſt irrational, and always muſt ariſe from ſuch.

If the Perſons, who maintain'd this *divine*, *hereditary*, *indefiezable Right of our Kings*, had thought fit to drop theſe Principles, when They laid aſide Thoſe of *Paſſive Obedience* and *Non-Reſiſtance*, and no tolerable Reaſon can be given why They did not, their Conduct would have been conſiſtent and uniform on this great Occaſion; and this Conſiſtency and Uniformity would have been productive of great Good, by taking away at once even the Appearances of all political Diviſion in the Bulk of the

Nation

Nation. But whilst They labour'd to reconcile their *present Conduct* to their *antient System*, They were true to *neither*. They had gone much farther than *This* would allow, and then *They* refused to go as far as the *other* required, in order to be safe, and therefore in order to be justify'd. They lost every Kind of Merit; the chimerical Merit of adhering to a Set of *silly Principles*; the real Merit of sacrificing their Prejudicies to the compleat Deliverance of their Country from the recent Danger of *Popery* and *arbitary Power*. Nay, They did worse; for the mischievous Consequences of their Conduct were not hurtful to Them alone, and at that Time alone, but to the Publick, and even down to these Times. They furnish'd Pretence to *Factions*, who kept up a Division under the *old Names*, when the Differences were really extinguish'd by the Conduct of *both Parties*; because the Conduct of *both Parties* was no longer conformable to the Principles imputed to Them. The *Tories* had no longer any Pretence of fearing the Designs of the *Whigs*; since the *Whigs* had sufficiently purged Themselves from all Suspicion of *Republican Views*, by their Zeal to continue *monarchical Government*, and of latitudinarian Schemes in Point of *Religion*, by their ready Concurrence in preserving our *Ecclesiastical Establishment*, and by their insisting on nothing farther, in Favour of the *Dissenters*, than that Indulgence, which the *Church* was most willing to grant. The *Whigs* had as little Pretence of fearing the *Tories*; since the *Tories* had purged Themselves, in the most signal Manner, from all Suspicion of favouring *Popery*, or *arbitary Power*, by the vigorous Resistance They made *to both*. They had engaged, They had taken the Lead in the *Revolution*, and They were fully determined against the Return of King *James*. The real Essences of

Whig

Whig and *Tory* were thus destroy'd; but the nominal were preserved, and have done since that Time a good Part of the Mischief, which the real did before. The Opposition made to the *Settlement of the Crown* brought This about. An over-curious Enquiry into the Motives of this Opposition would be a Task too invidious for Me to undertake. Something however may be said upon it. We may say in general, without Offence, that *private Ambition* mingled itself early in the great and national Concerns of the *Revolution*; and that it did so more, as the Prospect of a *new Settlement*, and of the Elevation of the Prince of *Orange* approach'd. Expectations were raised; Disappointments were given, or foreseen; and a Variety of Motives of the same Kind began to influence very strongly the Conduct of the principal Actors. *Some* endeavour'd to lay the Foundations of their future Fortune by Demonstrations of a personal Attachment to the *Prince*; which were carried on, I doubt a little too independently of the Regard due to their Country, in some Cases; particularly, if I mistake not, in That of *the Declaration of Rights*, of which We may pronounce, and Experience will justify us, that it was too loose, too imperfect, and nothing less than proportionable to the Importance of the Occasion, and the favourable Circumstances of the Conjuncture. *Others* there were, who imagined that the shortest and surest Way for them to take, in Pursuit of the same View, was to make Themselves considerable by *Opposition*, to form a *Party*, and maintain a Struggle for *personal Power*, under the Pretence and Umbrage of *Principle*. This was, without Doubt, the Motive of some particular leading Men, and could not be, at least at first, the Motive of Numbers. But there was *another Motive*, which easily became That of Numbers, because

it

it arose out of a Fund common to all Men, the *Perversity of human Nature*, according to an Observation made in one of these Letters. Whilst the Event of the Prince of *Orange*'s Expedition was undecided, Men remain'd under the full Influence of their *Fears*, which had determined Them to act against their *Prejudices*. But when the *Revolution* was secure and these *Fears* were calm'd, *these Prejudicies* resumed, in some Degree, their former Power, and the more for being revived and encouraged by Men of Reputation and Authority, who argued for some, and might as reasonably have argued for all the Errors, in Contradiction to which most of Them had acted, nay and were ready to act. With such Views, and by such Means, were many brought, at this Time, to entangle Themselves in a Maze of inextricable Absurdities. Had They own'd candidly and fairly that their *Principles*, as well as Those of the *Whigs*, were carried too high in the former Disputes of *Parties*, and that *these Principles* could not be true, since They found Themselves actually in a Situation, wherein it was not possible to act agreeably to them without manifest Absurdity, the Distinction, as well as the Difference, of *Whig* and *Tory* had been at an End. But contrary Measures produced a contrary Effect. They kept up the Appearances, and They could keep up no more, of a *Whig* and a *Tory Party*, and with these Appearances a great Part of the old Animosity. The *two Names* were sounded about the Nation; and Men, who saw the same Ensigns flying, were not wise enough to perceive, or not honest enough to own, that the same Cause was no longer concern'd, but listed Themselves on either Side, as their Prejudices at first, and their Inclinations, or other Motives, which arose in the Progress of their Contests, directed Them afterwards; *Whigs* very often under the

the *Tory* Standard, *Tories* very often under the *Whig* Standard.

This general Representation, which I have made of the State of *Parties* at the *Revolution*, is, I am verily persuaded, exactly just; and it might be supported by many particular Proofs, which I chuse rather to suggest, than to mention. But if any Doubt remains, let us analyse the several *Parties* of that Time a little more, reduce Them to their *first* and *real Principles*, and then pronounce whether We find the *Whig*, or the *Tory Party* subsisting among Them.

In the first Place, there was a *Party*, that concur'd in making the *new Settlement*; a *Party*, that prevail'd in *Parliament*, and was by much the Majority of the Nation out of it. Were the *Whigs* this Majority? Was this Party a *Whig Party?* No Man will presume to affirm so notorious an Untruth. The *Whigs* were far from being this Majority, and King *James* must have dyed on the Throne, if the *Tories* had not concur'd to place the Prince of *Orange* there, in his stead. Was this Party a *Tory Party* then? Certainly no. The *Whigs* had been zealous in the same Cause, and had contributed to make it successful by their Temper, as well as their Zeal; by waiting the Time of the *Tories*, or rather the Maturity of the Conjuncture, and by moderating their Principles and their Conduct, in Favour of that *Coalition*, without which the *Revolution* could have succeeded no more than the *Exclusion* did. We find then here neither a *Whig*, nor a *Tory Party*; for in *Coalitions* of this Kind, where *two Parties* are melted, as it were, into one, *neither* of them can be said, with Truth and Propriety, to exist.

There was *another Party* directly opposite to *This*; a certain Number of Men, on whom the

original Taint, transmitted down from King *James* the 1*st*, remain'd still in the full Strength of its Malignity. These Men adhered to *those Principles*, in the natural Sense and full Extent of them, which the *Tories* had profess'd. But yet, the *Tories* having renounced *these Principles*, or distinguish'd Themselves out of any Obligation to observe them, this inconsiderable Faction could not be deem'd the *Tory Party*, but received the Name of *Jacobite* with more Propriety.

Two other Parties there were at this Time, form'd on one common Principle, but widely different however, by the different Consequences They drew from it. The Principle I mean is That contain'd in the Distinction of a King *de Jure*, and a King *de Facto*. The famous Statute of *Henry* the 7*th* authorized this Distinction. The Statute was design'd principally, no Doubt, for the Advantage of the *Subjects*, that they might be safe, which-ever Side prevail'd in an Age, when the epidemical Folly of fighting for *different Pretenders* had spilt Oceans of Blood on the Scaffold, as well as in the Field; and yet the Statute was design'd for the Service of *Kings de Facto* too, and particularly of *Henry* the 7*th*. The Author of *hereditary Right asserted* would have us believe otherwise; and yet surely nothing can be more evident than This, that if King *Henry* the *Seventh*'s Right had been as unquestionable as He supposes, and I presume to deny that it was, yet He would have been declared a King *de Facto* only, if the Intrigues of the Dutchess of *Burgundy*, and the Faction of *York* had succeeded; and consequently this Provision for the Safety of his Adherents, in that possible Contingency, gave Strength to Him, as it would have given Strength to any other Prince, whilst it attach'd his Adherents to Him by the apparent Security it provided; for *this Author*

thor contends that it did not eſtabliſh a real Security, and adviſes us to ſuſpend our Judgment on the Validity of *this Statute*, till We ſee what the *Opinion of Parliament, or the Judges, may be, whenever a King* de Jure *ſhall diſpoſſeſs a King* de Facto. He refers us *ad Calendas Græcas.*

But there are two Obſervations to be made to our preſent Purpoſe on *this Statute*, which ſeem to Me natural and plain. *Firſt*, it confounds in Effect the very Diſtinction it ſeems to make; ſince it ſecures alike, and, by ſecuring alike, authorizes alike Thoſe, who adhere to the *King de Jure*, and Thoſe, who adhere to the *King de Facto*, provided They adhere to the *King in Poſſeſſiou. Secondly*, it was contrived *to hinder People*, according to my Lord *Bacon*'s Senſe of it, *from buſying Themſelves in prying into the King's Title, and that Subjects might not trouble Themſelves with Enquiries into the Juſtneſs of the King's Title, or Quarrel.* Now, upon the Foundation of this Diſtinction, and this Statute, thus underſtood, They, who demur'd on the *Settlement of the Crown*, at the *Revolution*, might plauſibly, though I think very unreaſonably, reſolve neither to vote, nor act Themſelves againſt thoſe Maxims and Principles, which they had entertain'd and profeſs'd, as Maxims of Law, and Principles of the Conſtitution, and yet reſolve to ſubmit ſincerely, and adhere faithfully to a *new Eſtabliſhment*, when it was once made. But the *other of the two Parties* I mention'd drew from the ſame Principle, of diſtinguiſhing between a King *de Facto*, and a King *de Jure*, a very different Concluſion. They acknowledged *one King*, and held their Allegiance ſtill due to *another*. They bound Themſelves by Oath to preſerve a *Settlement*, which They pretended Themſelves in Conſcience obliged to ſubvert. This was to juſtify *Perfidy*, to ſanctify *Per-*

jury, to remove the ſacred Boundaries of *Right* and *Wrong*, and, as far as in them lay, to teach Mankind *to call Good evil, and Evil good.*

Such were the *three Diviſions*, into which Men broke at the *Revolution*, in oppoſing the *Settlement* then made; whilſt the great Body of the Nation concur'd in it, and *Whig* and *Tory* form'd in Reality but *one Party.* The *firſt of theſe Diviſions* continued, and became a *Faction in the State*; but made no Proſelytes, and was worn out by Time. The Principle of the *ſecond* was wrong; but it could not be reputed dangerous, whilſt it laſted, and it ſeems to have been built on ſo narrow and ſlippery a Foundation, that it did not continue long in Force. I may be more bold in aſſerting This, ſince if We look back to the *Æra* of the *Revolution*, and to the Times, which follow'd, We ſhall find among Thoſe, who voted for a *Regent*, not a *King*, on the Abdication of King *James*, ſome illuſtrious Perſons, who ſerved King *William* faithfully, who adhered inviolably to our *new Eſtabliſhment*, and who have been diſtinguiſh'd Friends of the *Succeſſion*, that hath now taken Place. That there have been Perſons, who deſerved to be rank'd under the *third Head*, is too notorious to be deny'd; but I perſuade Myſelf that *this Diviſion* hath conſiſted always of a flux Body. On one Hand, it is ſcarce poſſible to believe that any Number of Men ſhould be ſo harden'd, as to avow to Themſelves, and to one another, the acting and perſiſting to act on a *Principle* ſo repugnant to every Notion and Sentiment, that harbour in the Breaſts of ſocial Creatures. On the other, We know how the Sallies and Tranſports of *Party*, on ſome Occaſions, can hurry even reaſonable Men to act on the moſt abſurd, and honeſt Men to act on the moſt unjuſtifiable Principles, or both one and the other on

on no Principle at all, according as the Object, which the prevailing Paſſion preſents to Them, directs. This hath been the Caſe of many, ſince the *Revolution*, and there are ſome of all Sides, I believe, ſtill alive, ſure I am that there were ſome a few Years ago, who know that no Side is abſolutely unexceptionable in this Reſpect.

I am, SIR, &c.

LETTER IX.

SIR,

BUT whatever the State of *Parties* was at the *Revolution*, and for ſome Time afterwards, the *Settlement* made at that Time having continued, that State of *Parties* hath changed gradually, tho' ſlowly, and hath received at Length, according to the neceſſary Courſe of Things, a total Alteration. This Alteration would have been ſooner wrought, if the Attempt I have mention'd, to defend *Principles* no longer defenſible, had not furniſh'd the Occaſion and Pretence to keep up the Appearances of a *Tory*, and a *Whig Party*. Some of Thoſe, who had been call'd *Tories*, furniſh'd this Pretence. They, who had been call'd *Whigs*, ſeized and improved it. The Advantages to *one Side*, the Diſadvantages to the *other*, the Miſchiefs to the whole, which have enſued, I need not deduce. It ſhall ſuffice to obſerve, that theſe Appearances were the more eaſy to be kept up, becauſe ſeveral Men, who had ſtood conſpicuous in Oppoſition to one another before the *Revolution*, continued an Oppoſition, though

though not the ſame, afterwards. Freſh Provocations were daily given, and freſh Pretences for Diviſion daily taken. Theſe Conteſts were preſent; They recall'd thoſe, that had paſt in the Time of King *Charles* the 2*d*; and *both Sides* forgot that Union, which their common Danger and their common Intereſt had form'd at the *Revolution*. Old Reproaches were renew'd, new ones invented, againſt the Party call'd *Whigs*, when They were as complaiſant to a *Court* as ever the *Tories* had been; againſt the Party call'd *Tories*, when they were as jealous of *publick Liberty*, and as frugal of *publick Money*, as ever the *Whigs* had been. Danger to the *Church*, on *one Side*, and Danger to the *State*, on the *other*, were apprehended from Men, who meant no Harm to *either*; for though *Diſſenters* mingled Themſelves on *one Side*, and *Jacobites* on the *other*, and notwithſtanding the Leanings of *Parties* in Favour of Thoſe, by whom they were abetted; yet is it certain Truth, that the Struggle was in the main for *Power*, not *Principle*; and that there was no formal Deſign laid, on *one Side*, to deſtroy the *Church*, nor, on the *other*, the *State*. The Cavils, which may be made, and the Facts, which may be cited, ſome of older, and ſome of freſher Date, againſt what hath been here ſaid, do not eſcape Me. Men of Knowledge, and of cool and candid Thought, will anſwer one, and account for the other, without my Help; and I cannot reſolve, for the Sake of the Paſſionate, nor even of the Ignorant, to deſcend upon this Subject into a greater Detail.

'I paſs to That, which is cloſer to my preſent Purpoſe, and of more immediate Uſe; and I ſay that as the natural Diſpoſitions of Men are alter'd and form'd into different moral Characters by Education, ſo the Spirit of a Conſtitution of Government

Government, which is confirm'd, improved and ſtrengthen'd by the Courſe of Events, and eſpecially by Thoſe of fruitleſs Oppoſition, in a long Tract of Time, will have a proportionable Influence on the Reaſoning, the Sentiments, and the Conduct of Thoſe, who are ſubject to it. A different Spirit and contrary Prejudices may prevail for a Time. But the Spirit and Principles of the Conſtitution will prevail at laſt. If one be unnatural, and the other abſurd, and That is the Caſe in many Governments, a vigorous Exerciſe of Power, ſignal Rewards, ſignal Puniſhments, and a Variety of other ſecondary Means, which in ſuch Conſtitutions are never wanting, will however maintain, as long as they are employ'd, both the Spirit and the Principles. But if the Spirit and the Principles of a Conſtitution be agreeable to Nature, and the true Ends of Government, which is the Caſe of the preſent Conſtitution of the *Britiſh Government*, they want no ſuch Means to make them prevail. They not only flouriſh without them, but they would fade and dye away with them. As *Liberty* is nouriſh'd and ſupported by ſuch a Spirit and ſuch Principles, ſo they are propagated by Liberty. Truth and Reaſon are often able to get the better of Authority in particular Minds; but Truth and Reaſon with Authority on their Side will carry Numbers, bear down Prejudices, and become the very Genius of a People. The Progreſs they make is always ſure, but ſometimes not obſervable by every Eye. Contrary Prejudices may ſeem to maintain themſelves in Vigour, and theſe Prejudices may be kept up long by Paſſion and by Artifice. But when Truth and Reaſon continue to act without Reſtraint, a little ſooner, or a little later, and often when this Turn is leaſt expected, the Prejudices vaniſh at

once

once, and Truth and Reason triumph without any Rival.

The Constitution of *England* had been seen in two very different Lights, for almost a Century before the *Revolution*; so that there is no Room to be surprised at the great Opposition, that appear'd (when the *Whig* and *Tory Parties* arose a very few Years before that *Æra*,) between *Principles*, which, as opposite as they were, each Side pretended to establish on the Nature of *one and the same Constitution*. How This happen'd, hath been often hinted, and I have not here Room to explain any farther. Let us be satisfy'd that it is no longer the Case. Our *Constitution* is no longer a Mystery; the Power of the *Crown* is now exactly limited; the Chimæra of *Prerogative* removed; and the *Rights of the Subject* are no longer problematical, though some Things necessary to the more effectual Security of them may be still wanting. Under *this Constitution*, the greatest Part of the Men now alive were born. They lie under no Pretence of Obligation to any *other*, and to the Support of This they are bound by all the Ties of Society, and all the Motives of Interest.

Let us prove what We advance; and that We may do so *ad Homines*, let us borrow our Argument from the great Champion of *hereditary Right*. Having mention'd in his Introduction what He endeavours pompously, but vainly, to establish in his Book, in Favour of *hereditary Right*, *a Prescription of nine Centuries*, *a continual Claim of five hundred and fifty Years*, He attempts to convince us by a *novel Law*, *and a modern Constitution*. This modern Constitution is the *Act of Recognition*, in the 1*st* of King *James* the 1*st*. The Declarations there made, in Favour of *hereditary Right*, are no Doubt as strong as Words can frame, and the

the Words are ſuch as would tempt one to think, by the Fuſtian they compoſe, that his Majeſty himſelf had pen'd them. From hence it is concluded, that ſince *the Vows and Acts of Fathers—bind their Poſterity—This Act, till the Society hath revoked it lawfully, lays the ſame Obligation on every Member of the Society, as if He had perſonally conſented to it.*——If *this Act* then was *lawfully revoked*, or repeal'd, another *novel Law*, contrary to it, might be made equally binding; but neither *this Act*, nor the Act of the 12th of *Charles* the 2*d*, affirming the Crown to appertain *by juſt and undoubted Right* to the King, his Heirs and lawful Succeſſors, having been expreſly repeal'd, We ſtill lye under the ſame Obligations, and every Settlement, contrary to them, and by Conſequence the Settlement made at the *Revolution*, is unlawful. Now I ask, was not the Will of *Henry* the 8*th*, which excluded the whole *Scotiſh* Line, made in Purſuance, and by the Authority of an Act paſs'd in the 25th Year of his Reign? Hath not *this Author* juſtify'd the Validity of *this Will*, much to his own Satisfaction, and, I believe, to That of his Readers? Was this Will *lawfully revoked?* Was this Statute *expreſly repeal'd?* I ask farther, whether *hereditary Right*, and the *Obligations of Subjects to it*, could be made *immutable and eternal*, as *this Author* aſſerts that they were by the *Act of Recognition*, without a manifeſt Contradiction to the Act of Queen *Elizabeth*, which declares the Power of Parliament to *limit* and *bind* the Succeſſion to the Crown? Was this Act *expreſly repeal'd?* That King *James* the 1*ſt* ſucceeded *lawfully againſt Law*, our Author is fond to maintain, and the Propoſition is not unlike That of ſome *Popiſh Caſuiſts*, who aſſert that his Holineſs *Jure poteſt contra Jus decernere, can decree rightfully againſt Right*; but if theſe Queſtions are fairly anſwer'd, it will reſult from

 ſuch

ſuch Anſwers, and from the Arguments I have quoted, that this *novel Law*, this *modern Conſtitution*, is a meer Illuſion; that it never bound any *Member of the Society*; and that the Parliament had as much Right to make the *Settlement* in 1688, notwithſtanding the *Act of Recognition*, as the Parliament had to make *this Act* in 1603, notwithſtanding the *two Acts* I have mention'd, and the *Will* of *Henry* the 8*th*, made by Virtue of the *firſt* of them. This wayward and forlorn *hereditary Right* muſt therefore fall to the Ground, or be ſupported by the ſuppoſed *Preſcription of nine Centuries, and Claim of five and a half*, which no intelligent Man, who reads this Book, will be perſuaded that the *Author* hath proved a Jot better, than the uninterupted Succeſſion of *Popes*, from St. *Peter* down to his preſent Holineſs, is proved by the learned Antiquaries of *Italy*. If *this Act of Recognition* be urged, as it ſometimes is, to ſhew the declared Senſe of the *three Eſtates of the Kingdom*, which Declaration was obtain'd, it ſeems, in an Hurry, ſince the *Act* was read three Times in one Houſe the ſame Day; the declared Senſe of the *three Eſtates*, not pronounced in an Hurry, but after the moſt ſolemn Debates and Conferences, may be urged with much greater Weight, in Favour of our *preſent Settlement*. If this *Act of Recognition*, notwithſtanding what hath been objected, be urged as a *Law*, which had the Aſſent of a *King*, in Oppoſition to the Proceedings of the *Convention*, by which King *William* and Queen *Mary* were raiſed to the Throne; the Anſwer is obvious and concluſive. The Circumſtances of the *two Caſes* are very different; but when they come to be weigh'd in a fair Ballance, Thoſe, which attended the Settlement of the Crown on the *Revolution*, will be found at leaſt as comformable to Reaſon, to Law, and to Practice, as Thoſe, which attended the Eſtabliſh-

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ment of the *Stuart Family*. Queen *Elizabeth* design'd King *James* the *1st* to be her Succeſſor; the Nation concur'd to make him ſo; neither She nor They paid any Regard to the *Law*, which ſtood in his Way. Their Reaſons for acting in this Manner are eaſy to be diſcover'd in the Hiſtory of that Time; and on the ſame Authority We may certainly conclude, that they would have not acted in this Manner, if King *James* had been like his Mother, a *profeſs'd Papiſt*. Thus he got into the Throne, and when He was there, He got, like other Kings, *ſuch a Title*, as He choſe to ſtand upon, *agnized*, or *recognized*, by his Parliament. The Settlement at the *Revolution* was made by a *Convention of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal*, and *a full and free Repreſentative of the whole Body of the People*. When King *William* and Queen *Mary* were once ſettled in the Throne, *this Settlement* was continued and and confirm'd by an Aſſemblage of *all the legiſlative Powers*. He, who will diſpute the Validity of theſe Proceedings, muſt ſhew therefore *firſt* of all, what hath never yet been ſhewn, (no, not by the *Author* I have ſo often quoted) the Invalidity of the Proceedings of thoſe *Parliaments*, which raiſed *Edward* the *3d* and *Henry* the *4th* to the Throne; which were call'd as irregularly, though by Writs in the Names of *Edward* the *2d* and *Richard* the 2d, as it can be pretended that the *Convention* was. He muſt ſhew the Invalidity of the Proceedings even of *that Aſſembly*, by which *Charles* the *2d* was call'd home, till their Proceedings became valid by a ſubſequent Confirmation. He muſt ſhew farther, how any of the Laws of the Princes of the Houſe of *Lancaſter* came to be *conſtantly received and executed*, a little better than the Author of *hereditary Right aſſerted* hath done, by aſſuring us on his Word that it was by the *Sufferance of Edward*

the 4th *and his Successors, and the Approbation of the People.* He must account for the Continuance in Force of the Laws of *Richard* the 3*d*, and of *Henry* the 7*th*, a little better than the *same Author* does, by the Deficiency of *Henry* the 7*th*'s Title, (which, upon another Occasion, He magnifies; though upon This he affirms it to have been *no better* that That of *Richard* the 3*d*) and by the great Respect of *Henry* the 8*th* for his Father. When This hath been once shewn, it will be Time to think of a Reply. In the mean while, We will observe that besides the Passion and Party-Spirit, which possess almost all Those, who write on this Subject, there is a Distinction, which should be constantly made in Cases of this Nature, and which they never make, or never make exactly enough. They compare the Proceedings, without comparing the Situation. *Necessity* and *Self-Preservation* are the great Laws of Nature, and may well dispense with the strict Observation of the common Forms of any particular Constitution Either the *Convention* must have fallen into the Absurdities I have already mention'd; or have call'd back King *James*, which would have been still a greater Absurdity; or have left their Country in absolute Anarchy; or have done what They did. What They did, was done as near as possible to the Spirit of our *Constitution*, the Forms of our *Laws*, and the Examples of *former Times*. They had the *Merit*; their Posterity hath the *Benefit*; nay He, who would say that They had the *Guilt*, not the *Merit*, must still allow that their Posterity hath the *Benefit*, without sharing the *Guilt*; and, upon the whole Matter, I will venture to assert that He, who scruples, or pretends to scruple, at this Time, the Validity of our *present Constitution*, is no wiser, or else no honester, than He would be, who should scruple, or pretend

pretend to ſcruple, the Validity of *Magna Charta*. I have often wiſh'd that ſome profound Antiquary, of much Leiſure, would write an elaborate Treatiſe to aſſert *Royal Prerogative* againſt the *great Charter*, as well as *hereditary Right* againſt the *Revolution*. I am perſuaded that He would ſucceed alike in *both*. Why, indeed, ſhould a *Charter*, extorted by Force, and therefore vicious in its Principle, ſtand on a better Foot, or have more Regard paid to it, than a *Settlement* made in Oppoſition to a *divine*, and therefore *indefiezable Right?* I ſay, *and therefore indefiezable*; becauſe if it be not proved to be ſomething more than *human*, it will hardly be proved *indefiezable*. But I quit this Subject; upon which, perhaps, You may think I have ſpent my Time as ill, as I ſhould have done, if I had preach'd againſt the *Koran* at *Paul's*. It is Time to ſpeak of the Motives of Intereſt, by which We are bound, as well as by the Ties of Duty, to ſupport the *preſent Conſtitution*.

Upon this Head, a few Words will be ſufficient; ſince I preſume that no Prejudices can be ſtrong enough to create much Diverſity of Opinion, in a Caſe ſo very clear, and capable of being ſtated ſo ſhortly. Whether the *Revolution* alter'd our *old Conſtitution for the better*, or *renew'd* it, and brought it back to the *firſt Principles*, and nearer to the *primitive Inſtitution*, ſhall not be diſputed here. I think the *latter*, and every Man muſt think that *one* or the *other* was neceſſary, who conſiders, in the firſt Place, how the Majeſty and Authority of the *Prince* began to ſwell above any Pitch, proportionable to the Rank of *chief Magiſtrate*, or *ſupreme Head*, in a *free State*; by how many Arts, the *Prerogative of the Crown* had been ſtretch'd, and how many *Precedents*, little favourable to *Liberty*, had been ſet, even before the Acceſſion of the *Scotiſh Line*;

Line; and who conſiders, in the next Place, the direct Tendency, confirm'd by Experience, of *thoſe Principles of Government*, ſo frequently mention'd, which compoſed an avow'd Syſtem of *Tyranny* and eſtabliſh'd *Slavery* as a political, a moral, and a religious Obligation; which King *James* the 1*ſt* was too ſucceſsful in eſtabliſhing; but neither *He*, nor his *Deſcendents* were able to purſue. What theſe Conſiderations made neceſſary, was done at the *Revolution*; at leaſt, ſo far as to put it into our Power to do the Reſt. A Spirit of *Liberty*, tranſmitted down from our *Saxon Anceſtors*, and the unknown Ages of our Government, preſerved itſelf through one almoſt continual Struggle, againſt the Uſurpations of our *Princes*, and the Vices of our *People*; and They, whom neither the *Plantagenets*, nor the *Tudors* could enſlave, were incapable of ſuffering their Rights and Privileges to be raviſh'd from Them by the *Stuarts*. They bore with the *laſt King of this unhappy Race*, till it was ſhameful, as it muſt have been fatal, to bear any longer; and whilſt They aſſerted their *Liberties*, They refuted and anticipated, by their Temper and their Patience, all the Objections, which foreign and domeſtick Abettors of *Tyranny* are apt to make againſt the Conduct of our Nation towards their *Kings*. Let us juſtify this Conduct, by perſiſting in it, and continue to Ourſelves the peculiar Honour of maintaining the Freedom of our *Gothick Inſtitution of Government*, when ſo many other Nations, who enjoy'd the ſame, have loſt theirs.

If a *divine*, *indefiezable*, *hereditary Right* to govern a Community be once acknowledged, a *Right independent of the Community*, and which veſts in every ſucceſſive Prince immediately on the Death of his Predeceſſor, and previouſly to any Engage-

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ment taken on his Part towards the *People*; if the *People* once acknowledge Themſelves bound to ſuch Princes by the Ties of *Paſſive-Obedience* and *Non-Reſiſtance*, by an *Allegiance unconditional*, and not reciprocal to *Protection*; if a Kind of *oral Law*, or *myſterious Cabala*, which Phariſees of the *black Gown* and the *long Robe* are always at Hand to report and interpret, as a *Prince* deſires, be once added, like a ſupplemental Code, to the *known Laws of the Land*; then, I ſay, ſuch Princes have the *Power*, if not the *Right*, given Them, of commencing *Tyrants*; and Princes, who have the *Power*, are prone to think that They have the *Right*. Such was the State of *King* and *People* before the *Revolution*. By the *Revolution*, and the *Settlement* ſince made, this State hath received conſiderable Alterations. A *King of Britain* is now, ſtrictly and properly, what *Kings* ſhould always be, a Member, but the Supreme Member, or the Head of a political Body. Part of one individual, ſpecifick Whole, in every Reſpect; diſtinct from it, or independent of it in none; He can move no longer in another Orbit from his *People*, and, like ſome ſuperior Planet, attract, repel, influence, and direct their Motions by his own. He and They are Parts of the ſame Syſtem, intimately join'd and co-operating together, acting and acted upon, limiting and limited, controuling and controuled by one another; and when He ceaſes to ſtand in this Relation to Them, he ceaſes to ſtand in any, The *Settlements*, by Virtue of which He governs, are plainly *original Contracts*. His *Inſtitution* is plainly *conditional*; and He may forfeit his Right to *Allegiance*, as undeniably and effectually, as the Subject may forfeit his Right to *Protection*. There are no longer any hidden Reſerves of Authority, to be let out on Occaſion, and to overflow the Rights

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and Privileges of the People. The *Laws of the Land* are known, and they are the ſole Springs, from whence the *Prince* can derive his Pretenſions, and the *People* theirs. It would be to no Purpoſe to illuſtrate any farther a Matter, which begins to be ſo well underſtood; or to deſcend into a more particular Enumeration of the Advantages, that reſult, or may reſult, from our *preſent Settlement.* No Man, who does not prefer *Slavery* to *Liberty*, or a more precarious Security to a better, will declare for ſuch a Government, as our national Diviſions, and a long Courſe, ſeldom interrupted, of improvident Complaiſance to the *Crown*, had enabled King *James* the 2*d* to eſtabliſh againſt ſuch a Government as was intended by the *ſubſequent Settlement*; and if there be any ſuch Man, I declare that I neither write to Him, nor for Him.

I may aſſume therefore, without fearing to be accuſed of begging the Queſtion, that the *Conſtitution*, under which we now live, is preferable to That, which prevail'd at any Time before the *Revolution.* We are arrived, after many Struggles, after a Deliverance almoſt miraculous, and ſuch an one as no Nation hath Reaſon to expect twice, and after having made ſome honeſt Improvements on the Advantages of our *new Conſtitution*, very near to that full Security, under which Men, who are free and ſolliciteous to continue ſo, may ſit down, not without Watchfulneſs, (for That is never to be ſuffer'd to relax under ſuch a Government as ours) but without Anxiety. The Sum therefore of all theſe Diſcourſes, and of all our Exhortations to one another, is, and ought to be, that We ſhould not ſtop ſhort in ſo important a Work. It was begun at the *Revolution*; but He, who thinks it was perfected then, or hath been perfected ſince, will find Himſelf very much miſtaken. The Foundations were laid then. We proceeded

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for ſome Time after That, like the *Jews* in rebuilding their Temple; We carried on the holy Work with one Hand, and held our Swords in the other to defend it. That Deſtraction, that Danger is over, and we betray the Cauſe of *Liberty* without any Colour of Excuſe, if We do not compleat the glorious Building, which will laſt to Ages yet remote, if it be once finiſh'd, and will moulder away and fall into Ruins, if it remain longer in this imperfect State.

Now, that we may ſee the better how to proceed in the Cauſe of *Liberty*, to compleat the Freedom, and to ſecure the Duration of our *preſent Conſtitution*; it will be of Uſe, I think, to conſider what Obſtacles lye, or may hereafter lye, in our Way, and of what Nature that Oppoſition is, or may hereafter be, which we may expect to meet. In order to This, let us once more analyſe our political Diviſions; Thoſe, which may poſſibly exiſt now, or hereafter, as We did Thoſe, which were form'd at the *Revolution*.

One poſſible Diviſion then is That of Men angry with the *Government*, and yet reſolved to maintain the *Conſtitution*. This may be the Caſe at any Time; under the preſent, wiſe, virtuous, and triumphant Adminiſtration, and therefore to be ſure at any other.

A *ſecond poſſible Diviſion* is That of Men averſe to the *Government*, becauſe They are ſo to the *Conſtitution*, which I think can never be the Caſe of many; or averſe to the *Conſtitution*, becauſe They are ſo to the *Government*, which I think may be the Caſe of more. *Both* of Theſe tend to the ſame Point. *One* would ſubvert the *Government*, that They might change the *Conſtitution*. The other would ſacrifice the *Conſtitution*, that They might ſubvert the *Government*.

A *third possible Division*, and I seek no more, is That of Men attach'd to the *Government*; or, to speak more properly, to the Persons of *Those*, who govern; or, to speak more properly still, to the Power, Profit, or Protection They acquire by the Favour of *these Persons*; but Enemies to the *Constitution*.

Now, as to the *first* and *second of these possible Divisions*, if there be any such among Us, I do not apprehend that We are at present, or can be hereafter, in much Danger; or that the Cause of *Liberty* can meet with much Opposition from them; though the *second* have certainly Views, more likely to bring *Slavery* upon us, than to promote *Liberty*; and though Prudence requires that We should be on our Guard against *both*. The *first* indeed, might hope to unite even the Bulk of the Nation to Them, in a weak and oppressive Reign. If Grievances should grow intolerable under some Prince as yet unborn; if Redress should become absolutely desperate; if *Liberty* itself should be in imminent Peril; the Nature of our *Constitution* would justify the Resistance, that We ought to believe well enough of Posterity to persuade ourselves would be made in such an Exigency. But without such an Exigency, particular Men would flatter Themselves extremely, if They hoped to make the Nation angry, because They were so. Private Motives can never influence Numbers. When a Nation revolts, the Injury is national. This Case therefore is remote, improbable, nay impossible, under the Lenity, Justice and heroical Spirit of the *present Government*; aad if I mention'd such an *imaginary Party*, it was only done that I might omit none, which can be supposed. The Projects of the *second Division*, stated in the same hypothetical Manner, are surely too extravagant, and their Designs too wicked to be dangerous.

dangerous. Disputes may arise hereafter, in some distant Time, about *Ministers*, perhaps about *Kings*; but I persuade myself that *this Constitution* will be, as it ought to be always, distinguish'd from, and prefer'd to *both*, by the *British* Nation. Reasons must arise in Process of Time, from the very Nature of Man, to oppose *Ministers* and *Kings* too; but none can arise, in the Nature of Things, to oppose *such a Constitution* as ours. *Better Ministers*, *better Kings*, may be hereafter often wanted, and sometimes found; but a *better constituted Government* never can. Should there be therefore still any such Men, as We here suppose among Us, They cannot expect, if They are in their Senses, a national Concurrence; and surely a little Reflection will serve to shew Them, that the same Reasons, which make Them weaker now than They were some Years ago, must make Them weaker some Years hence than They are now.

As to the *third Division*, if any such there be, it is in That our greatest and almost our whole Danger centers. The *Others* cannot overthrow, but *These* may undermine our *Liberty*. Capable of being admitted into Power, in all Courts, and more likely than other Men to be so in every Court, except the present, (whose approved Penetration and spotless Innocence give a certain Exclusion to Them,) They may prevent any farther Securities from being procured to *Liberty*, till Those already establish'd are dissolved, or perverted. Since then our principal Danger must in all Times arise from Those, who belong to *this Division*, it is necessary to shew, before We conclude these Discourses, by what Means *such Men* may carry on their pernicious Designs with Effect, and by what Means They may be defeated. These Considerations will lead us to fix that Point, wherein

Men of all Denominations ought to unite, and do unite, and to ſtate the ſole Diſtinction of *Parties*, which can be made with Truth at this Time amongſt us.

I am, SIR, &c.

LETTER X.

SIR,

IT may be ask'd, perhaps, how Men, who are Friends to a *Government*, can be Enemies at the ſame Time to the *Conſtitution*, upon which *that Government* is founded. But the Anſwer will be eaſy, if We conſider theſe two Things; *firſt*, the true Diſtinction, ſo often confounded in Writing, and almoſt always in Converſation, between *Conſtitution* and *Government*. By *Conſtitution* We mean, whenever We ſpeak with Propriety and Exactneſs, that Aſſemblage of Laws, Inſtitutions and Cuſtoms, derived from certain fix'd Principles of Reaſon directed to certain fix'd Objects of publick Good, that compoſe the general Syſtem, according to which the Community hath agreed to be govern'd. By *Government* We mean, whenever We ſpeak in the ſame Manner, that particular Tenor of Conduct, which a chief Magiſtrate, and inferior Magiſtrates, under his Direction and Influence, hold in the Adminiſtration of publick Affairs. We call This a *good Government*, when the Execution of the Laws, the Obſervation of the Inſtitutions and Cuſtoms, in ſhort, the whole Adminiſtration of publick Affairs is wiſely purſued, and with a ſtrict Conformity

Conformity to the Principles and Objects of the *Constitution*. We call it a *bad Government*, when it is administer'd on other Principles, and directed to other Objects, either wickedly or weakly, either by obtaining *new Laws*, which want this Conformity, or by perverting *old ones*, which had it; and when This is done *without Law*, or in *open Violation of the Laws*, We term it a *tyrannical Government*. In a Word, and to bring this home to our own Case, *Constitution* is the Rule, by which our Princes ought to govern, at all Times; *Government* is That, by which They actually do govern, at any particular Time. *One* may remain immutable; the *other* may, and as human Nature is constituted, must vary. *One* is the Criterion, by which We are to try the *Other*; for surely We have a Right to do so, since if We are to live in Subjection to the Government of our *Kings*, our *Kings* are to govern in Subjection to the *Constitution*; and the Conformity, or Non-Conformity of their Government to it, prescribes the Measure of our Submission to Them, according to the Principles of the *Revolution*, and of our *present Settlement*; in both of which, though some remote Regard was had to *Blood*, yet the Preservation of the *Constitution* manifestly determined the Community to the Choice then made of the *Persons*, who should govern. Another Thing to be consider'd is This. When Persons are spoken of as *Friends to the Government*, and *Enemies to the Constitution*, the Term *Friendship* is a little prostituted, in Compliance with common Usage. Such Men are really incapable of Friendship; for real Friendship can never exist among Those, who have banish'd Virtue and Truth. They have no Affection to any but Themselves; no Regard to any Interest, except their own. Their sole Attachments are such as I mention'd in the

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laſt Letter, Attachments to *Power* and *Profit*, and when They have contracted a Load of Infamy and Guilt, in the Purſuit of *Theſe*, an Attachment to *that Protection*, which is ſufficient to procure Them Appearances of Conſideration, and real Impunity. They may bear the Semblance of Affection to their Prince and of Zeal for his Government; but They, who are falſe to the Cauſe of their Country, will not be true to any other; and the very *ſame Miniſter*, who exalts his Maſter's Throne on the Ruins of the *Conſtitution*, that He may govern without Controul, or retire without Danger, would do the Reverſe of This, if any Turn of Affairs enabled Him to compound, in that Manner, the better for Himſelf.

Under a Prince therefore tolerably honeſt, or tolerably wiſe, *ſuch Men as Theſe* will have no great Sway; at leaſt, They will not hold it long. Such a Prince will know, that to unite Himſelf to *Them*, is to diſunite Himſelf from his *People*, and that He makes a ſtupid Bargain, if He preſers Trick to Policy, Expedient to Syſtem, and a Cabal to the Nation. Reaſon and Experience will teach Him that a Prince, who does ſo, muſt govern weakly, ignominiouſly and precariouſly; whilſt He, who engages all the Hearts, and employs all the Heads and Hands of his People, governs with Strength, with Splendour, and with Safety, and is ſure of riſing to a Degree of abſolute Power, by maintaining *Liberty*, which the moſt ſucceſsful Tyrant could never reach, by impoſing *Slavery*. But how few Men (and Princes, by their Leaves, are Men) have been found in Times paſt, or can be hoped for in Times to come, capable of governing by ſuch Arts as theſe? Some cannot propoſe the Ends, nor ſome employ the Means; for ſome are wicked, and ſome are weak. This general Diviſion runs through the

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whole Race of Mankind; of the Multitudes design'd to obey, and of the Few design'd to govern. It was this Depravity of Multitudes, as well as their mutual Wants, which obliged Men first to enter into Societies; to depart from their natural Liberty; and to subject Themselves to Government. It was this Depravity of the Few, (which is often the greater, because born no better than other Men, They are educated worse) which obliged Men first to subject *Government* to *Constitution*, that They might preserve social, when They gave up natural Liberty, and not be oppress'd by arbitary Will. *Kings* may have preceded *Lawgivers*, for aught I know, or have possibly been the *first Lawgivers*, and *Government by Will* have been establish'd before *Government by Constitution*. *Theseus* might reign at *Athens*, and *Eurytion* at *Sparta*, long before *Solon* gave Laws to *one*, and *Lycurgus* to the *other* of these Cities. *Kings* had govern'd *Rome*, We know, and *Consuls* had succeeded *Kings*, long before the *Decemviri* compiled a Body of Law; and the *Saxons* had their Monarchs before *Edgar*, though the *Saxon Laws* went under his Name. These and a thousand other Instances of the same Kind will never serve to prove, what my Lord *Bacon* would prove by them, † *that Monarchies do not subsist, like other Governments, by a precedent Law, or Compact*; that the *original Submission to Them was natural*, like the Obedience of a *Child* to his *Parents*; and that *Allegiance to hereditary Monarchs is the Work of the Law of Nature*. But That, which these Examples prove very plainly is, that however Men might submit voluntarily in the primitive Simplicity of early Ages, or be subjected by Conquest, to a *Government* without a *Consti-*

† *Argum. in the Case of* Postnati.

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tution, yet they were never long in discovering that * *to live by one Man's Will became the Cause of all Mens Misery*, and therefore They soon rejected the Yoke, or made it sit easy on their Necks. They instituted *Commonwealths*, or they limited *Monarchies*; and here began that Struggle between the *Spirit of Liberty* and the *Spirit of Dominion*, which always hath subsisted, and, that We may not flatter Ourselves, nor Others, must always subsist, except in those Instances, of which the most antient Histories furnish so few, the Reigns of a *Titus*, or a *Trajan*; for it might look like Flattery to quote the present most auspicious Reign.

To govern a Society of Freemen by a *Constitution*, founded on the eternal Rules of right Reason, and directed to promote the Happiness of the whole, and of every Individual, is the noblest Prerogative, which can belong to Humanity; and if Man may be said, without Prophaneness, to imitate God in any Case, This is the Case. But sure I am, He imitates the Devil, who is so far from promoting the Happiness of Others, that He makes his own Happiness to consist in the Misery of Others; who governs by no Rule but That of his Passions, whatever Appearances He is forced sometimes to put on; who endeavours to corrupt the Innocent, and to inslave the Free; whose Business is to seduce, or betray; whose Pleasure is to damn; and whose Triumph is to torment. Odious and execrable as this Character is, it is the Character of every Prince, who makes use of his Power to subvert, or even to weaken *that Constitution*, which ought to be the Rule of his *Government*. When such a Prince fills a Throne with superior Parts, *Liberty* is in the utmost Peril; nor does the Danger diminish in Pro-

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Hooker's *Eccles. Pol. L.* 1. *Sect.* 10.

portion

portion, if He happens to want them. Such Men as we are now to ſpeak of, (*Friends to the Government* and *Enemies to the Conſtitution*) will be always at Hand to ſupply his Defects; for as They are the willing Inſtruments of a wicked Prince, They are the ready Prompters of a weak one. They may ſink into the Maſs of the People, and diſappear in a good and a wiſe Reign, or work Themſelves into Power under falſe Colours. *Sed Genus immortale manet.* Their Race will continue as long as Ambition and Avarice prevail in the World, and there will be bad Citizens as long as there are bad Men. The Good ought therefore to be always on their Guard againſt Them, and whatever Diſguiſe They aſſume, whatever Veils They caſt over their Conduct, They will never be able to deceive Thoſe long, who obſerve conſtantly the Difference between *Conſtitution* and *Government*, and who have Virtue enough to preſerve the Cauſe of the *former*, how unprofitable ſoever it may be at all Times, and how unpopular ſoever at ſome.———But I ramble too long in generals. It is high Time I ſhould come to thoſe particular Meaſures, by which the Men I have deſcribed are moſt likely to carry on their Deſigns againſt our *Conſtitution*; after which I ſhall ſay ſomething of the Methods, by which alone their Deſigns may be prevented, or will be deſeated, if a *national Union* oppoſe itſelf by ſuch Methods as Theſe, in Time, to them.

Now, that I may do This the better, and make what I have to ſay the more ſenſibly felt, give Me Leave to ſuppoſe (though I ſpeak of a remote Time, and ſuch an one as We ought to hope will never come) that our national Circumſtances will be juſt the ſame as they are now, and our *Conſtitution* as far diſtant as it now is from that Point of Perfection, to which the *Revolution* ought to have

brought it, might have brought it, and hath given the Nation a Right to expect that it ſhould be brought. The Completion of that glorious Deliverance is ſtill imperfect, after five and forty Years, notwithſtanding the Hopes then given, the Engagements then taken, and the Opportunities, that have ſince ariſen. How This hath happen'd, by what Arts this Juſtice to the *Conſtitution* hath been hitherto evaded, ſometimes in Favour of one Government, and ſometimes in Favour of another, might eaſily be ſhewn, and proved too, beyond Contradiction. But I had rather exhort, than reproach; and eſpecially at a Time, when a ſtrong Tendency appears among Men of all Denominations to ſuch a *national Union*, as will effectually obtain the compleat Settlement of our *Conſtitution*, which hath been ſo long delay'd, if it be honeſtly, prudently and vigorouſly improved.

It is certain then that if ever ſuch Men as call Themſelves *Friends to the Government*, but are *real Enemies of the Conſtitution*, prevail, They will make it a capital Point of their wicked Policy to keep up a *ſtanding Army*. Falſe Appearances of Reaſon for it will never be wanting, as long as there are *Pretenders* to the Crown; though nothing can be more abſurd than to employ, in Defence of *Liberty*, an Inſtrument ſo often employ'd to deſtroy it; tho' nothing can be more abſurd than to maintain that *any Government* ought to make uſe of the ſame Expedient to ſupport itſelf, as *another Government*, on the Ruins of which *this Government* ſtands, was ſubverted for uſing; tho' nothing can be proved more manifeſtly by Experience than theſe two Propoſitions; that *Britain* is enabled, by her Situation, to ſupport her *Government*, when the Bulk of her People are for it, without employing any Means inconſiſtent with her *Conſtitution*; and that the Bulk of

of the People are not only always for the *Government*, when the *Government* ſupports the *Conſtitution*, but are even hard and ſlow to be detach'd from it, when the *Government* attacks, or undermines the *Conſtitution*, and when They are by Conſequence both juſtified in reſiſting, and even obliged in Conſcience to reſiſt the *Government*.

I have heard it argued lately that *Pretenders* abroad are a Security at home; and that a *Government*, expoſed to their Attacks, will never venture to attack the *Conſtitution*. I have been told too that theſe Notions were entertain'd by Some, who drew many political Conſequences from them at the *Revolution*. But if any of thoſe Perſons are ſtill alive, I perſuade Myſelf that They have alter'd this Opinion, ſince ſuch a Situation will furniſh, at all Times, Pretences of Danger; ſince Pretences of Danger to a *Government*, whether real or imaginary, will be always urged with Plauſibility, and generally with Succeſs, for obtaining *new Powers*, or for ſtraining *old ones*; and ſince whilſt Thoſe, who mean well to the *Government*, are impoſed upon by Thoſe, who mean ill to the *Conſtitution*, all true Concern for the *latter* is loſt in a miſtaken Zeal for the *former*, and the moſt important is ventured to ſave the leaſt important, when neither one nor the other would have been expoſed, if falſe Alarms had not been raſhly and too implicitly taken, or if true Alarms had not given unneceſſary Strength to the *Government*, at the Expence of weakening the *Conſtitution*.

Notwithſtanding what hath been ſaid, I do not imagine that an *Army* would be employ'd by *theſe Men*, directly and at firſt, againſt the Nation, and national Liberty. I am far from thinking that any Men can ariſe, in future Times, capable of attempting, in this Manner, what ſome Men in our

Age, who call Themſelves *Friends to the Government*, have been ſo weak and ſo imprudent as to avow in Print, and publiſh to the Nation. To deſtroy *Britiſh Liberty* with an *Army of Britons* is not a Meaſure ſo ſure of Succeſs, as ſome People may believe. To *corrupt the Parliament* is a ſlower, but might prove a more effectual Method, and two or three hundred Mercenaries in the *two Houſes*, if They could be liſted there, would be more fatal to the *Conſtitution* than ten Times as many Thouſands in Red and in Blue out of them. *Parliaments* are the true Guardians of *Liberty*. For This principally They were inſtituted; and This is the principal Article of that great and noble Truſt, which the collective Body of the People of *Britain* repoſes in the Repreſentative. But then no Slavery can be ſo effectually brought and fix'd upon us, as *Parliamentary Slavery*. By the *Corruption of Parliament*, and the abſolute Influence of a *King*, or his *Miniſter*, on the *two Houſes*, We return into that State, to deliver or ſecure us from which *Parliaments* were inſtituted, and are really govern'd by the arbitary Will of *one Man*. Our whole *Conſtitution* is at once diſſolved. Many Securities to *Liberty* are provided; but the Integrity, which depends on the *Freedom* and the *Independency of Parliament*, is the Keyſtone, that keeps the whole together. If This be ſhaken, our *Conſtitution* totters. If it be quite removed, our *Conſtitution* falls into Ruin. That noble Fabrick, the Pride of *Britain*, the Envy of her Neighbours, raiſed by the Labour of ſo many Centuries, repair'd at the Expence of ſo many Millions, and cemented by ſuch a Profuſion of Blood; that noble Fabrick, I ſay, which was able to reſiſt the united Efforts of ſo many Races of Gyants, may be demoliſh'd by a Race of Pygmies. The Integrity of *Parliament* is a Kind of *Palladium*, a tutelary

Goddeſs,

Goddeſs, who protects our State. When She is once removed, We may become the Prey of any Enemies. No *Agamemnon*, no *Achilles* will be wanted to take our City. *Therſites* himſelf will be ſufficient for ſuch a Conqueſt. But I need not dwell any longer on this Subject. There is no Man, who thinks at all, can fail to ſee the ſeveral fatal Conſequences, which will neceſſarily flow from this one Source, whenever it ſhall be open'd. If the Reaſon of the Thing does not ſtrike Him enough, Experience muſt. The ſingle Reign of *Henry* the *8th* will ſerve to ſhew that no Tyranny can be more ſevere than That, which is exerciſed by a Concert with *Parliament*; that *arbitary Will* may be made the ſole Rule of Government, even whilſt the Names and Forms of a *free Conſtitution* are preſerved; that for a *Prince*, or his *Miniſter*, to become our *Tyrant*, there is no Need to aboliſh *Parliaments*; there is no Need that He, who is Maſter of *one Part of the Legiſlature*, ſhould endeavour to aboliſh the *other two*, when He can uſe, upon every Occaſion, the united Strength of the *whole*; there is no Need He ſhould be a Tyrant in the Groſs, when He can be ſo in Detail, nor in Name, when He can be ſo in Effect; that for *Parliaments* to eſtabliſh *Tyranny*, there is no Need therefore to repeal *Magna Charta*, or any other of the great Supports of our *Liberty*. It is enough, if They put Themſelves corruptly and ſervilely under the Influence of *ſuch a Prince*, or *ſuch a Miniſter*.—— On the whole, I conclude that, in the poſſible Caſe here ſuppoſed, the firſt and principal Object will be to deſtroy the *Conſtitution*, under Pretence of preſerving the *Government*, by *corrupting our Parliaments*. I am the better founded in concluding that This may happen in ſome future Age, by what We may obſerve in our own. There is ſurely but too much Reaſon to

ſuſpect

ſuſpect that the *Enemies of our Conſtitution* may attempt hereafter to govern by *Corruption*, when We hear and ſee the Friends and Advocates of our *preſent moſt incorrupt Miniſter* harrangue and ſcribble, in Favour of *Corruption*; when it is pleaded for and recommended, as a neceſſary Expedient of Government, by ſome Men of all Ranks and Orders; not only by *profeſs'd Hirelings*, who write that They may eat; but by Men, who have talk'd and written Themſelves already out of their native Obſcurity and Penury, by affecting Zeal in the Cauſe of *Liberty*; not only by ſuch as Theſe, but by Men, whoſe Birth, Education and Fortune aggravate their Crime and their Folly; by Men, whom Honour at leaſt ſhould reſtrain from favouring ſo diſhonourable a Cauſe; and by Men, whoſe peculiar Obligations to preach up *Morality* ſhould reſtrain Them, at leaſt, from being the Preachers of an *Immorality*, above all others, abominable in its Nature, and pernicious in its Effects.

Theſe Men are ready, I know, to tell us that the *Influence* They plead for is neceſſary to ſtrengthen the Hands of Thoſe, who govern; that *Corruption* ſerves to oil the Wheels of Government, and to render the Adminiſtration more ſmooth and eaſy; and that it can never be of dangerous Conſequence, under the preſent Father of our Country.——Abſurd and wicked Triflers! *According to Them our excellent Conſtitution* (as one of your Correſpondents hath obſerved extremely well) *is no better than a Jumble of incompatible Powers, which would ſeparate and fall to Pieces of Themſelves, unleſs reſtrain'd and upheld by ſuch honourable Methods as thoſe of* BRIBERY and CORRUPTION. They would prove *that the Form of our Government is defective to a Degree of Ridiculouſneſs.* But the Ridicule, as well as the Iniquity,

is

is their own. A *good Government* can want no Power, under the *present Constitution*. A *bad one* may, and it is fit it should. *Popularity* is the Expedient of *one*, and will effectually support it. Nothing but *Corruption* can support the *other*. If there was a real Deficiency of *Power in the Crown*, it ought to be supply'd, no Doubt. The old Whimsies of *Prerogative* should not be revived; but *Limitations* ought to be taken off, or *new Powers* to be given. The *Friends of Liberty* acknowledge that a Ballance of the Powers, divided among the *three Parts of the Legislature*, is essential to our *Constitution*, and necessary to support it. The *Friends of Liberty* therefore would concur, at least to a certain Point, with the *Friends of the Ministry*; for the *former* are Friends to Order, and Enemies to Licence. For Decency's Sake therefore let the Debate be put on this Issue. Let it be such a Debate as *Freemen* may avow, without blushing. To argue from this supposed Deficiency of *Power in the Crown*, in Favour of a Scheme of Government, repugnant to all Laws divine and human, is such an Instance of abandon'd, villainous Prostitution, as the most corrupt Ages never saw, and as will place the present Age, with infamous Pre-eminence, at the Head of them; unless the Nation do itself Justice, and fix the Brand on *Those*, who ought alone to bear it.———Thus much for the Iniquity of the Practice pleaded for. As to the Danger of it, let us agree that a Prince, of such Magnanimity and Justice as our present Monarch, can never be tempted by any sordid Motives to forget the recent Obligation, which He and his Family have to the *British* Nation, by whom They were made Kings; nor to aim at greater Power and Wealth than are consistent with the Safety of the *Constitution* They are intrusted to preserve, and obliged to

secure.

ſecure. Allowing This to be our preſent Caſe, (and concerning our preſent Caſe, there are not two Opinions, I dare ſay, in the whole Nation) yet ſtill the Symptoms I have mention'd ſhew that the Poiſon, with which theſe pretended *Friends of the Government*, and real *Enemies of the Conſtitution*, corrupt the Morals of Mankind, hath made ſome Progreſs; and if this Progreſs be not immediately check'd by proper Antidotes, and the Power of poiſoning taken from *theſe Empiricks*, the Diſeaſe will grow incurable. The laſt diſmal Effect of it may not, or if You pleaſe, cannot happen in this Reign; but it may, nay it muſt happen in ſome other, unleſs we prevent it effectually and ſoon; and what Seaſon more proper to prevent it in, and to compleat the Security of our *Liberties*, than the Reign of a Prince, for whom the Nation hath done ſo much, and from whom by Conſequence the Nation hath a Right to expect ſo much? King *William* deliver'd us from Popery and Slavery. There was Wiſdom in his Councils, and Fortitude in his Conduct. He ſteer'd through many real Difficulties at home, and He fought our Battles abroad; and yet thoſe Points of Security, which had been neglected, or not ſufficiently provided for, in the Honey-moon of his Acceſſion, were continually preſs'd upon Him, during the whole Courſe of his Reign. The Men, who preſs'd them, were call'd *Jacobites*, *Tories*, *Republicans*, and *Incendiaries* too, not from the Throne indeed, but by the Clamour of Thoſe, who ſhew'd great Indifference at leaſt for the *Conſtitution*, whilſt They affected great Zeal for the *Government*. They ſucceeded however in Part, and We enjoy the Benefit of their Succeſs. If They did not ſucceed in the Whole; if the Settlement neceſſary to ſecure our *Liberty*, and therefore intended at the *Revolution*,

tion, be not yet compleat; let us be persuaded, and let us act on that Persuasion, that the Honour of compleating it was reserved to crown the Glories of the present Reign. To finish the great Work, which King *William* began, of establishing the Liberties of *Britain* on firm and durable Foundations, must be imputed an Honour surely; and to Whom can this Honour belong more justly than to a a *Prince*, who emulates in so remarkable a Manner all the other heroick Virtues of his *renown'd Predecessor?*

I am, SIR, &c.

LETTER XI.

SIR,

IF it was possible for any Man, who hath the least Knowledge of our Constitution, to doubt in good Earnest whether the Preservation of *publick Freedom* depends on the Preservation of *Parliamentary Freedom*, his Doubts might be removed and his Opinion decided, one would imagine, by this single, obvious Remark; that all the Designs of our Princes against *Liberty*, since *Parliaments* began to be establish'd on the Model still subsisting, have been directed constantly to one of these *two Points*; either to obtain *such Parliaments as They could govern*; or else to stand all the Difficulties, and to run all the Hazards of *governing without Parliaments*. The Means principally employ'd, to the *first of these Purposes*, have been undue Influences on the *Elections* of Members of the House of Commons, and on *these Members*, when chosen. When such Influences could be employ'd successfully, they

 have

have anſwer'd all the Ends of *arbitrary Will*; and when they could not be ſo employ'd, *arbitrary Will* hath been forced to ſubmit to the *Conſtitution*. This hath been the Caſe, not only ſince, but before that great Change in the Ballance of *Property*, which began in the Reigns of *Henry* the *7th* and *Henry* the *8th*, and carried a great Part of the Weight into the Scale of the *Commons*, which had lain before in the Scale of the *Peers* and *Clergy*.

If We look back as far as the Cloſe of the 14th Century, (an Æra pretty near to That, when *Parliaments* received their preſent Form) We ſhall find *both theſe Means* employ'd by one of the worſt of our Kings, *Richard* the *2d*. *That he might obtain his Will, which was raſh*, He directed Mandates to his *Sheriffs* (Officers of the *Crown* and appointed by the *Crown*; for ſuch They were then, and ſuch They ſtill are) *to return certain Perſons nominated by Himſelf*; and thus He acquired an undue Influence over the *Elections*. In the next Place, He obliged the Perſons thus return'd *ſometimes by Threats and Terrour, and ſometimes by Gifts, to conſent to thoſe Things, which were prejudicial to the Realm*; and thus He acquired an undue Influence over the *Houſe of Commons*; ſo that, upon the whole, the arbitrary Will, of a *raſh, headſtrong Prince*, and the Suggeſtions of his *wicked Miniſters*, guided the Proceedings of *Parliament*, and became the *Law of the Land*. I might purſue Obſervations of the ſame Kind through ſeveral ſucceeding Reigns; but to avoid lengthening theſe Letters, which are grown perhaps too long already, let us deſcend at once to the Reign of King *Charles* the *2d*; for in That we ſhall find Examples of all the Means, which a *Court*, that hath common Senſe, and a *Prince*, who will not ſet his Crown on the Caſt of a Dye, can take to undermine the Foundations of *Liberty*, either

either by *governing Parliaments*, or by *governing without them*.

Now the first Attempt, of this Kind, which King *Charles* made against the *Constitution*, was This. He improved and managed the Spirit of the *first Parliament* He call'd, so as to render the *two Houses* obsequious to his Will, almost in every Case; and having got the TRIENNIAL BILL repeal'd, He kept the *same Parliament* in Being for many Years by *Prorogations*; which crept into Custom long before his Time, but were still a modern Invention with Respect to the primitive Institution of *Parliaments*, and wholly repugnant to the antient Practice. Thus He establish'd a *standing Parliament*; which is, in the Nature of it, as dangerous as a *standing Army*, and may become, in some Conjunctures, much more fatal to *Liberty*. When the Measures of his Administration grew too bad, and the Tendency of them too apparent to be defended and supported, even in *that Parliament*, and even by a *Party-Spirit*, He had Recourse to a second Attempt; That is, to *Corruption*, and *Clifford* first listed a mercenary Band of *Friends to the Government* against the *Constitution* —— Let us observe, on this Occasion, and as We pass along, that a *national Party* (such a Party as the Court *adopts*, in Contradistinction to such a Party as it *creates*) will always retain some *national Principles*, some Regard to the *Constitution*. They may be transported, or surprized, during the Heat of Contest especially, into Measures of long and fatal Consequences. They may be carried on for a certain Time and to a certain Point, by the Lusts of Vengeance and of Power, in order to wreak one upon their Adversaries, and to secure the other to Themselves. But a *national Party* will never be the Instruments of compleating *national Ruin*. They will become the Adversaries of their

Friends, and the Friends of their Adversaries, to prevent it; and the *Minister*, who persists in so villainous a Project, by what Name soever He may affect to distinguish Himself and his Followers, will be found really at the Head of a *Faction*, not of a *Party*. But the Difference between *one* and the *other* is so visible, and the Boundaries, where *Party* ceases and *Faction* commences, are so strongly mark'd, that it is sufficient to point at them.

I return therefore, and observe that when the *Spirit of Party* fail'd King *Charles*, and the *Corruption* He employ'd proved ineffectual, He resolved to govern for a Time *without Parliaments*, and to employ that Time, as soon as he had check'd the Spirit of *one Party*, by inflaming That of *another*, in *garbling Corporations*. He had found by Experience that it was impossible to corrupt the Stream in any great Degree, as long as the Fountain continued pure. He apply'd Himself therefore to spread the Taint of the *Court* in them, and to poison those Springs, from whence the Health and Vigour of the *Constitution* flow. This was the third, the last, and by much the most dangerous Expedient, employ'd by the *Friends of the Government*, in the Reign of King *Charles* the 2*d*., to undermine our *Liberties*. The Effect of it he did not live to see; but We may easily conjecture what it would have been.

The Use I make of what hath been here said is This. The Design of the *Revolution* being not only to save us from the immediate Attempts on our Religion and Liberty, made by King *James*, but to save us from all other Attempts, which had been made, or might be made, of the same Tendency; to renew and strengthen our Constitution; * to

* *See the Prince of* Orange's *Declaration.*

establish

establish the Peace, Honour and Happiness of these Nations upon lasting Foundations, —— *and to procure a Settlement of the Religion, and of the Liberties and Properties of the Subjects, upon so sure a Foundation, that there might be no Danger of the Nation's relapsing into the like Miseries at any Time hereafter*; This being, I say, the avow'd Design of the *Revolution*, and the Nation having engaged in it on a Confidence that all This would be effectually perform'd, the Design of the *Revolution* was not accomplish'd, the Benefit of it was not secured to us, the just Expectations of the Nation could not be answer'd, unless the *Freedom of Elections* and *the Frequency, Integrity and Independency of Parliaments* were sufficiently provided for. These are the Essentials of *British Liberty*. Defects in other Parts of the *Constitution* can never be fatal, if These are preserved intire. But Defects in These will soon destroy the *Constitution*, though every other Part of it should be so preserved. However it happen'd, the Truth and Notoriety of the Fact oblige us to say that these important Conditions, without which *Liberty* can never be secure, were almost wholly neglected at the *Revolution*. The *Claim of Right* declares, indeed, that *Elections ought to be free*; *that Freedom of Speech and Debates ought not to be impeach'd or question'd out of Parliament*; *and that Parliaments ought to be held frequently*. But such Declarations, however solemnly made, are nothing better than pompous Trifles, if they stand alone; productive of no Good, and thus far productive of Ill, that they serve to amuse Mankind, in Points of the greatest Importance, and wherein it concerns Them the most nearly neither to be deceived, nor so much as amused. These were *Rights*, no Doubt, to which the Nation had an indisputable Claim. But then they ought to have been more than

than claim'd, since they had been so often and so lately invaded. That they were not more than claim'd, that they were not effectually asserted and secured, at this Time, gave very great and immediate Dissatisfaction; and They, who were call'd *Whigs* in those Days, distinguish'd Themselves by the Loudness of their Complaints. Thus, for Instance, They insisted that there could be no * *real Settlement*, nay that it was a *Jest to talk of Settlement*, till *the Manner* and *Time of calling Parliaments*, and their *sitting*, when *call'd*, were *fully determined*; and This, in order to prevent the Practice of *keeping* ONE *and the* SAME PARLIAMENT *so long on Foot*, till the Majority *was corrupted by Offices, Gifts and Pensions.* They insisted that the Assurances given at the *Revolution* had led Them to think that † *the antient, legal Course of* ANNUALLY CHOSEN PARLIAMENTS *would have been immediately restored*; and the particular Circumstances of King *William*, who had received the Crown by Gift of the *People*, and who had renew'd the *original Contract* with the People, (which are precisely the Circumstances of the present, Royal Family) were urged as particular Reasons for the Nation to expect his Complyance.

The *frequent sitting of Parliament* was indeed provided for, indirectly and in Consequence, by the Exigencies of the *War*, which soon follow'd the *Revolution*. This War made *annual Supplies* necessary; and, before it was over, the same Necessity of *annual Sessions of Parliament* came to be establish'd, as it continues to this Hour, by the

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* See *Considerations concerning the State of the Nation, by Mr.* Hambden, *publish'd in* 1692.

† *An Enquiry, or a Discourse*, &c. *publish'd in* 1693.

great

great Alteration made with Relation to the *publick Revenue*. The *whole publick Revenue* had been the *King's* formerly. *Parliamentary Aids* were, in those Days, extraordinary and occasional; and Things came to that Pass at last, that *Parliaments* were more frequently, or more rarely convened, just as *Courts* had more frequent, or more rare Occasions for such Supplies. But King *William* began to be, and all our Princes since Him have continued to be, only Proprietors for Life of that Part of the *publick Revenue*, which is appropriated to their *Civil-List*; although They are intrusted still with the Management of the *Whole*; and are even the Stewards of the *publick Creditors* for that Part, which is the private Property of *these Creditors*. This is the present State, sufficiently known, but necessary to be mention'd particularly on this Occasion; and This must continue to be the State; unless some Prince should arise hereafter, who, being advised by a *desperate Minister*, abetted by a *mercenary Faction*, supported by a *standing Army*, and instigated, like *Richard* the 2*d*, by the * *Rashness of his own Temper*, may lay rapacious Hands on all the *Funds* that have been created, and by applying illegally what he may raise legally, convert the whole to his own Use, and so establish *arbitrary Power*, by depriving at one Stroke many of his Subjects of their *Property*, and all of them of their *Liberty*. Till This happens, (and Heaven forbid that it should be ever attempted!) *Sessions of Parliament* must be *anually* held, or the Government itself be distress'd. But neither is This such a direct and full Security as the Importance of the Thing requires; nor does

* *Per immoderatam voluntatem.*

the

the Security of our *Liberty* consist only in the *frequent Sessions of Parliaments*; but it consists likewise in *frequent new Parliaments*. Nay, it consists so much more in *This* than in the *Other*, that the *former* may tend, without the *latter*, even more than the *Discontinuance of Parliaments*, to the Loss of *Liberty*. This was forseen by the Wisdom of our *Constitution*. According to That, although it became in Time (by the Course of Events, and insensible Alterations) no longer necessary to call Parliaments *once*, or even *twice in a Year*, which had been the more antient Practice; yet still our *Kings* continued under an Incapacity of proceeding long in Government, with any tolerable Ease and Safety to Themselves, without the Concurrence and Assistance of *these Assemblies*. According to the *same Constitution*, as *Parliaments* were to be *held*, so they were to be *chosen frequently*; and the Opinion, that the *Holding and Continuance of Parliaments depended absolutely on the Will of the Prince*, may be justly rank'd amongst those Attempts, that were made by some Men to set the *Law*, whilst Others endeavoured to set the *Gospel*, on the Side of *arbitrary Power*. This is the plain Intent and Scheme of our *Constitution*, which provides that the *Representatives of the People* should have frequent Opportunities to communicate together about *national Grievances*; to complain of them, and to obtain the Redress of them, in an orderly, solemn, legal Manner; and that the *People* should have frequent Opportunities of calling their *Representatives* to Account, as it were, for the Discharge of the Trust commited to Them, and of approving, or disapproving their Conduct, by electing, or not electing them anew. Thus our *Constitution* supposes that *Princes* may abuse their Power, and *Parliaments* betray their Trust; and provides

provides, as far as human Wisdom can provide, that neither *one*, nor the *other*, may be able to do so long, without a sufficient Controul. If the *Crown*, indeed, persists in usurping on the *Liberty of the People*, or in any other Kind of *Mal-Administration*; and if the *Prince*, who wears it, proves deaf, as our *Princes* have sometimes been, to the Voice of his *Parliament* and his *People*, there remains no Remedy in the System of the *Constitution*. The *Constitution* is broken by the Obstinacy of the *Prince*, and the * *People must appeal to Heaven in This, as in all other Cases, where They have no Judge on Earth.* Thus if a *Parliament* should persist in abetting *Mal-Administration*, or any Way give up *those Liberties*, which They were intrusted to maintain, no Doubt can be made but that the *People* would be in the same Case; since their *Representatives* have no more Right to betray Them, than their *Kings* have to usurp upon Them; and by Consequence They would acquire the same Right of *appealing to Heaven*, if our *Constitution* had not provided a Remedy against *this Evil*, which could not be provided against the *other*; but our *Constitution* hath provided such a Remedy in the *frequent Succession of new Parliaments*, by which there is not Time sufficient given to form a *Majority of the Representatives of the People* into a MINISTERIAL CABAL; or by which, if This should happen, *such a Cabal* must be soon broken. These Reflections and such others, as they naturally suggest, are sufficient to convince any thinking Man, 1*st*, that nothing could make it safe, nor therefore reasonable, to repose in any Set of Men whatsover so great a

* Locke's *Essay upon Government*, *Chap.* 14.

Truſt as the *collective Body* delegates to the *Repreſentative* in this Kingdom, except the *Shortneſs of the Term*, for which this Truſt is delegated. 2*dly*, that every *Prolongation of this Term* is therefore, in its Degree, unſafe for the *People*; that it weakens their *Security*, and endangers *Liberty* by the very Powers given for its Preſervation. 3*dly*, that *ſuch Prolongations* expoſe the Nation, in the poſſible Caſe of having a *corrupt Parliament*, to loſe the great Advantage, which our *Conſtitution* hath provided, of curing the Evil, before it grows confirm'd and deſperate, by the gentle Method of *chuſing a new Repreſentative*, and reduce the Nation by Conſequence to have no other Alternative than That of *ſubmitting*, or *reſiſting*; though *Submiſſion* will be as grievous, and *Reſiſtance* much more difficult, when the *Legiſlature* betrays its Truſt, than when the *King* alone abuſes his Power.—Theſe Reflections, I ſay, are ſufficient to prove theſe Propoſitions; and theſe Propoſitions ſet before us, in a very ſtrong Light, the Neceſſity of uſing our utmoſt Efforts that the true Deſign of our Conſtitution may be purſued as cloſely as poſſible by the Re-eſtabliſhment of *annual*, or at leaſt of *triennial Parliaments*. But the Importance of the Matter, and the particular Seaſonableneſs of the Conjuncture, invite Me to offer one Conſideration more upon this Head, which I think will not ſtrike the leſs for being obvious and plain. It is This. Should a *King* obtain, *for many Years at once*, the Supplies and Powers, which uſed to be granted *annually* to Him; This would be deem'd, I preſume, even in the preſent Age, an unjuſtifiable Meaſure and an intolerable Grievance, for this plain Reaſon; becauſe it would alter our *Conſtitution* in the fundamental Article, that requires *frequent Aſſemblies of the whole Legiſlature*, in order to aſſiſt and controul

too,

too, the *executive Power*, which is intrusted with *one Part of it*. Now I ask, is not the Article, which requires *frequent Elections of the Representative*, by the *collective Body of the People*, in order to secure the *latter* against the ill Consequences of the possible Weakness, or Corruption of the *former*, as fundamental an Article, and as essential to the Preservation of our *Liberties*, as the *other?* No Man dares say that it is not; at least no Man, who deserves our Attention. The People of *Britain* have as good a Right, and a Right as necessary to be asserted, to keep their *Representatives* true to the Trust reposed in Them, and to the Preservation of the *Constitution*, by the Controul of *frequent Elections*, as They have to keep their *Kings* true to the Trust reposed in Them, and to the Preservation of the *Constitution*, by the Controul of *frequent Sittings of Parliament*. How comes it then to pass, that We may observe so great a Difference in the Sentiments of Mankind, about these *two Cases?* Propose the *first*, there is no *servile Friend of Government*, who will not affect all that Horrour at the Proposition, which every *Friend of the Constitution* will really feel. Propose the keeping up *septennial*, nay the making *decennial Parliaments*, the same *Friends of Government* will contend strenuously for *one* and by Consequence for *both*; since there can be no Reason alledged for the *first*, which is not stronger for the *last*, and would not be still stronger for a *longer Term*. These Reasons, drawn from two or three common-place Topicks of *pretended Conveniency* and *Expediency*, or of *supposed Tranquility at home*, and *Strength abroad*, I need not mention. They have been mention'd by Others, and sufficiently refuted. But That, which may very justly appear marvellous, is This; that some Men, I think not

many, who are *true Friends of the Conſtitution*, have been ſtagger'd in their Opinions, and almoſt ſeduced by the falſe Reaſonings of theſe *Friends of Government*; though nothing can be more eaſy than to ſhew, from Reaſon and Experience, that *Conveniency*, *Expediency*, and *domeſtick Tranquility* may be, and in Fact have been as well, nay better ſecured, under *triennial*, nay *annual Parliaments*, than under *Parliaments of a longer Continuance*; and as for *Strength abroad*, (That is, national Credit and Influence) it will depend on the Opinion foreign Nations have of our national Diſpoſitions, and the Unanimity of our Sentiments. It muſt be chiefly determined therefore by their Knowledge of the real Senſe of the Nation. Now That can appear no Way ſo much as in the natural State of our *Conſtitution*, by *frequent Elections*; and when it does appear ſo, it muſt have another Kind of Effect than the bare Reſolutions of a *ſtale, miniſterial Parliament*; eſpecially if it happens, as it may happen in ſome future Time, that the Senſe of the *Nation* ſhould appear to be different from the Senſe of *ſuch a Parliament*; and that the Reſolutions of *ſuch a Parliament* ſhould be avowedly dictated by *Men*, odious and hated, contemptible and contemn'd, both at Home and Abroad.

But in the Suppoſition that ſome Inconveniences may ariſe by *frequent Elections*; (which is only allow'd for Argument's Sake;) are ſuch Inconveniencies, and the trifling Conſequences of them, to be ſet in the Ballance againſt the Danger of weakening any one Barrier of our *Liberty?* Every Form of Government hath Advantages and Diſadvantages peculiar to it. Thus *abſolute Monarchies* ſeem moſt form'd for ſudden and vigorous Efforts of Power, either in attacking, or in defending; whilſt, in *free Conſtitutions*, the Forms of Government muſt be

neceſſarily

neceſſarily more complicated and ſlow; ſo that in *Theſe*, the ſame Secrecy cannot be always kept, nor the ſame Diſpatch always made, nor the ſame Steadineſs of Meaſures always purſued. Muſt all theſe Forms, inſtituted to preſerve the Checks and Controuls of the ſeveral Parts of the *Conſtitution* on one another, and neceſſary by Conſequence to preſerve the *Liberty* of the Whole, be abandon'd therefore, and a *free Conſtitution* be deſtroy'd, for the Sake of ſome *little Conveniency*, or *Expediency* the more, in the Adminiſtration of publick Affairs? No certainly. We muſt keep our *free Conſtitution*, with the ſmall Defects belonging to it, or We muſt change it for an *arbitary Government*, free perhaps from theſe Defects, but liable to more and to worſe. In ſhort, We muſt make our Option; and ſurely this Option is not hard to be made, between the real and permanent Bleſſings of *Liberty*, diffuſed through a *whole Nation*, and the fantaſtick and accidental Advantages, which *They*, who govern not the *Body of the People*, enjoy under *abſolute Monarchies*. I will not multiply Inſtances, though they crowd in upon Me.——— *Two Councils* where choſen *annually* at *Rome*, and the *Proconſular Power* in the Government of Provinces was limited to a *Year*. Several Inconveniences aroſe, no Doubt, from the ſtrict Obſervation of this Inſtitution. Some appear very plain in Hiſtory; and We may aſſure ourſelves that many Arguments of *Conveniency*, of *Expediency*, of preſerving the *Tranquility* of the City, and of giving *Strength* and *Weight* to the Arms and Counſels of the Commonwealth, were urged to prevail on the People to diſpenſe with theſe Inſtitutions, in Favour of *Pompey* and of *Cæſar*. What was the Conſequence? The *Pyrates* were extirpated, the Price of *Corn* was reduced, *Spain* was held in Subjection, *Gaul* was conquer'd, the *Germans* were repulſed,

Rome

many, who are *true Friends of the Conſtitution*, have been ſtagger'd in their Opinions, and almoſt ſeduced by the falſe Reaſonings of theſe *Friends of Government*; though nothing can be more eaſy than to ſhew, from Reaſon and Experience, that *Conveniency*, *Expediency*, and *domeſtick Tranquility* may be, and in Fact have been as well, nay better ſecured, under *triennial*, nay *annual Parliaments*, than under *Parliaments of a longer Continuance*; and as for *Strength abroad*, (That is, national Credit and Influence) it will depend on the Opinion foreign Nations have of our national Diſpoſitions, and the Unanimity of our Sentiments. It muſt be chiefly determined therefore by their Knowledge of the real Senſe of the Nation. Now That can appear no Way ſo much as in the natural State of our *Conſtitution*, by *frequent Elections*; and when it does appear ſo, it muſt have another Kind of Effect than the bare Reſolutions of a *ſtale, miniſterial Parliament*; eſpecially if it happens, as it may happen in ſome future Time, that the Senſe of the *Nation* ſhould appear to be different from the Senſe of *ſuch a Parliament*; and that the Reſolutions of *ſuch a Parliament* ſhould be avowedly dictated by *Men*, odious and hated, contemptible and contemn'd, both at Home and Abroad.

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Rome

Rome triumph'd, her *Government* flourish'd; but her *Constitution* was destroy'd, her *Liberty* was lost.——The Law of *Habeas Corpus*, that noble Badge of *Liberty*, which every Subject of *Britain* wears, and by which He is distinguish'd so eminently, not from the *Slaves* alone, but even from the *Freemen* of other Countries; the Law of *Habeas Corpus*, I say, may be attended perhaps with some little Inconveniences, in Time of Sedition and Rebellion.——The slow Methods of *giving Money*, and the *strict Appropriations of it*, when given, may be attended with some Inconveniency likewise, in Times of Danger and in great Exigencies of the State.——But who will plead for the Repeal of the *Habeas Corpus Act*; or who would not press for the Revival of it, if it stood suspended for an *indefinite*, or even a *long Term?*—Who will say that the Practice of *giving Money without Account*, or passing *Votes of Credit*, (by which the *Purse of the People* is taken out of the Hands of *Those*, whom the *People* trusted, and put into the Hands of *Those*, whom They neither did, nor would have trusted) who will say that such a Deviation from those *Rules of Parliament*, which ought to be deem'd sacred and preserved inviolate, may be establish'd, or should not be opposed by all possible Means, if it was establish'd?

If all This be as clear as I imagine it is; if the Objections to *frequent Elections of Parliaments* do not lye; or, supposing them to lye, if the Danger on *one Side* out weighs vastly the supposed Inconveniency on the *other*; nay, if *Laws* and *Institutions*, not more essential to the Preservation of *Liberty* than this *antient and fundamental Rule of our Constitution*, be maintain'd; and if all Men are forced to agree, (even They, who wish them perhaps abolish'd) that they ought to be maintain'd,

maintain'd, for the Sake of preſerving *Liberty*; let Me ask again, how comes it to paſs that We obſerve ſo great a Difference between the Sentiments and Reaſonings of Mankind about *frequent Seſſions of Parliament*, and *frequent Parliaments*; about the *Caſe* now before us, and all the *others*, that have been mention'd? The only Manner, in which I can account for ſuch an Inconſiſtency, is This. The Sight of the *Mind* differs very much from the Sight of the *Body*, and its Operations are frequently the Reverſe of the *other*. Objects at a Diſtance appear to the *former* in their true Magnitude, and diminiſh as they are brought nearer. The Event, that created much Aſtoniſhment, Indignation, or Terror in Proſpect, creates leſs and leſs, as it approaches, and by the Time it happens, Men have familiarized Themſelves with it.——If the *Romans* had been told, in the Days of *Auguſtus*, that an Emperor would ſucceed, in whoſe Reign an *Horſe* ſhould be made Conſul, They would have been extremely ſurpriſed. I believe, They were not ſo much ſurpriſed, when the Thing happen'd; when the *Horſe* was Conſul and *Caligula* Emperor.——If it had been foretold to thoſe Patriots at the *Revolution*, who remember'd *long Parliaments*, who ſtill felt the Smart of them, who ſtruggled hard for *annual*, and obtain'd with much Difficulty, at the End of five or ſix Years, *triennial Parliaments*, that a Time would come, when even the Term of *triennial Parliaments* would be deem'd too ſhort, and a Parliament, choſen for *three Years*, would chuſe itſelf for *four* more, and entail *ſeptennial Parliaments* on the Nation; that This would happen, and the Fruits of their honeſt Labours be loſt, in little more than twenty Years; and that it would be brought about, whilſt our Government continued on the

Foundations

Foundations They had then so newly laid; if all This had been foretold at the Time I mention, it would have appear'd improbable and monstrous to the Friends of the *Revolution*. Yet it hath happen'd; and, in less than twenty Years, it is grown, or is growing, familiar to us. The uniform Zeal and Complaisance of our *Parliaments* for the *Crown* leave little Room to apprehend any Attempt to *govern without Them*; or to make Them do in *one Session* the Work of *seven*; though This would be extreamly *convenient*, no Doubt, a great Ease to *future Ministers*, and a great Saving of Expence and Time to *Country Gentlemen*. But suppose, (for I desire it may be remember'd that We reason hypothetically) suppose a *Parliament* should think fit to give, in the *first Session*, all the *Money*, all the *Credit*, and all the *Powers*, necessary for carrying on the Government, during *seven Years*; and then let those Persons, who will be shock'd at this Supposition, and yet declare Themselves for *septennial Parliaments*, lay their Hands on their Hearts, and consider whether such an Alteration of the Constitution might not grow familiar to Them, and even gain their Approbation. I think, it would do so. I am sure, it might as reasonably as the other. They would find the Ease, in one Case, of *little Attendance*, as much as That of *distant Elections*, in the other. The Arguments of *Conveniency*, *Expediency*, *Publick Tranquility*, and *Strength to the Government*, would be just as well apply'd; and if the *Ministers* should, by Miracle, make no very exorbitant ill Use of such a Situation, I doubt whether He, who should plead for *annual Parliaments then*, would be much better heard by the same Persons, than He, who pleads for *frequent Elections of Parliaments*, is now. But let not the *Lovers of Liberty*, the *Friends of our Constitution*,

reason

reaſon in this Manner. Let them remember that Danger commences, when the Breach is made, not when the Attack is begun; that He, who neglects to ſtop the Leak, as ſoon as it is diſcover'd, in Hopes to ſave his Ship by Pumping, when the Water guſhes in with Violence, deſerves to be drown'd; and, to lay aſide Figures of Speech, that our *Conſtitution* is not, like the Schemes of *ſome Politicians*, a Jumble of disjointed, incoherent Whimſies, but a noble and wiſe Syſtem, the eſſential Parts of which are ſo proportion'd, and ſo intimately connected, that a Change in one begets a Change in the whole; that the *frequent Elections of Parliament* are as much an eſſential Part of this Syſtem as the *frequent Sittings of Parliament*; that the Work of the *Revolution* is imperfect therefore, and our future Security precarious, unleſs our *antient Conſtitution* be reſtored, in this eſſential Part; and that the Reſtoration of it, in this Part, is one of thoſe Methods, by which alone the pernicious Deſigns of *ſuch Men*, as We have mention'd in a former Letter, if any ſuch ſhould be ever admitted into Power, (*Enemies to the Conſtitution*, under the Mask of *Zeal for the Government*) may be defeated.

I am, SIR, &c.

LETTER XII.

SIR,

WE have obſerved already that the *Conſtitution of the Britiſh Government* ſuppoſes our *Kings* may abuſe their Power, and our *Repreſentatives* betray their Truſt; and provides againſt both theſe Contingencies, as well as human Wiſdom can provide. Here let us obſerve that the ſame *Conſtitution* is very far from ſuppoſing the *People* will ever betray Themſelves; and yet this Caſe is poſſible, no Doubt. We do not read, I think, of more than * *one Nation*, who refuſed *Liberty*, when it was offer'd to Them; but We read of many, and have almoſt ſeen ſome, who loſt it through their own Fault, by the plain and neceſſary Conſequences of their own Conduct, when They were in full Poſſeſſion of it, and had the Means of ſecuring it effectually in their Power. A wiſe and brave People will neither be cozen'd, nor bully'd out of their *Liberty*; but a wiſe and brave People may ceaſe to be ſuch; They may degenerate; They may ſink into Sloth and Luxury; They may reſign Themſelves to a treacherous Conduct; or abet the *Enemies of the Conſtitution*, under a Notion of

* *The* Cappadocians, *vid.* Strabo. *Lib.* 12 —— *Libertatem repudiaverunt, ut quam ſibi dicerent intolerabilem.*

ſupporting

ſupporting the *Friends of the Government*; They may want the Senſe to diſcern their Danger in Time; or the Courage to reſiſt, when it ſtares Them in the Face. The *Tarquins* were expell'd, and *Rome* reſumed her Liberty. *Cæſar* was murder'd, and all his Race extinct; but *Rome* remain'd in Bondage. From whence this Difference? † *Machiavel* ſhall account for it. In the Days of *Tarquin*, the People of *Rome* were not yet corrupted. In the Days of *Cæſar*, they were moſt corrupt. A free People may be ſometimes betray'd; but no People will betray Themſelves, and ſacrifice their *Liberty*, unleſs They fall into a State of univerſal Corruption; and when They are once fallen into ſuch a State, They will be ſure to loſe what They deſerve no longer to enjoy. To what Purpoſe therefore ſhould our *Conſtitution* have ſuppoſed a Caſe, in which no Remedy can avail; a Caſe, which can never happen, 'till the Spirit, which form'd *this Conſtitution* firſt, and hath preſerved it ever ſince, ſhall be totally extinguiſh'd; and 'till it becomes an ideal Entity, like the *Utopia*, exiſting in the Imagination, or Memory, no where elſe? As all Government began, ſo all Government muſt end by the *People*; tyrannical Governments by their Virtue and Courage, and even free Governments by their Vice and Baſeneſs. Our *Conſtitution*, indeed, makes it impoſſible to deſtroy *Liberty* by any ſudden Blaſt of popular Fury, or by the Treachery of a Few; for though the Many cannot eaſily hurt, They may eaſily ſave Themſelves. But if the Many will concur with the Few; if they will adviſedly and deliberately ſuffer their *Liberty* to be taken away by Thoſe, to

† *Diſcourſes Lib.* 1. *c.* 17.

whom They delegate Power to preſerve it; This no *Conſtitution* can prevent. God would not ſupport even his own Theocracy againſt the concurrent Deſire of the Children of *Iſrael*, but gave Them a *King* in his Anger. How then ſhould our human Conſtitution of Government ſupport itſelf againſt ſo univerſal a Change, as We here ſuppoſe, in the Temper and Character of our People? It cannot be. We may give Ourſelves a Tyrant in our Folly, if We pleaſe. But This can never happen till the whole Nation falls into a State of political Reprobation. Then, and not till then, political Damnation will be our Lot.

Let us deſcend into a greater Detail, in order to develope theſe Reflections fully, and to puſh the Conſequences of Them home to Ourſelves, and to our preſent State. They deſerve our utmoſt Attention, and are ſo far from being foreign to the Subject of theſe Eſſays upon *Parties*, that they will terminate in the very Point, at which We began, and wind up the whole in one important Leſſon.

To proceed then; I ſay, that if the People of this Iſland ſhould ſuffer their Liberties to be at any Time raviſh'd, or ſtolen from Them, They would incur greater Blame, and deſerve by Conſequence leſs Pity, than any enſlaved and oppreſs'd People ever did. By how much *true Liberty* (That is, Liberty ſtated and aſcertain'd by *Law*, in equal Oppoſition to *popular Licence* and *arbitary Will*) hath been more boldly aſſerted, more wiſely or more ſucceſsfully improved, and more firmly eſtabliſh'd in This, than in other Countries; by ſo much the more heavy would our juſt Condemnation prove in the Caſe, that is here ſuppoſed. The Virtue of our Anceſtors, to whom all theſe Advantages are owing, would aggravate the Guilt and the Infamy of their degenerate Poſterity. There have

have been Ages of *Gold* and of *Silver*, of *Brass* and of *Iron*, in our little World, as in the great World, though not in the same Order. In which of these Ages we are at present, let Others determine. This, at least, is certain, that in all these Ages *Britain* hath been the Temple, as it were, of *Liberty*. Whilst her sacred Fires have been extinguish'd in so many Countries, here they have been religiously kept alive. Here She hath her Saints, her Confessors, and a whole Army of Martyrs, and the Gates of Hell have not hitherto prevail'd against Her; so that if a fatal Reverse is to happen; if Servility and Servitude are to over-run the whole World, like Injustice, and *Liberty* is to retire from it, like *Astræa*; our Portion of the abandon'd Globe will have, at least, the mournful Honour, whenever it happens, of shewing her last, her parting Steps.

The antient *Britons* are to us the *Aborigines* of our Island. We discover little of Them through the Gloom of Antiquity, and We see nothing beyond Them. This however We know; They were *Freemen*. *Cæsar*, who visited Them in an hostile Manner, but did not conquer Them, perhaps was * beaten by Them; *Cæsar*, I say, bestows very liberally the Title of *Kings* upon their Chieftains, and the Compilers of fabulous Traditions deduce a Series of their Monarchs from *Samothes*, a Cotemporary of *Nimrod*. But *Cæsar* affected to swell the Account of his Expedition with pompous Names; and these Writers, like Those whom † *Strabo* mentions, endeavour'd to recommend Themselves by publishing Romances to an

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* *Territa quæsitis ostendit Terga Britannis.*
† *Geog. Lib.* II.

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ignorant Generation, instead of Histories. These supposed Monarchs were the * Heads of little Clans; *Reguli, vel melioris Notæ Nobiles*; and if our Island knew any Authority of the kingly Sort in those Days, it was That of *occasional* and *temporary Monarchs*, elected in great Exigencies, † *communi Consilio, Suffragiis Multitudinis*, like *Cassivellaunus* in *Britain*, or *Vercingetorix* in *Gaul*; for, in some Cases, Examples taken from either of these People will conclude for both. The *Kings*, who ruled in *Britain*, after the *Romans* abandon'd the Island, in the Beginning of the 5th Century, held their Authority from the *People*, and govern'd under the Controul of *national Assemblies*, as We have great Reason to believe, and none to doubt. In short, as far as We can look back, a lawless Power, a Government by Will, never prevail'd in *Britain*.

The *Saxons* had *Kings*, as well as the *Britons*. The Manner, in which They establish'd Themselves, and the long Wars They waged for and against the *Britons*, led to and maintain'd *monarchical Rule* amongst Them. But *these Kings* were in their first Institution, no Doubt, such as *Tacitus* describes the *German Kings* and *Princes* to have been; ** Chiefs, who persuaded, rather than commanded; and who were heard in the publick Assemblies of the Nation, according as their *Age*, their *Nobility*, their *military Fame*, or their *Eloquence* gave Them Authority. How many doubty Monarchs, in later and more polite Ages, would have slept in Cottages, and have

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* *Sel. Anal. Anglo Brit. Lib.* 2 *cap.* 3. *Camd.*
† *Cæs. de Bell. Gal. Lib.* 5. & 7.
** *De Situ mor. & Pop. Germ. lib.* 11.

work'd

work'd in Stalls, instead of inhabiting Palaces, and being cushion'd up in Thrones, if this Rule of Government had continued in Force? —— But the *Saxon Kings* grew into Power in Time; and among Them, as among other Nations, Birth, instead of Merit, became, for the Sake of Order and Tranquility, a Title to the Throne. However, tho' these Princes might command, and were no longer under the Necessity of governing by Persuasion, They were still under That of governing to the Satisfaction of the People. By what other Expedient could They govern Men, who were wise enough to preserve and exercise the Right of electing their *civil Magistrates*, and *military Officers*, and the System of whose Government was upheld and carried on by a Gradation of *popular Assemblies*, from the inferior Courts to the high Court of Parliament; for such, or very near such, was the *Wittena-Gemote* in Nature and Effect, whenever the Word *Parliament* came into Use?

The first Prince of the *Norman* Race was an absolute *Conqueror*, in the Opinion of some Men; and I can readly agree that He assumed, in some Cases, the Power of a *Tyrant*. But supposing all This to be true in the utmost Extent, that the *Friends of absolute Monarchy* can desire it should be thought so; This, and This alone, will result from it; *unlimited*, or *absolute Monarchy*, could never be establish'd in *Britain*; no, not even by *Conquest*. The Rights of the People were soon re-asserted; the Laws of the *Confessor* were restored; and the third Prince of this Race, *Henry* the *1st*, covenanted in a solemn Speech to his People for their Assistance against his Brother *Robert* and the *Normans*, by promising that *sacred Charter*, which was in other Reigns so often and so solemnly confirm'd by engaging

gaging to maintain his Subjects in * *their antient Liberties*, to *follow their Advice*, and to rule Them in Peace with *Prudence* and *Mildness*.

I need not descend into more Particulars to shew the Perpetuity of free Government in *Britain*. Few Men, even in this Age, are so shamefully unacquainted with the History of their Country, as to be ignorant of the principal Events and signal Revolutions, which have happen'd since the *Norman* Æra. One continued Design against *Liberty* hath been carried on by various Methods, almost in every Reign. In many, the Struggles have been violent and bloody. But *Liberty* still hath triumph'd over Force, over Treachery, over Corruption, and even under Oppression. The Altars of *Tyranny* have been demolish'd as soon as raised; nay, even whilst they were raising; and the Priests of that Idol have been hew'd to Pieces; so that I will affirm, without the least Apprehension of being disproved, that our *Constitution* is brought nearer than any *other Constitution* ever was to the most perfect Idea of a *free System of Government*.——One Observation only I will make, before I leave this Head, and it is This. The Titles of those Kings, which were precarious, from Circumstances of Times, and Notions that prevail'd, notwithstanding the general Acquiescence of the Nation to them, afforded so many Opportunities to our Ancestors of better securing, or improving *Liberty*. They were not such Bubbles as to alter, without mending the Government; much less to make Revolutions, and suffer by them. They were not such Bubbles

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* *In antiquis vestris Libertatibus. Vestris inclinando Consiliis. Consultius & mitius, more mansueti Principis.*——— Vid. *Mat. Par.*

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as to raiſe Princes to the Throne, who had no Pretence to ſit in it but their Choice, purely to have the Honour of bettering the Condition of thoſe Princes, without bettering their own in proportion. ——— If what I have been ſaying appears a little too digreſſive from the main Scope of this Eſſay, I ſhall hope for Indulgence from this Conſideration, that the natural Effect of ſuch Reflections, as I have made and ſuggeſted, muſt be to raiſe in our Minds the honeſt Ambition of emulating the Virtue and Courage of our Forefathers, in the Cauſe of *Liberty*; and to inſpire a reaſonable Fear, heighten'd by Shame, of loſing what They preſerved and deliver'd down to us, through ſo many Mixtures of different People, of *Britons* with *Saxons*, of both with *Danes*, of all three with *Normans*, through ſo many Difficulties, ſo many Dangers, ſo many Revolutions, in the Courſe of ſo many Centuries.

There is another Reaſon to be given why the People of this Iſland would be more inexcuſable than any other, if They loſt their *Liberty*; and the opening and enforcing of this Reaſon will bring us fully into our Subject.

I ſuppoſed juſt now that our *Liberty* might be raviſh'd, or ſtol'n from us; but I think that Expreſſion muſt be retracted; ſince it will appear, upon due Conſideration, that our *Liberty* cannot be taken away by the Force, or Fraud alone of Thoſe, who govern; it cannot be taken away, unleſs the People are Themſelves Accomplices; and They, who are Accomplices, cannot be ſaid to ſuffer by one, or the other. Some Nations have received the Yoke of Servitude with little or no Struggle; but if ever it is impoſed upon us, We muſt not only hold out our Necks to receive it; We muſt help to put it on. Now, to be paſſive in ſuch a Caſe

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is ſhameful; but to be active is ſupreme and unexampled Infamy. In order to become *Slaves*, We of this Nation muſt be beforehand, what other People have been render'd by a long Courſe of Servitude; We muſt become the moſt corrupt, moſt profligate, the moſt ſenſeleſs, the moſt ſervile Nation of Wretches, that ever diſgraced Humanity; for a Force ſufficient to raviſh *Liberty* from us, ſuch as a great *ſtanding Army* is in Time of Peace, cannot be continued, unleſs we continue it; nor can the Means, neceſſary to ſteal *Liberty* from us, be long enough employ'd with Effect, unleſs We give a Sanction to their Iniquity, and call Good Evil, and Evil Good.

It may be ſaid that even the *Friends of Liberty* have ſometimes different Notions about it, and about the Means of maintaining, or promoting it; and therefore that even the *Britiſh* Nation may poſſibly, ſome Time or other, approve and concur in Meaſures deſtructive of their *Liberty*, without any Intention to give it up, and much more without changing from the Character, which They have hitherto borne amongſt the Societies of Mankind, to that infamous Character I have juſt now ſuppoſed. If This were true, it would only furniſh more Reaſons to be always on our Guard, to be jealous of every extraordinary Demand, and to reject conſtantly every Propoſition, though never ſo ſpecious, that had a Tendency to weaken the Barriers of *Liberty*, or to raiſe a Strength ſuperior to theirs. But I confeſs I do not think We can be led blindfold ſo far as the Brink of the Precipice. I know that all Words, which are Signs of complex Ideas, furniſh Matter of Miſtake and Cavil. We diſpute about *Juſtice*, for Inſtance, and fancy that We have different Opinions about the ſame Thing; whilſt, by ſome little Difference in the Compoſition of

of our Ideas, it happens that We have only different Opinions about different Things, and ſhould be of the ſame Opinion about the ſame Thing. But This, I preſume, cannot happen in the Caſe before us. All Diſputes about *Liberty* in this Country, and at this Time, muſt be Diſputes for and againſt the ſelf-ſame, fix'd and invariable Set of Ideas, whatever the Diſputants on *one Side of the Queſtion* may pretend, in order to conceal what it is not yet very ſafe to avow. No Diſputes can poſſibly ariſe from different Conceptions of any Thing ſo clearly ſtated, and ſo preciſely determined, as the fundamental Principles are, on which our whole *Liberty* reſts.

If *Liberty* be that delicious and wholſome Fruit, on which the *Britiſh* Nation hath fed for ſo many Ages, and to which we owe our Riches, our Strength, and all the Advantages we boaſt of; the *Britiſh Conſtitution* is the Tree, that bears this Fruit, and will continue to bear it, as long as We are careful to fence it in, and trench it round, againſt the Beaſts of the Field, and the Inſects of the Earth. To ſpeak without a Figure, our *Conſtitution* is a Syſtem of Government ſuited to the Genius of our Nation, and even to our Situation. The Experience of many hundred Years hath ſhewn that by preſerving *this Conſtitution* inviolate, or by drawing it back to the Principles, on which it was originally founded, whenever it ſhall be made to ſwerve from them, We may ſecure to Ourſelves, and to our lateſt Poſterity, the Poſſeſſion of that *Liberty*, which We have long enjoy'd. What would We more? What *other Liberty* than This do We ſeek? And if We ſeek no other, is not This mark'd out in ſuch Characters as He, that runs, may read? As our *Conſtitution* therefore ought to be, what it ſeldom is, the *Rule of Government*; ſo-

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let us make the Conformity, or Repugnancy of Things to *this Constitution*, the Rule, by which We accept them as favourable, or reject them as dangerous to *Liberty*. They, who talk of *Liberty* in *Britain* on any other Principles than Those of the *British Constitution*, talk impertinently at best, and much Charity is requisite to believe no worse of Them. But they, who distinguish between *practicable* and *impracticable Liberty*, in order to insinuate what they mean, (or They mean nothing) that the *Liberty* establish'd by the true Scheme of our *Constitution* is of the *impracticable Kind*; and They, who endeavour, both in Speculation and Practice, to elude and pervert the Forms, and to ridicule and explode the Spirit of *this Constitution*; these Men are Enemies, open and avow'd Enemies, to it, and by Consequence to *British Liberty*, which cannot be supported on any other Bottom.——— Some Men there are, the Pests of Society I think Them, who pretend a great Regard to *Religion* in general, but who take every Opportunity of declaiming publickly against that *System of Religion*, or at least against that *Church-Establishment*, which is received in *Britain*. Just so the Men, of whom I have been speaking, affect a great Regard to *Liberty* in general, but They dislike so much the System of *Liberty* establish'd in *Britain*, that They are incessant in their Endeavours to puzzle the plainest Thing in the World, and to refine and distinguish away the Life and Strength of our *Constitution*, in Favour of the little, present momentary Turns, which They are retain'd to serve. What now would be the Consequence, if all these Endeavours should succeed? I am persuaded that the great *Philosophers*, *Divines*, *Lawyers* and *Politicians*, who exert them, have not yet prepared and agreed upon the Plans of

a *new*

a *new Religion*, and of *new Conſtitutions in Church and State*. We ſhould find Ourſelves therefore without any Form of *Religion*, or *civil Government*. The *firſt Set of theſe Miſſionaries* would take off all the Reſtraints of *Religion* from the *Governed*, and the *latter Set* would remove, or render ineffectual, all the Limitations and Controuls, which *Liberty* hath preſcribed to *Thoſe that govern*, and diſjoint the whole Frame of our *Conſtitution*. Entire Diſſolution of Manners, Confuſion, Anarchy, or perhaps abſolute Monarchy, would follow; for it is poſſible, nay probable, that in ſuch a State as This, and amidſt ſuch a Rout of lawleſs Savages, Men would chuſe this Government, abſurd as it is, rather than have no Government at all.

But here again it may be ſaid, that as *Liberty* is a Word of uncertain Signification, ſo is *Conſtitution*; that Men have taught the moſt oppoſite Doctrines, and pretended at leaſt to build them on the Principles of the *Conſtitution*; that the Rule therefore of determining our Notions of *Liberty*, by the Principles of our *Conſtitution*, is no Rule, and We are by Conſequence juſt where we were before. But the Anſwer is ready. It is true that there were formerly Men, who perſiſted long in the Attempt to talk and write that Chimera, called *Prerogative*, into Vogue; to contend that it was ſomething *real*; a Right inherent in the *Crown*; founded in the *Conſtitution of our Government*; and equally neceſſary to ſupport the juſt Authority of the *Prince*, and to protect the *Subject*. How We had like to have loſt our *Liberty* by the Prevalence of *ſuch Doctrines*, by the Conſequences drawn from them, and the Practices built upon them, hath been touch'd in the Deduction of the State of *Parties*. But happily this Kind of Progeſſion from a free to a ſlaviſh Conſtitution of Government was

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ſtop'd at the *Revolution*, and the Notions themſelves are ſo exploded in the Courſe of ſix and forty Years, that they are entertain'd at this Hour by no Set of Men, whoſe Numbers, or Importance, give Them any Pretence to be reckon'd among our *national Parties*.———It is as true, that there are now Men, who purſue the very ſame Deſign by different Methods. The *former* attack'd, *Theſe* undermine our *Liberty*. The *former* were the *Beaſts of the Field*, hinted at above; *Theſe* are the *Inſects of the Earth*; and like other Inſects, though ſprung from Dirt, and the vileſt of the animal Kind, They can nibble and gnaw, and poiſon; and, if They are ſuffer'd to multiply and work on, They can lay the moſt fruitful Country waſte. *Corruption* and *Dependency* are their favourite Topicks. They plead for the *firſt* as a laudable Expedient of Government; and for the *laſt*, I mean *corrupt*, *private Dependency*, as an eſſential Part of our *Conſtitution*. When They have perplex'd, as much as they are able, our Ideas of *Dependency* and *Independency*, They reaſon, if I may give their Sophiſms ſo good a Name, as if the *Independency of each Part of the Legiſlature*, of the *King* particularly, aroſe from the *Dependency of the other Parts on that Part*. Now, This is both falſe and abſurd. ——— It is falſe, becauſe the *conſtitutional Independency of each Part of the Legiſlature* ariſes from hence; that diſtinct Rights, Powers and Privileges are aſſign'd to it by the *Conſtitution*. But then this *Independency of one Part* can be ſo little ſaid to ariſe from the *Dependency of another*, that it conſiſts properly and truely in the free, unbiaſs'd, uninfluenced, and independent Exerciſe of theſe Rights, Powers and Privileges, by *each Part*, in as ample an Extent as the *Conſtitution* allows; or, in other Words,

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as far as that Point, where the *Conſtitution* ſtops this free Exerciſe, and ſubmits the Proceedings of *one Part*, not to the private Influence, but to the publick Controul of the *other Parts*. Before this Point, the *Independency of each Part* is meant by the *Conſtitution* to be *abſolute*. From this Point the *conſtitutional Dependency of each Part on the others* commences. To talk of *natural Independency* belonging to the *kingly Office*, to an *Houſe of Peers*, or an *Houſe of Commons*, (the Inſtitutions of *Art*, not of *Nature*) is impertinent. ——— It is abſurd, becauſe it abſolutely deſtroys the very Thing it is advanced to eſtabliſh; for if *A*'s *Independency* ariſes from the *Dependency of B*, and *B*'s *Independency* from the *Dependency of A*, then are *A* and *B* both dependent, and there is no ſuch thing as *conſtitutional Independency* at all. The *Crown* is the Source of *Honours*, and hath the Diſpoſal of *publick Employments*. This no Man diſputes; nor would any Man, I believe, go about to alter. But will it follow that the * *conſtitutional Independency of the King* would be loſt, becauſe the *Houſe of Commons* give the Supplies, if He had not the Power of giving Part of this Money, in *Places* and *Penſions*, back again to the Members of *that Houſe?* It would be eaſy for Me to turn this whole profound Reaſoning into many, even ridiculous Lights; but the Subject creates other Sentiments than Thoſe of Mirth, though the Logick employ'd about it deſerves a ludicrous, not a ſerious Treatment.——I ask Pardon for having ſaid ſo much upon ſo ſlight an Occaſion, and I proceed.

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* *Vide London Jour. Sept.* 28, 1734.

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Notwithſtanding all theſe Endeavours to puzzle our *Conſtitution*, formerly in Favour of that *Prerogative*, by the Weight of which it muſt have been cruſh'd, and actually at this Time in Favour of *that Corruption* and *corrupt Dependency*, by which it would be ſoon demoliſh'd; the main Principles of the *Britiſh Conſtitution* are ſimple, and obvious, and fix'd, as well as any Truths can be fix'd, in the Minds of Men, by the moſt determinate Ideas. The State of our *Conſtitution* then affords an eaſy and unerring Rule, by which to judge of the State of our *Liberty*. The Improvement, or Decay of *one* denotes the Improvement, or Decay of the *other*; and the Strength, or Weakneſs of *one*, the Safety, or Danger of the *other*. We cannot loſe our *Liberty*, unleſs We loſe our *Conſtitution*, nor loſe our *Conſtitution*, unleſs We are Accomplices to the Violations of it; for *this Conſtitution* is better fitted than any, antient or modern, ever was, not only to preſerve *Liberty*, but to provide for its own Duration, and to become immortal, if any Thing human could be ſo.

I am, SIR, &c.

LETTER XIII.

SIR,

MUCH hath been ſaid occaſionally, in the Courſe of theſe Letters, concerning the Beauty and Excellency of the *Britiſh Conſtitution.* I ſhall make however no Excuſe for returning to the ſame Subject upon an Occaſion, which introduces it ſo naturally, and indeed ſo neceſſarily. Nothing can be more appoſite to the profeſs'd Deſign of theſe Writings; nothing of more real, and more preſent Uſe. Let me ſpeak plainly. We have been all of us, Thoſe of every Side, and of every Denomination, accuſtom'd too long to value ourſelves fooliſhly, or knaviſhly, on our Zeal for *this*, or *that Party*, or for *this*, or *that Government*; and to make a Merit of ſtraining the *Conſtitution* different Ways, in order to ſerve the different Purpoſes of each. It is high Time We ſhould all learn, if That be ſtill poſſible, to value Ourſelves in the firſt Place on our Zeal for the *Conſtitution*; to make *all Governments*, and much more *all Parties*, bow to *That*, and to ſuffer *That* to bow to none. But how ſhall this *Conſtitution* be known, unleſs We make it the Subject of careſul Enquiry, and of frequent and ſober Reflection? Or unknown, how ſhall it become, what it ought to be, the Object of our Admiration, our Love and our Zeal? Many of Thoſe, who reap the greateſt Advantages

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from it, paſs it by unregarded, with equal Folly and Ingratitude. Many take a tranſient, inattentive View of it. Many again conſider it in Part only, or behold it in a narrow, pedantick Light. Inſtead of This, We ſhould view it often. We ſhould pierce through the Form to the Soul of it. We ſhould contemplate the noble Object in all its Parts, and in the Whole, and render it as familiar to our intellectual Sight, as the moſt common ſenſible Objects are to our corporeal Sight. *Quam illa ardentes Amores excitaret ſui, ſi videretur?* Well may it be allow'd Me to apply to ſo glorious an Effort of human Wiſdom what *Tully* ſays after *Plato*, in the *Phædrus*, if I miſtake not, of Wiſdom herſelf.

All publick Regiment, ſays Mr. *Hooker*, *hath ariſen from deliberate Advice, Conſultation and Compoſition between Men.* The Propoſition is undoubtedly and univerſally true. It is as true in the Kingdom of *Morocco*, as it is in the Kingdom of *Britain*; and the undeniable Conſequences, which flow from it, are obvious. We are not to wonder however, if Men do not look up to *this Original of Government*, nor trace theſe Conſequences from it, in moſt Countries. In the Inſtitution of Governments, too great Powers have been uſually given, and two great Confidence repoſed, either at firſt, or in Proceſs of Time. Theſe Powers have ſubſiſted, have been confirm'd by more Time, and increaſed by the very Nature of Power, which is the propereſt Inſtrument of its own Propagation. But the *original Compoſition*, for want of being expreſs'd, or ſufficiently imply'd, or frequently recur'd to by the Forms of the Government, hath been forgot, or hath grown ſo obſolete, that They, whoſe Intereſt

* *Cic. de Finib. l.* 2.

required

required that no ſuch Thing ſhould be believed, have thought Themſelves at Liberty boldly to deny it; and not only ſo, but to ſuppoſe *ſome other Original of Government*. Strange Syſtems of *Policy*, and ſtranger of *Religion*, have been deviſed to ſupport and ſanctify theſe Uſurpations. *Education* hath been ſet on the ſame Side; and *ſaucy Authority* hath prevail'd againſt the clereſt Light of *Nature*, and the plaineſt Dictates of *common Senſe*. No Man, who hath read and look'd abroad into the World, and made a reaſonable Uſe of either, will think This too ſtrange to be true; ſince there is no demonſtrated Truth, (ſuch Truths I mean as are here ſpoken of) which may not be render'd, at leaſt, very problematical by long, uniform, poſitive Contradiction; nor any demonſtrated Lye, which may not be render'd probable to many, and certain to ſome, by long, uniform, poſitive Affirmation; according to a juſt Obſervation made by Father *Paul* ſomewhere or other, on Occaſion of *Conſtantine*'s ſuppoſed Grant, and other Cheats of the Court of *Rome*. But We of this Country have been more happy. Our *original Contract* hath been recur'd to often, and as many Cavils as have been made, as many Jeſts as have been broke about this Expreſſion, We might ſafely defy the *Aſſertors of abſolute Monarchy and arbitary Will*, if there were any worth our Regard, to produce any one Point of Time, ſince which We know any Thing of our *Conſtitution*, wherein the whole Scheme of it would not have been one monſtrous Abſurdity, unleſs an *original Contract* had been ſuppoſed. They muſt have been blinded therefore by Ignorance, or Paſſion, or Prejudice, who did not always ſee that there is ſuch a Thing neceſſarily, and in the very Nature of our *Conſtitution*; and that They might as well doubt whether the Foundations of an antient,

ſolid Building were ſuited and proportion'd to the Elevation and Form of it, as whether our *Conſtitution* was eſtabliſh'd by *Compoſition* and *Contract*. Sure I am that They muſt be worſe than blind, if any ſuch there are, who do not confeſs at this Time, and under the *preſent Settlement*, that our *Conſtitution* is in the ſtricteſt Senſe a *Bargain*, a *conditional Contract between the Prince and the People*, as it always hath been, and ſtill is, between the *repreſentative and collective Bodies of the Nation*.

That *this Bargain* may not be broken, on the Part of the *Prince*, with the *People*, (though the *executive Power* be truſted to the *Prince*, to be exerciſed according to ſuch Rules, and by the Miniſtry of ſuch Officers, as are preſcribed by the Laws and Cuſtoms of this Kingdom) the *legiſlative*, or *ſupreme Power*, is veſted by our *Conſtitution* in *three Eſtates*, whereof the *King* is one. Whilſt the Members of the *other Two* preſerve their *private Independency*, and *thoſe Eſtates* are conſequently under no *Dependency* except That, which is in the Scheme of our *Conſtitution*, this Controul on the *firſt* will always be ſufficient; and a *bad King*, let Him be as bold as He may pleaſe to be thought, muſt ſtand in Awe of an *honeſt Parliament*.

That *this Bargain* may not be broken, on the Part of the *repreſentative Body*, with the *collective Body of the Nation*, it is not only a principal, declared Right of the People of *Britain*, *that the Election of Members to ſit in Parliament ſhall be free*; but it hath been a principal Part of the Care and Attention of Parliaments, for more than three hundred Years to watch over *this Freedom*, and to ſecure it, by removing *all Influence of the Crown*, and *all other corrupt Influence*, from theſe Elections. This Care and this Attention have gone ſtill farther.

They

They have provided, as far as they have been suffer'd to provide hitherto, by the *constitutional Dependency of one House on the other, and of both on the Crown*, that *all such Influence* should be removed from the Members, after They are chosen. Even here the Providence of our *Constitution* hath not stop'd. Lest all other Provisions should be ineffectual to keep the Members of the House of Commons out of this *unconstitutional Dependency*, which some Men presume with a silly dogmatical Air of Triumph to suppose necessary to support the *constitutional Independency of the Crown*, the Wisdom of our *Constitution* hath thought fit that the *Representatives of the People* should not have Time to forget that They are *such*; that They are empower'd to act *for the People*, not *against Them*. In a Word, our *Constitution* means that the Members of this Body should be kept, as it were, to their good Behaviour, by the frequent Returns of *new Elections*. It does all that a *Constitution* can do, all that can be done by legal Provisions, to secure the Interests of the *People*, by maintaining the Integrity of their *Trustees*; and lest all This should fail, it gives frequent Opportunities to the *People* to secure their Interests *Themselves*, by mending their Choice of their *Trustees*; so that as a *bad King* must stand in Awe of an *honest Parliament*, a *corrupt House of Commons* must stand in Awe of an *honest People*.

Between these *two Estates*, or Branches of the *legislative Power*, there stands a *third*, the *House of Peers*; which may seem in Theory, perhaps, too much under the Influence of the *Crown*, to be a proper Controul upon it; because the sole Right of creating *Peers* resides in the *Crown*; whereas the *Crown* hath no Right to intermeddle in the electing *Commoners*. This would be the Case, and an intolerable one indeed, if the *Crown* should exercise this

this Right often, as it hath been exercised some times with universal and most just Disapprobation. It is possible too that This may come to be the Case, in some future Age, by the Method of electing Peers to sit in Parliament. for *one Part of the same Kingdom*, by the frequent Translations of *Bishops*, and by other Means, if the Wisdom and Virtue of the present Age, and the favourable Opportunity of the present auspicious and indulgent Reign do not prevent it. But in all other Respects the Persons, who are once created *Peers*, and their Posterity, according to the Scheme of the *Constitution*, having a Right to sit and debate, and vote in the *House of Peers*, which cannot be taken from Them, except by Forfeiture; all Influence of the Kind I have mention'd seems to be again removed, and their Share in the *Government* depending neither on the *King*, nor the *People*, They constitute a *middle Order*, and are properly Mediators betweeen the *other Two*, in the Eye of our *Constitution*.

It is by this Mixture of *Monarchical*, *Aristocratical* and *Democratical Power*, blended together in one System, and by these *three Estates* ballancing one another, that our *free Constitution of Government* hath been preserved so long involiate, or hath been brought back, after having suffer'd Violations, to its original Principles, and been renew'd, and improved too, by frequent and salutary Revolutions. It is by This, that *weak* and *wicked Princes* have been opposed, restrain'd, reform'd, punish'd by *Parliaments*; that the real, and perhaps the doubtful, Exorbitancies of *Parliaments* have been reduced by the *Crown*; and that the Heat of *one House* hath been moderated, or the Spirit raised, by the Proceedings of the *other*. Parliaments have had a good Effect on the *People*, by keeping

Them

Them quiet, and the *People* on *Parliaments*, by keeping Them within Bounds, which They were tempted to transgress. A just Confidence in the safe, regular, Parliamentary Methods of redressing Grievances hath often made the freest, and not the most patient People on Earth, bear the greatest Grievances much longer than People, held under stronger Restraints, and more used to Oppression, who had not the same Confidence, nor the same Expectation, have borne even less. The Cries of the *People*, and the Terror of *approaching Elections* have defeated the most dangerous Projects for beggaring and enslaving the Nation; and the *Majority without Doors* hath obliged the *Majority within Doors* to truckle to the *Minority*. In a Word, two Things may be said with Truth of our *Constitution*, which I think neither can, nor ever could be said of any other. It secures Society against the Miseries, which are inseparable from *simple Forms of Government*, and is liable as little as possible to the Inconveniencies, that arise in *mix'd Forms*. It cannot become uneasy to the *Prince*, or *People*; unless the *former* be egregiously weak, or wicked; nor be destroy'd, unless the *latter* be excessively and universally corrupt.—— But these general Assertions require to be a little better explain'd.

By *simple Forms of Government* I mean such as lodge the whole supreme Power, absolutely and without Controul, either in a *single Person*, or in the *principal Persons of the Community*, or in the *whole Body of the People*. Such Governments are Governments of *arbitary Will*, and therefore of all imaginable Absurdities the most absurd. They stand in direct Opposition to the sole Motive of Submission to any Government whatsoever; for if Men quit the State, and renounce the Rights of *Nature*, (one of which is, to be sure, That of being

govern'd

govern'd by their *own Will)* They do This, that They may not remain exposed to the *arbitary Will of other Men*, the Weakest to That of the Strongest, the Few to That of the Many. Now, in submitting to any *single Form of Government* whatever, They establish what They mean to avoid, and for Fear of being exposed to *arbitary Will* sometimes, They chuse to be govern'd by it always. *These Governments* do not only degenerate into *Tyranny*; they are *Tyranny* in their very Institution; and They, who submit to them, are *Slaves*, not *Subjects*, however the supreme Power may be exercised; for *Tyranny* and *Slavery* do not so properly consist in the Stripes, that are given and received, as in the Power of giving them at Pleasure, and the Necessity of receiving them, whenever and for whatever they are inflicted. *Absolute Democracy* may appear to some, in abstracted Speculation, a less Deviation from Nature than *Monarchy*, and more agreeable to Reason; because here it is the *Will of the whole Community*, that governs the *whole Community*, and because Reason does certainly instruct every Man, even from a Consciousness of his own Frailty, the *Impotentia Animi* of the *Latin* Writers, to trust as little Power as possible to any other Man. But still it must be confess'd, that if it be unsafe for a People to truit too much Power to a *Prince*, it is unsafe for Them likewise to keep too much Power to *Themselves*. *Absolute Monarchy* is *Tyranny*; but *absolute Democracy* is *Tyranny* and *Anarchy* both. If *Aristocracy* be placed between these two Extremes, it is placed on a slippery Ridge, and must fall into one or the other, according to the natural Course of human Affairs; if the Few, who govern, are united, into *Tyranny*, perhaps, more severe than any other; if they are disunited, into *Factions* and *Disorders*, as great as Those of the most *tumultuous Democracy*.

From

From ſuch Obſervations, and many of the ſame Kind and Tendency, it hath been concluded very reaſonably that the beſt Form of Government muſt be one compounded of *theſe Three*, and in which they are *all* ſo temper'd, that *each* may produce the good Effects, and be reſtrain'd by the Counter-workings of the *other Two*, from producing the bad Effects, that are natural to it. Thus much is evident. But then how to fix that juſt Proportion of *each*, how to hit that happy Temperament of them all in one Syſtem, is a Difficulty that hath perplex'd the wiſeſt Politicians, and the moſt famous Legiſlators. Let me quote one of the greateſt Writers of Antiquity. † *Tacitus* acknowledges, in the fourth Book of his Annals, what is here advanced; but He thinks *ſuch a Conſtitution of Government* rather a Subject of fine Speculation, than of Practice. He thinks it much more likely that *ſuch a Syſtem* ſhould continue to be admired and praiſed in Idea, than eſtabliſh'd in Fact; and if it happens ever to be eſtabliſh'd, He does not imagine it can be ſupported long. Not only the real Difficulties, which his Sagacity preſented to his Mind, but his Reflections on the Conſtitution and Fate of the *Roman* Commonwealth might lead *Tacitus* into this Deſpondency. But what the Refinements of *Roman* Policy could not do, hath been done in this Iſland, upon Foundations laid by the rough Simplicity of our *northern Anceſtors*.

It would be a curious and entertaining Amuſement, to reduce the Conſtitutions of the *Roman Government* and of *Thoſe*, which were form'd on the Ruins

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† *Cunctas Nationes & Urbes* Populus, *aut* Primores, *aut* ſinguli *regunt*. *Delecta ex his & conſtituta Reipublicæ Forma, laudari facilius quàm evenire; vel, ſi evenit, haud diuturna eſſe poteſt.*

of *that Empire*, particularly of *our own*, to their first Principles; to observe in which they agree, and in which they differ, and the uniform or various Tendencies of each; to mark the latent, as well as apparent Causes of their Rise and Fall; how well or how ill they were contrived for Triumphs abroad, or Peace at home; for vain Grandeur, or real Prosperity; for resisting Corruption, or being ruin'd by it. Such an Analysis and Enquiry would be, I imagine, not only amusing, but useful. At least, it would be more so than any Rhapsody of general Reflections, huddled together with little Order, or Design; for These leave no systematical Impressions on the Mind; nothing but a Confusion of Ideas, often bright and glittering, seldom instructive. But a Work of this Kind would be too voluminous and too aspiring for these little Essays, and the humble Author of them. He will therefore keep to his Point, and content Himself to make some of those Observations alone, which seem proper to illustrate and prove what He hath advanced; that the *British Constitution* is a plain and sufficient Rule of Judgment and Conduct to us in every Thing, that regards our *Liberty*; for preserving of which, as well as for securing its own Duration, it is better fitted than any other.

There was so great a Mixture of monarchical Power in the *Roman Commonwealth*, that † *Livy* dates the Original of *Liberty* from the Expulsion of the *Tarquins*, rather because the *consular Dignity* was made annual, than because the *regal Power* had suffer'd any Diminution in that Change. The

† *Libertatis Originem inde magis, quia annuum Imperium Consulare factum est, quam quod diminutum quicquam sit ex Regiâ Potestate, numeres. Omnia Jura, omnia Insignia primi Consules tenuere. Lib. Cap.* 1.

dictatorial

dictatorial Power, the most absolute that can be imagined, was introduced in eight, or at farthest in eleven Years afterwards, and may therefore be reckon'd coæval with the Commonwealth; and whatever Diminution either This, or the *consular Power* might suffer, the Axes and the Rods were terrible to the last; especially when they were carried before a *Dictator*, for whom the *Tribunes of the People* were not a Match, as They were for the *Consuls*. But though there were *three sorts of Power* exercised, there were but *two Orders*, or *Estates*, establish'd in this Commonwealth, the *Patricians* and the *Plebeians*; and the supreme Power was divided accordingly between the *Senate* and the *collective*, not a *representative*, *Body of the People*. These *two Orders*, or *Estates*, had frequent Contests, and well They might, since They had very opposite Interests. † *Agrarian Laws*, for Instance, began to be promulgated within three and twenty Years, and continued to the End of the Commonwealth to produce the same Disorders. How inconsistent, indeed, was *that Plan of Government*, which required so much hard Service of the *People*; and which, leaving Them so much *Power* in the Distribution of *Power*, left Them so little *Property* in the Distribution of *Property?* Such an *Inequality of Property*, and of the Means of acquiring it, cannot subsist in an *equal Commonwealth*; and I much apprehend that any near Approaches to a *Monopoly of Property* would not be long endured even in a *Monarchy*.——But I return to my first Observation.

Though the *Romans* made frequent Experience of the cruel Mischiefs, and even extreme Danger

† *Tum primum Lex agraria promulgata est; nunquam deinde usque ad hanc Memoriam sine maximis motibus Rerum agitata.* Liv. L. 2. C. 41.

to *Liberty*, which attended almost every Variance of the *two Estates*, yet did they never fall upon any safe, or effectual Method of preventing these Disputes, or of reconciling them, without Violence. The old Expedients alone subsisted; and surely they were not only violent, but extra-constitutional. When the *Senate* was inflexible, the *People* had immediate Recourse to *Sedition*. When the *People* was refractory, the *Senate* had Recourse to a *Dictator*. The *latter* had an Approbation, which could not be given to the *former*, and was a *legal Institution*; notwithstanding which I make no scruple of saying that it was, at least, as inconsistent with a free *Constitution of Government* as the *former*. *Sedition* was *temporary Anarchy*. A *Dictator* was a *Tyrant for six Months*, unless He thought fit to abdicate sooner, The *Constitution* was suspended, and endanger'd by both. It might have been destroy'd by the Excesses of *one*. It was destroy'd by the bare Duration of the *other*. If the *Romans* had annually elected out of their Tribes a certain Number of Men to *represent the People* instead of depending on their *Tribunes*; (a Sort of bullying Magistracy, and often a very corrupt one) and if this *representative Body* had been *one Estate*, and had acted as such, the *Consuls* might very well have supply'd the Place of a *third Estate*, and have been safely trusted, even more independently of the *Senate* than They were, with the *executive Power*. But the Want of a *third Estate* in the *Roman* System of Government, and of a *representative Body*, to act for the *collective Body*, maintain'd one perpetual Ferment, which often increased into a Storm, but never subsided into a Calm. The State of *Rome*, and of the greatest Men in that Commonwealth, would have deserved Pity rather than Envy, even in the best Times, if their

defective

defective Constitution had not made such a State of * Trouble and Tumult the Price They paid for the Maintenance of their *Liberty*. But This was not the whole Price. Whilst *Rome* advanced triumphantly in conquering the *World*, as her Orators, Poets and Historians have express'd Themselves; That is, a few Nations round the *Mediterranean Sea*, and little more; her Citizens turn'd against one another those Weapons, which were put into their Hands against the Enemies of *Rome*. Mutual Proscriptions and bloody Massacres follow'd; *each Party* triumph'd in its Turn; They were more animated and better disciplined by their Contests; both grew stronger; the *Commonwealth* alone grew weaker; and *Pompey* and *Cæsar* finish'd the last tragical Scene, which *Marius* and *Sylla* began. In fine, the *Roman Commonwealth* would have been dissolved much sooner than it was, by the Defects I have mention'd, which many Circumstances concur'd to aggravate, if such a Spirit of Wisdom, as well as Courage, and such an Enthusiasm for the Grandeur, the Majesty, and the Duration of their Empire had not possess'd this People, as never possess'd any other. When this Spirit decay'd, when this Enthusiasm cool'd, the *Constitution* could not help, nay work'd against itself. That *dictatorial Power*, on which the *Senate* had always depended for preserving it, compleated the Ruin of it, in the Hands of *Cæsar*; and that *tribunitial Power*, to which the *People* had always trusted the Defence of their *Liberty*, confirm'd their *Slavery*, in the Hands of *Augustus*. *I am, SIR, &c.*

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* *Conciones Magistratuum pæne pernoctantium in Rostris.——Accusationes potentium Reorum, & assignatæ etiam Domibus Inimicitiæ.——Proceerum Factiones, & assidua Senatûs adversum Plebem Certamina.*

Dial. de Orat. Quinctil. Tacito inscrip.

LETTER

LETTER XIV.

SIR,

THE Defects, which I have presumed to censure in the *Roman Constitution of Government*, were avoided in some of Those, that were establish'd on the breaking of that Empire, by the *northern Nations* and the *Goths*; for I suspect that the *Goths* were not properly and strictly a *northern Nation*, any more than the *Huns* and the *Alans*, though They have been often confounded, and I believe by Myself.———Let us cast our Eyes on *Spain* and *France*.

We cannot arrive, as far as my scanty Knowledge informs Me, at any particular and authentick Account of the Scheme of that Government, which the *Western Goths* establish'd, when, driven out of *Gaul* by the *Franks*, They drove the *Vandals* and the *Alans* out of *Spain*; nor distinguish very accurately between such Institutions as were Parts of the *original*, *Gothick Plan*, and such as were introduced into the several Kingdoms, that form'd Themselves on the Re-Conquest of the Country by the *Spaniards* from the *Arabs* and *Moors*. The Original of the *Cortes* particularly is quite in the Dark, as We are assured by a very * *industrious Enquirer*

* *Dr.* Geddes *in his miscell. Tracts.*

and

and judicious Writer. Thus much however We may assert; that the *Gothick Kings* were at first *elective*, and always *limited*, even after they became *hereditary*; and that the *Cortes*, whenever it was establish'd, was an Assembly, that may be more truely compared to a *British Parliament* than the Assembly of the *Estates of France* could ever pretend to be. *Churchmen* had wriggled Themselves into a Share of temporal Power among the *Goths*, as They did in every Country, where they were admitted to preach the Gospel, though without any Authority from the Gospel; so that the *Cortes* consisted of *Prelates*, as well as *Dukes*, *Masters of Orders*, *Earls* and *Ricoshomes*, who composed the whole Body of the Nobility; and of the *Procurators of the Commons*; That is, of the *Citizens* and *Burgesses*, chosen by the *Cities* and *Boroughs* to represent and act for the *the whole Body of the Commons.* To preserve the Independency of this Assembly, *these Procurators* were to be paid by the *Corporations*, for which They served; the *King* was to give no *Office*, or *Salary* to any of Them; nay, a * *Resumption of Rewards*, *granted to Members of the Cortes*, was once at least debated, if not enacted. In short, He was not to name their *President*, nor even to *send Letters unopen'd to any of Them.* No *Money* could be raised on the Subjects, without the Consent of *this Assembly*; and it was a standing Maxim, or Order, that *Redress of Grievances* should precede the *Grants of Supplies.* Such a Frame of Government as This seems built for Duration; and in Fact, if it had not been undermined, it could not have been demolish'd. The Manner, in which it was both undermined and demolish'd totally at last, deserves the Attention of every Man

* *Dr.* Geddes *in his miscell. Tracts.*

in

in *Britain*. It was undermined by the *Influence of the Court*, too much connived at and too long tolerated, *on the Members of the Cortes*. *Prostitute Wretches* were found in those Days, I doubt not, as well as in ours, to maintain that the *necessary Independency of the Prince* could not be supported, without allowing a *corrupt Dependency of the Cortes on Him*; and They had, in those Days, such Success in *Castile*, as we ought to hope They will never obtain in *Britain*. When *corrupt Majorities* were thus secured, Pretences were not wanting, nor will they ever be so, for making Concessions to the *Crown*, repugnant to the Spirit of the *Constitution*, and even inconsistent with the Forms of it. Such Pretences, however plausible, would not have been admitted by Men zealous to preserve their *Liberty*; because any real Danger, remote as well as immediate, to a *free Constitution* would in their Ballance outweigh all Considerations of real Expediency, and much more all the frivolous Pretences of that Kind. But the * *Members of the Cortes* were no longer such Men, when *Castile* lost her *Liberties* under *Charles* the *5th*. The Custom of bribing the *Representatives of the Commons*, by *Gifts* and *Promises*, and so securing a Majority to the *Court*, had long prevail'd, as We have just now said; and after That, it is not to be wonder'd at if *Excises*, given for eight Years only, became perpetual; if *Money* was granted before *Grievances* were redress'd; and if the *Precedent*, set in the Time of *Henry* the *2d*, was follow'd in all succeeding Reigns. The *Cortes* gave *this Prince* a Supply, for making War on the *Moors*; but the † Sum being represented by the *Court* to be insufficient for the Service, it was

* *Dr.* Geddes *in his miscell. Tract.* † *Ib.*

carried

carried that, in Caſe of a Deficiency, the *King* might raiſe, without calling a *Cortes*, the Money neceſſary to make good that Deficiency. This *Vote of Credit* gave an incurable fatal Wound to *that Conſtitution.* I call it a *Vote of Credit*, though the Powers it gave ſeem to be leſs than Thoſe, which are given by *ſome modern Votes of Credit*; for ſurely there is a Difference, and not a ſmall one, between a Power to raiſe Money, directly on the People, for a *Service known*, and already approved, and provided for in Part, by their *Repreſentatives*, and a Power to borrow Money, on the national Credit, for *Services unknown*, and to lay the Nation under an Obligation of paying for That, which it is poſſible their *Repreſentatives* may diſapprove.

This Precedent having been made, in Favour of *one King*, and in one particular Conjuncture, it became a prevailing Argument, in Favour of *every other King*, and in every other Conjuncture; for though it may be, nay muſt be, in the vaſt Variety of Characters, and of Conjunctures, prudent and juſt to grant, in Favour of *ſome Princes*, and upon ſome Occaſions, what it would be neither prudent, nor juſt to grant, in Favour of *other Princes*, and upon other Occaſions; yet ſuch is the Merit of *every Prince*, who fills a Throne, or rather ſuch is the ſervile Adulation paid to *Power*, in what Hands ſoever it be lodged, that general and almoſt univerſal Experience ſhews *this Rule*, which no Man of Senſe would break in the Management of his *private Intereſts*, abſolutely reverſed in the Management of the moſt *important, national Intereſts.* The Inference to be drawn from hence is plainly This; that the Inconveniency, or Danger of refuſing to *every Prince*, and in every Conjuncture, ſuch Things as are inconſiſtent with the *Conſtitution of a free Government*, muſt be always

leſs than the Inconveniency, or Danger of granting them to *any Prince*, and in any Conjuncture.

Let me add this farther Obſervation, which preſents itſelf ſo naturally after the former. Though it be proper, in all *limited Monarchies*, to watch and guard againſt all Conceſſions, or Uſurpations, that may deſtroy the *Ballance of Power*, on which the Preſervation of *Liberty* depends; yet is it certain that *Conceſſions to the Crown* from the *other*, *conſtituent Parts of the Legiſlature* are almoſt alone to be fear'd. There is no Danger that the *Crown* ſhould make them to the *others*; and on this Head the *People* may very ſafely truſt to Thoſe, who *wear* it, and Thoſe, who *ſerve* it. The *Nobility* will not make them to the *Commons*, without great Struggles, which give Time for Interpoſitions; nor the *Commons* to the *Nobility*. But *both* may be eaſily induced to make them to the *Crown*. The Reaſons of this Difference are obvious enough; for, firſt, a *King* is really nothing more than a *ſupreme Magiſtrate*, inſtituted for the Service of the Community, which requires that the *executive Power* ſhould be veſted in a *ſingle Perſon*. He hath, indeed, a *Crown* on his Head, a *Scepter* in his Hand, and *velvet Robes* on his Back, and He ſits elevated in a *Throne*, whilſt Others ſtand on the Ground about Him; and all This to denote that He is a *King*, and to draw the Attention and Reverence of the Vulgar. Juſt ſo, another Man wears a *Mitre* on his Head, a *Croſier* in his Hand, and *lawn Sleeves*, and ſits in a *purple Elbow-Chair*, to denote that he is a *Biſhop*, and to excite the Devotion of the Multitude, who receive his Benediction very thankfully on their Knees. But ſtill the *King*, as well as the *Biſhop*, holds an *Office*, and owes a *Service*. *Officium eſt imperare, non Regnum.* The *King*, when He *commands*, diſcharges

discharges a *Trust*, and performs a *Duty*, as well as the *Subject*, when He *obeys*. Notwithstanding which, *Kings* are apt to see Themselves in another Light, and Experience shews us that even *They*, who made Them what They are, are apt to take Them for what They are not. From hence it happen'd in *Spain*, and may happen possibly in other Countries, that the *Kings*, instead of being satisfy'd with, and thankful for the Dignity, Honour, Power and Wealth, which they possess'd in so eminent a Degree above all other Magistrates and Members of the Commonwealth, repined at their being possess'd of no more. What They had, was given Them by the *Constitution*; and what They had not, was reserved by the same Authority to the *Nobility*, and to the *Commons*. But They proceeded, and their Sycophants reason'd, as if the sole Power of the Government, and the whole Wealth of the Nation, belonged of Right to *Them*, and the Limitations of the Monarchy were so many Usurpations on the Monarch.———In the second Place, besides this constant Desire of incroaching, there is another Reason why *Concessions to the Crown* are more to be guarded against than others, in *limited Monarchies*. The regal Power resides in *one Person*. The other Shares of the supreme Power are assign'd to *Bodies of Men*. From hence it follows that the Interest of the *King*, and the Interest of the *Crown*, cannot well be divided in the Mind of a *Prince*; whereas the Interest of *each Individual* may be distinguish'd from the Interest of the *Nobility*, or of the *Commons*, and still more from That of the *Nation*, in the Minds of Those, who compose an *House of Peers*, or who are *Representatives of the People*. A *King* cannot be tempted to give up the Interest of the *Crown*, because He cannot give up this *publick Interest*, with-

out giving up his *private Interest*; whereas the *Members of such Assemblies* may promote their *private Interest*, by sacrificing to it That of the *Publick*. Several other Reasons might be insisted upon, to establish the Truth of the Observation We have made, and to shew how unfairly They argue, who all along suppose that the *Independency of the Crown* may as easily be lost, and the Ballance of Power be destroy'd on that Side, by *Concessions from the Prince*, and *Usurpations on Him*, as the *Independency of the Lords*, or *Commons*, may be lost, and the Ballance of Power be destroy'd on that Side, by *Concessions to the Prince*, and by his *Usurpations*. Such Reasons, for Instance, might be drawn from the Difference of that *Influence*, which the *Crown* hath on the *other Estates*, and which the the *other Estates* have on the *Crown*; as well as from the Difference of the *Pretences*, which may be urged on Behalf of the *Crown*, or of the *Nobility*, or *Commons*, to obtain *such Concessions*; for supposing them all coequal, as Parts of the *Legislature*, yet if it be consider'd that the *executive Power* is solely in the *Crown*; that the Disposition of *publick Money*, as well as *publick Employments*, is a Part of *this Power*; that *this Power* is in continual Exercise, and may immediately affect, more or less, at one Time or at another, every particular Man, *Peer* as well as *Commoner*; whereas the *other Powers* are exercised occasionally, are continued or suspended, in great Measure, at the Will of the *Prince*, and are employ'd chiefly in Matters of general, not particular Concern; in fine, if it be consider'd farther, that the Powers exercised by *Assemblies of Peers and Commoners*, whether *these Assemblies* be regarded as Parts of the *Legislature*, as the *great Councils of the Nation*, or as the *Judges and Prosecutors of enormous Offenders*, are few and simple,

ſimple, directed to notorious Purpoſes, conducted by Rules always known, always the ſame, and always ſufficient to theſe Purpoſes; whereas the Branches of *executive Power* are numerous and complicated, the Rules various, and the Purpoſes often unknown, often contingent; ſo that it may become difficult to judge either of the Utility of the Purpoſes, or of the Sufficiency of the Powers; if all theſe Things be conſider'd, I ſay, We ſhall not be at a Loſs to determine on which Side the Danger to *Liberty*, in a *limited Monarchy*, lies; and whether *Conceſſions to the Crown*, in Prejudice of the *Conſtitution*, are not more likely to be made, than *Conceſſions from it.*

Happy had it been for the People of *Caſtile*; if They had ſeen this Danger in Time, and had remedied, whilſt the Remedies were in their Power, thoſe Defects in their *Conſtitution*, whatever they were, which gave their *Kings* by Degrees ſuch an Influence over the *Cortes*, as overturn'd at laſt the whole *Conſtitution*, and gain'd to the *German Race*, that began to reign in *Charles* the *5th*, (for his Father *Philip* is ſcarce to be reckon'd) ſuch an abſolute Power as the *Gothick Kings* had never been able to obtain. Though *Charles* the *5th* was a very able Prince, yet the Honour, (for ſuch it will be eſteem'd by ſome Men) or more truly the Infamy, of enſlaving *Caſtile* muſt not be aſcribed to his ſuperior Capacity, nor to That of his *Miniſters.* Had He been the meereſt Tool, a Thing of Straw, but ſomething leſs than a Scarecrow, and unable to protect the Property of his Subjects; He might ſtill have taken their Liberties from Them, in that Conjuncture, as He did moſt effectually. *Corruption* was eſtabliſh'd; a *Majority of the Cortes* was bribed; the *Nobility* was detach'd from the common Intereſt by *Titles*, *Places*, *Penſions*,

Pensions, and *Grants*; and the *Clergy* in general, for Exceptions there were, took no farther Share in it than their particular Piques, or some indirect and fleeting Considerations, inspired them to take. The Nation saw itself betray'd, and the *Commons* protested loudly against the Proceedings of their *Representatives*. But This was the very Point, for which the Enemies of the *Castilian* Constitution waited; and as soon as a Pretence for employing *Force* was given Them, They muffled Themselves up in that threadbare Cloak of Zeal for the *Government*, and stab'd their *Country* to the Heart. An Ordinance of the *Cortes* had been made, about a hundred Years before, against increasing the *standing Forces of the Kingdom* to more than 400 Soldiers in Garrisons, and 1500 Ginets. This Ordinance had not been very well observed. The long Wars with the *Moors* made *Armies* often necessary, when there was no actual War. The Danger of being invaded by the *Moors*, (for every *Moorish King* was deem'd a Pretender to the Throne) might serve to make Them so represented; and when this Reason fail'd intirely, as it did by the Conquest of *Granada*, the last Possession of these People in *Spain*, Pretences for keeping *Armies* on Foot were still to be found. There were still *Moorish Factions*; the *new Christians* were *Moors* in their Hearts; amongst the *old Christians* there were several, who favour'd Them; the People were not to be trusted with their own Preservation. *Chievres*, the rapacious Minister of *Charles* the *5th*, and his *Journeymen* (for so were those *Spaniards* call'd, according to Dr. *Geddes*, who did not care how much their Country was plunder'd by Foreigners, provided They shared the Spoils) *Chievres*, I say, and his *Journeymen*, a real Faction, and perhaps not a great one, were the

fast

faſt Friends of the Government. The reſt of the Nation were *open*, or *ſecret Enemies*. According to this excellent Logick, the *former* were to be protected in Blundering, for They were guilty of That too, as well as in Plundering; and the *latter* were to be oppreſs'd for complaining. The *Nation* was ſacrificed to a *Faction*, and an *excellent Conſtitution* deſtroy'd, in Favour of a *profligate Government*. This Deſtruction however would not have been ſo eaſily accompliſh'd, nor would *Caſtilians* alone have enſlaved *Caſtile* to a foreign Race, after aſſerting their *Liberty* ſo often, and ſo boldly, againſt Princes of their own Country, if two other Circumſtances had not concur'd. *Ferdinand* had conquer'd *Navarre*, and a regular, diſciplined Army defended that Conqueſt againſt the *French*. This Army, which was at Hand, march'd into *Caſtile*, defeated the Commons, and extinguiſh'd *Liberty* in a Country, where it had been long declining. The Nobility was detach'd from the Commons by Grants of Land, amongſt other Conſiderations, as I ſaid above; and the Commons renew'd their Conteſt on this Head, perhaps unjuſtly, to be ſure very unſeaſonably. The Commons however were juſtified for taking Arms, in the Opinion of the Nobility, and even in That of *Adrian*, who govern'd during the Abſence of *Charles*, whoſe Præceptor He had been; *for this honeſt Man*, (too honeſt to be long endured on the Papal Throne, where He was afterwards placed,) affirm'd that all the Troubles of *Caſtile* were cauſed by the *King*, and by his *covetous and tyrannical Miniſters*. The Conduct of the Commons, upon this great Occaſion, was in many Inſtances raſh and violent, as well as ill-adviſed and weak. But They were tumultuous Aſſemblies driven into Deſpair; and the *Nobility*, who might have had great Sway amongſt Them,

and

and might have help'd to regulate their Fire, and to keep Them ſober, help'd on the contrary to make Them mad, either by neglecting Them, or by taking Part againſt Them, till it was too late; and then complain'd of their being mad, with as ill a Grace as the principal Men of *Rome*, who help'd to *corrupt* that People, complain'd of their *Corruption*, and aſſign'd it as a Reaſon for depriving Them of their *Liberty*.

There cannot be a greater Soleciſm in Politicks than That of a *Nobility*, under *monarchical Government*, who ſuffer the Liberty of the *Commons* to be taken away. In *Ariſtocracies*, the *Nobility* get whatever the *Commons* loſe; but in *Monarchies*, the *Crown* alone is the Gainer, and the certain Conſequence of their helping to enſlave the *Commons*, muſt be That of being enſlaved Themſelves at laſt. How, indeed, ſhould it be otherwiſe; ſince the Liberty of the *Commons* cannot be taken away, unleſs the *Conſtitution* be firſt broken; and ſince neither the *Peers*, nor any one elſe can hold their Privileges or their Properties, by a better Tenure than That of *arbitrary Will*, when the *Conſtitution* is once broken? Was it poſſible to doubt of this Truth, We might find the Proof of it, without going out of the Country were We are; I mean *Spain*. Amongſt all the ſurprizing Phænomena, which have appear'd in the World of late Years, there are none, that have ſtruck Mankind with more Aſtoniſhment, than thoſe Inſtances of Perſons raiſed to the higheſt Poſts of Power, Authority and Command, nay to Empire, who had not, either from their obſcure Birth, or their low Talents, or their ſtill lower Habits, the leaſt Occaſion even to dream of ſuch Elevation. Amongſt other Countries, *Spain* hath had her Share of them; and the *Grandees*, as They are pompouſly ſtiled, the

Succeſſors

Succeſſors of thoſe Men, who thought to riſe on the Ruin of the *Commons of Caſtile*; They, who have the vain Honour of cocking their Hats in the Preſence of their *Prince*, have been ſeen to ſtand at aweful Diſtance, or approach with reſpectful Cringe, in the Preſence of a *Paraſite* and *Buffoon*.

I know full well that, in ſuch Governments as We ſpeak of here, it is both the Duty and Intereſt of the *Nobility* to oppoſe the Exceſſes of the *Commons*; but I know too that They have another Duty, which they are not to leave undone; another Point of Intereſt, which They are not to neglect; and therefore I have ſpoken of this *ſecond Eſtate* in our Government, as of a *middle Order*, that are properly Mediators between the *other two*, in the Eye of our *Conſtitution*. Whilſt the *Peers* maintain this Character, They will be able to diſcharge this Duty; but they would ceaſe to be ſo, if it was poſſible They ſhould ever become the *Tools of Faction*, or the *Vaſſals of a Miniſter*. In Mediations of this Kind, different from Thoſe that are more commonly call'd ſuch, *Mediators* mingle in the Conteſt, are Parties concern'd, and can by That alone expect to mediate with Effect, whether They be conſider'd as *Bodies of Men*, or *Individuals*. When the *Commons* are aſſiſted by the *Peers* in their reaſonable Endeavours to promote, or reſtore *Frugality*, to ſecure *Liberty*, and to correct all Sorts of *Mal-Adminiſtration*; the *Peers* will have, both collectively and ſeparately, a Credit with the *People*, as well as with the *Repreſentatives of the People*; by which They may contribute to check the *latter*, whenever an *Houſe of Commons* ſhall grow unreaſonable, factious, or, ſeditious. But if the *Peers of the Realm* neglect to oppoſe the *Commons* in their juſt Attempts, and forfeit by Conſequence the Character of Impar-

 tiality,

tiality, and even the Air of Independency, the *Peers* will then add little Strength to the *Crown*, whenever the evil Day comes, and have as little Power to prevent it from coming. There was a Time, our Fathers saw it, when an *House of Commons* destroy'd, instead of supporting, the *Constitution*, and introduced *Tyranny*, under Pretence of excluding *Slavery*. I think it might be shewn, from the Anecedotes of that Age, that This could not have happen'd, if the *Court* had not been so long and so partially abetted by the greatest Part of the *Nobility* and *Clergy*, both in the *House of Lords* and out of it. An universal and timely Concurrence with the Spirit of the *Commons*, which was pious in the true Sense of the Word at first, would have had, I presume, the full Effect that every honest Man proposed in a Parliamentary Reformation of the State; and those fatal Opportunities, that were afterwards given to the *Republican*, *Presbyterian* and *Independent Factions*, would have been avoided. But They, who could have *trimm'd*, (for there is a *wise* and *honest*, as well as a *silly* and *corrupt Trimming*) or have mediated with Success, lost the Power of doing either; Some by abetting the *Crown* so long, for Fear of the *Commons*, and Others by concurring with the *Commons* so far, for Fear of the *Crown*, that the *People* in general had no Confidence in the *former*, and that the *latter* were afraid to trust their Prince after all They had done against Him. If any Man had trusted to the plausible Professions of the *Court* at that Time, and the *Court* had subdued the *opposite Party*, We may judge, without any Breach of Charity, that these Men would have found Themselves deceived. Just so, if any Men, who meant the Reformation, not the Destruction of the State, believed in the *canting Reformers of that Age*, such Men were no Doubt

Doubt egregiouſly deceived. But I confeſs Myſelf of Opinion, and ſurely upon no improbable Grounds, that there were few, or no ſuch Men. The good Intentions of the *Court* were diſtruſted even by Thoſe, who took Arms for the *King*; and the ill Intentions of many of the Leaders on the *other Side* were ſuſpected, no Doubt, by many, who took Arms for the *Parliament*. But *two* of the *three Eſtates* being ripe for the raſheſt Enterprizes, and the *third* being in no Condition to mediate, the Extremes claſh'd without any Power ſufficient to interpoſe; and when the Sword was drawn, the Sword could alone decide. I conclude therefore, from theſe two Examples, that as there cannot be a greater Error in Politicks than That of a *Nobility*, who aſſiſt a *Prince* to take away the Liberties and Privileges of the *Commons*; (which was the Caſe in *Caſtile*;) ſo the ſureſt Way of preventing that terrible Dilemma, wherein Men are obliged to chuſe either Submiſſion to *tyrannical Government*, or Concurrence with an *enraged and no longer governable People*, (which hath been the Caſe in *Caſtile* and *Britain* both,) is for the *Nobility*, and the principal Men amongſt the *Commons*, to engage ſo early in the Cauſe of *Liberty*, that the *former* may be always in Condition to mediate with Effect, and the *latter* have always Power to allay the intemperate Heat of their own Body.

I am, SIR, &c.

LETTER XV.

SIR,

BUT to resume the Comparison of *other Constitutions of Government with our own*, I say that if the *Gothick Constitution* in *Spain*, either by original Defects, or by deviating from, and not being reduced again in Time to its first Principles, was destroy'd through the *Corruption of Parliaments*, and by the Force of an *Army*, *one* of which betray'd, and the other conquer'd the *Commons of Castile*; the *Commons of France* seem either not to have had, or to have lost, in the dark Beginnings of that Monarchy, all Share in the *supreme*, *legislative Power*. The great, original Defect of having but *two Estates* to share the *supreme Power* is an Objection common to the *Roman*, and to the *French Constitutions*, with this Difference; of the *three*, *simple Forms of Government*, *the Monarchical*, the *Aristocratical*, and the *Democratical*, *Rome* wanted the *first*, and *France* hath always wanted the *last*. *Rome* had a *Nobility* and a *Commonality*, but no Magistracy fitted by its Institution to answer the Purposes of that supreme Magistrate, who is call'd *King*, even in limited Monarchies. *France* hath always had a *King* and a *Nobility*, and hath felt in their Turns all the Evils of a *Monarchical* and *Aristocratical Tyranny*. But the *People* have not had, I presume, since the Government of the *Franks* was fully

fully eſtabliſh'd on this Side of the *Rhine*, and the Form of their Monarchy ſettled, any Share in the *ſupreme Power*, either collectively or repreſentatively, how much ſoever a contrary Notion may have been countenanced by ſome Writers, and have been generally entertain'd, at leaſt in other Countries.

There is no Nation in the World, ſays *Mezerai*, more *illuſtrious*, nor any, whoſe Original is more *obſcure* than That of the *French*. They, who would diſpute the *firſt*, could hardly diſpute the *laſt*; and it is no Buſineſs of mine to controvert *either*. As dark as their Original is, We may diſcover enough to eſtabliſh what hath been ſaid, and to carry on the Compariſon We are making.

The *Franks* were a Nation of *Germany*, ſeated at one Time between the *Elbe*, *Rhine* and *Neckar*, and at another (That is, in the Reign of *Theodoſius* the younger) extending Themſelves on the *German* Side of the *Rhine*, from *Cologne* down to *Nimighen*, and ſtill lower. What is known therefore of the Government of the *antient Germans*, either from *Tacitus*, or any other good Authority, may be properly apply'd to their Government, whilſt They continued in *Germany*, and even after They ſettled in *Gaul*, till ſuch Times as We find, by Relations more modern, that a *different Form of Government* prevail'd amongſt Them. Now it ſeems to Me extremely plain that a *different Form of Government* did prevail amongſt Them even from the Time of *Clovis*, the Conqueror of *Gaul*. Thus for Inſtance, that Paſſage in *Tacitus*, where he ſays * *that the*

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* *Reges ex Nobilitate, Duces ex Virtute ſumunt; nec Regibus infinita, nec libera Poteſtas; & Duces Exemplo potiùs quam Imperio præeſunt.* De Mor. Germ.

antient

antient Germans *took their* Kings *on Account of* Nobility, *and their* Generals *on Account of* Valour; *that the Power of their* Kings *was not absolute and unlimited*; *and that their* Generals *commanded by the Authority*, *which their* Example *rather than their* Power *gave Them*; that Passage, I say, is properly enough apply'd to the *Franks* before, and perhaps during the Conquest of *Gaul*; but very improperly afterwards, when † *Clovis*, both King and General of *that People*, had founded the Monarchy, which He transmitted to his Posterity. That the Nation of the *Franks* was divided into several *Tribes*, or *Clans*, and that These were govern'd by several *little Princes*, cannot be doubted. ——— *Habebat quot Pagos, tot pæne Duces.* That a *General* was chosen to command the whole with sovereign Authority, but according to certain Rules made by common Consent, whenever any great Enterprize was undertaken, and that *Clovis* himself, though He succeeded his Father *Childeric* in commanding over a Part of the *Franks*, was chosen in this Manner, and for this Purpose, is certain. In his first Expedition, he led an Army of *Free-booters*, and was obliged by Compact to divide the Spoil by Lots amongst Them. The Story, which so many Authors have told, after *Gregory* of *Tours*, of a private Soldier, who refused to leave to his Disposition a Vessel of Gold, that had been taken out of a Church at *Rheims*, and broke it before his Face, is a Proof that he was nothing more at first than I have represented Him, the *Head of a Troop of Adventurers*, who chose Him to lead Them, but made their Conditions with Him. The *Franks*

† *Boulainv. Mem. Hist.*

therefore

therefore might be at this Time, in ſome Senſe, * *all free, perfectly equal, and independent*; but will it follow from hence that They continued to be ſo, in any Senſe, after *Clovis* had founded their *Monarchy*; had deſtroy'd all their *little Kings*; united in one Body, and under his own Domination, all their *little States*; and changed the *Form of their Government*, by appointing *Dukes*, *Earls*, *Vicars*, and other Magiſtrates, to govern under Him, according to the Model of Government in the latter *Roman* Empire? Certainly not. However *this Change* was brought about, and to whatever it was owing, the *Monarchy of the Franks* in *Gaul* was built on the Ruins of their *former Government*. This *Boulainvilliers* himſelf confeſſes, when He ſays (though not very accurately, nor conſiſtently, as I imagine, in calling their *former Government a Kind of Ariſtocracy*) that *the Principle of Union, which founded the* Monarchy, *on the Ruins of a Kind* of Ariſtocracy, *was the miſtaken Ambition of particular Men.* In ſhort, Proofs enough may be collected out of *this very Author* to ſhew that the Government of the *Franks*, even under the *firſt Race of their Kings*, was not only different from the *German Governments*, but in ſome Reſpects founded on quite oppoſite Principles. One of theſe Reſpects, which is immediately to my Purpoſe, I ſhall mention.

The *general Aſſemblies*, that were held at firſt in the Month of *March*, and afterwards in the Month of *May*, were *national Aſſemblies*, indeed; but not ſuch as the *antient Germans* held; among whom the

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* *Boulainv. Mem. Hiſt.*

* *principal*

* *principal Men* consulted and decided about the *least*, and *the whole Body of the People* about the *greatest Affairs*. In *these Assemblies of the French* the People had nothing to do, unless We reckon for Something the Function of † *hollowing*, which the *Author* I have just now quoted assigns Them, and which he says that Custom had render'd necessary. In one Word, the People had not any Share in the *supreme Power*, either collectively or representatively, in the *original Plan of the* French *Government*. Whether They acquired any Share in *this Power* afterwards, let us enquire next. *† *Mezerai* pretends, and indeed the whole History of *France* vouches for Him, †† *that no Nation ever honour'd their* Nobility *so much as the* French; *amongst whom the* Nobility *was not only exempt from all Sorts of* Impositions *and* Charges, *but commanded absolutely all* inferior Ranks, *who were almost in a State of Servitude*. How could it be otherwise, when the *Nobility* and *chief Magistrates*, and the *Clergy*, composed alone the *national Councils*, or *Parliaments*, and even exercised *distributive Justice* all over the Kingdom? Their Power increased, as That of the *Kings of the first Race* diminish'd. *Charles Martel*, indeed, who trusted to that *Battle-Axe*, which gave Him his *Name*, and to *foreign*

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* *De minoribus Principes, de majoribus omnes.* Tacit.

† *Ills* (That is the French) *laisserent passer aux hauts Magistrats, les Ducs, les Comtes, & les Vicaires, le Droit de la Nation entiere; de sortque le Commune n'eut plus d'autres Fonctions dans les Assembleés reélles, que d'y paroitre pours les* Acclamations, *que l'Usage rendoit necessaires.*

Boulainv. *Mem. Hist.*

*† *L.* 2.

†† *Jamais Nation n'honora tant la Noblesse que celle la; car non seulement elle etoit exempte de toute sorte d'Impots, & Corvés, mais commandoit á baguette à ses Inferieurs, sur lesquels elle avoit pesque Droit de servitude.*

Troops

Troops, laid aſide the *national Aſſemblies*, neglected the *Nobility*, and miſuſed even the *Clergy*, who damn'd Him for it. But *Pepin* found it neceſſary to regain *Both*, and attach Them to his Intereſt, in order to mount the Throne. By attaching *Them*, He attach'd the *whole Nation* to him. *Childeric* was depoſed, and *He* choſen King in a general Aſſembly held at *Soiſſons*, which *Mezerai* calls moſt improperly (ſince the Expreſſion communicates a falſe Idea to his Reader) *the States*, *les Etats*. *Theſe Aſſemblies*, in his Time, in That of his Son *Charles the Great*, and ſo on, conſiſted of the *Nobility* and *Clergy* alone; and once more it is beyond all Diſpute certain, that the *People* had no more Share in theſe *national Councils*, under the *ſecond*, than under the *firſt Race of the Kings of* France.

When the *third Race of theſe Kings* began in *Hugues Capet*, the *Lords* were ſo powerful in their *Eſtates*, and ſo independent in their *Governments*, that He was forced to come to a Kind of Compoſition with Them. They became *Sovereigns*, each in his Territory, but held of the *Crown*, and acknowledged the *King* for the ſupreme Lord. There was ſcarce a *Town*, which had not a *little Sovereign*; ſcarce a *Caſtle* without ſome *little Tyrant*. The *Parliaments*, in theſe Ages, took ſeveral Turns; *Ills prirent divers plis*, as * *Paſquier* expreſſes Himſelf; but ſtill they conſiſted of *Princes*, *great Lords*, *Biſhops* and *Abbots*, who decided in them their Diſputes with *one another*, and with the *King*, and maintain'd by theſe Means a Sort of national Confederacy, or foederal Union of *many States*, politically united under *one Head*. *Such Aſſemblies as theſe*, under the *ſecond* and *third Race*, were the original

* *Recherches de la France.*

 Inſtitutions,

Institutions, from whence the * *Parliaments of France* have proceeded, as many Alterations as they have received, and as much as they are now changed; so that We may safely affirm the *Parliaments of France* never gave the *People* any Share in the Government of that Kingdom, and whoever entertains a Notion that the *Assemblies of the States* did, or that † *these Assemblies* are of great Antiquity, or that they are the Foundation of the Liberty of the People of that Country, will find Himself, on due Examination, grosly deceived.

These Assemblies of the *three Estates*, the *Nobility*, *Clergy*, and *Commons*, were invented first by †† *Philip le Bel.* They were entirely unknown before the Year 1301. The *People* had no Right to any *such Assemblies*; and when they were instituted, they were plainly design'd for nothing less than the *Good of the People.* Long after the Establishment of the *Capetian Race*, when *Taxes* grew heavy, and were laid on and levied very arbitrarily, *† Seditions and Rebellions of an oppress'd People, who had no other Recourse, follow'd. To prevent These, not only Writs, or Orders, were sent to the *Nobility* and *Clergy*, in the several Sheriffwicks and Bailywicks, but to the *Commons*, to assemble and take into Consideration how to *redress Grievances*, and *support the publick Expences*; and after such Consideration had amongst Themselves, to depute some Persons of *each Order*, or *Estate*,

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* *Primitive Origine & Institution des Parlemens. Ib.*

† *Ib.*

†† *L'Assemblée des Etats.* —— *fut une Idée toute nouvelle de* Philippe le Bel. *& jusqu' alors entirement inusitée.*

Boulainv. *Let. sur les anciens Parl. de France.*

*† Pasqu. *Rech.*

to

to confer together in the Place appointed for holding such general Assemblies. *The* Commons *were added to these Assemblies*, * says Pasquier, *against the antient Order or Practice of* France, *for no other Reason than This, that the principal Burthen, or Charge, was to fall upon them.* This was the true Reason. *Redress of Grievances* had no Part in the Schemes of that *rapacious* and *profuse Prince*, who was the Author of this Institution; and He, that considers the Manner, in which *these Assemblies* were convened, the Powers They were suffer'd to exercise, the Subordination, in which the *Commons* particularly were kept, and the habitual, unavoidable Influence, under which They lay, will be easily convinced that *such Assemblies* were fitted to do the Jobs, and sanctify the Iniquity of the *Court*, and nothing more. If, at any Time, they make any good Ordinances for the Reformation of the State, † *these Ordinances are*, says honest *Pasquier*, *like fine Pieces of Tapestry, hung up to make a Shew to Posterity.* They have no other Effect. But the *Imposition granted to the King hath its full Effect.* I conclude therefore, and upon sufficient Grounds, that even since the Establishment of these *Assemblies of the Estates*, in the Beginning of the 14th Century, the *People of France* have had no real Share in the *supreme Power of the Government*, either collectively or representatively.

I might illustrate and prove what is here advanced by the Example of *every Assembly of the States of France*, of which We have any good Accounts,

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* *Le Roturier fut expres ajouté, contre l'ancien Ordre de la* France, *à cette Assemblé*, &c.

† —— *Ces sont belles Tapisseries, qui servent seulement de Parade à une Postérité. Cependant l'Impost que l'on accorde au Roy est fort bien mis à Effet.*

from the *first* in 1301 to the *last* that was held, as I remember, in 1614. But such a Deduction would carry us too far. I shall content Myself therefore with making two Observations.

First, that *these Farces* (for such *these Assemblies* were, and such they were design'd to be) owe their Institution not only to one of the *worst Kings*, but to one of the *worst Ministers*, that *France* ever saw; *Enguerand de Marigny*, who was call'd the *Coadjutor* and the *Governor of the Kingdom*; the most insolent, the most avaricious, and the most prodigal Man of his Age. The great Ability of *this Minister*, on which his whole Merit with a *greedy Master* was raised, consisted in making his Administration a System of *Violence* and *Fraud*, in order to plunder and enslave the *People*. When he durst not employ *one*, He turn'd Himself to the *other*; and how grosly and impudently He managed even *Fraud*, it may not be improper to take Notice, in one Instance; because We shall see the better, by this Instance, what the Nature and Effect of *these Assemblies* were, of which We speak, and what Use the *Court* made of them from their first Institution. *Enguerand de Marigny* then, meeting with great Opposition to * *some Taxes* He had devised, proposed the calling an *Assembly of the States*, and hoped probably that He might gain the *Commons* to favour the Intention He had of extending *these Taxes* to the *Nobility* and *Clergy*. A great Scaffold was erected. The *King*, the *Lords* and the *Clergy* took their Places on it. The *Commons* attended at the Foot of it. The *Minister* made a most vehement Declamation, to stir the Pas-

* Boulainv. *Let. sur les anciens Parl. de France.*

sions

ſions of the Audience, and made no Scruple of inſinuating in it, what neither He nor his *Maſter* intended to perform, a Promiſe of reimburſing, after the Expedition propoſed, what the *People* ſhould give to the *King*. The *King* roſe from his Throne, and advanced to the Extremity of the Scaffold, that He might ſecond by his Looks the Harangue of his *Treaſurer*, and ſee who Thoſe were, that refuſed, or conſented to the Aid he demanded. The *Deputies of Paris* promiſed to give a ſufficient Supply, or to follow the *King* in their Perſons to the War. The *other Deputies* concur'd in this general Engagement, and the *Aſſembly* broke up, without any *farther Deliberation*, or any *Ordinance of the Eſtates*. But an *Ordinance of the King* ſoon follow'd; a † *general Exciſe* was impoſed by his Authority, as if it had been the Grant of the *Eſtates* to Him; and his *Miniſter* had a Number of *Harpies* ready, whom He let looſe to deſolate the Kingdom, by levying this *infamous Tax*, for the Conſideration of ſome little Advance made to the *King*. If you ask what were the Conſequences of *theſe Proceedings*, it will be ſufficient to mention two. The Tax of a 5th on the *Revenues of the Subject*, which is the Proportion of our *Land Tax of four Shillings in the Pound*, was continued, though the *general Exciſe* had been impoſed; and * *Enguerand de Marigny* was hang'd in the ſucceeding Reign for This, amongſt other Crimes, though not by an *Aſſembly of the Eſtates*; for the *Eſtates* had neither

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†——— *Six Deniers par Livre de toutes les Merchandiſes, Victuailles, Boiſſons, & Denrées,* ——— *Vendues dans le Royaume.*

Boulainv. *Let. ſur les anciens Parl. de France.*

* Mezerai, Daniel, &c. *Sous Louis Hutin.*

the

the Opportunity, nor the Power of resenting the greatest Insult that could be offer'd them, and the greatest Injury that could be done to the Nation.

The *next Observation* I have to make is very short; but I think very pertinent, and very important.—— This Example shews us clearly how true it is, that no *Instruments of Tyranny* can be found so sure and effectual as an *Assembly of the Estates of a Realm*, when *such an Assembly* is so constituted as to want the *Power*, (which was from the first the Cause of the *three Estates* in *France)* and the same must happen, when they are so managed as to want the *Will* (which became at last the Case of the *Cortes* in *Spain)* to secure the Liberty and defend the Property of the *People*, against such Kings as *Philip le Bel*, and such *Coadjutors* as *Marigny*. *This Prince* and his *Minister* had strain'd *Prerogative* to the utmost, and had govern'd by it very tyrannically. Whilst *this Expedient* would do, they try'd no *other*; but when They apprehended it might fail Them, They added a *Deputation of the Commons* to the *Assembly of the Estates*; that, seeming to create a *new Controul on the Crown*, They might in Reality give greater Scope and freer Exercise to *arbitrary Will*. The *Friends of Liberty* therefore, who live under *limited Monarchies*, cannot be too careful to preserve their *Constitution* in Vigour, nor too fearful lest their *Representatives* should be so influenced as to neglect their *Privileges*, misapply their *Powers*, and depart from their *Integrity*; since these *Friends of Liberty* see that the *greatest Masters of Tyranny* have judged the *Form*, without the *Spirit*, *of a free Government* more favourable to their *Schemes of Oppression*, than all the Authority, that *absolute Monarchy* can give; and

and that They made an Innovation in the *Form of their Government* on this very Motive, and for this very Purpose.

I am, SIR, &c.

LETTER XVI.

SIR,

I Have dwelt long, perhaps too long, on the last Head. I was induced to it, not only because the Account, I have given according to the Truth of History, is contrary to the national Prejudices of many People on this Subject, as I hinted before; but principally because the great Point of Strength and Security, on which the *Freedom of our Constitution* rests, will appear in a fuller Light, by being thus contrasted with the *Constitution of the French Government.* Both *their Ancestors* and *ours* came out of *Germany*, and had probably much the same Manners, the same Customs, and the same Forms of Government. But as They proceeded differently in the Conquests They made, so did They in the Establishments that follow'd. The Conquest of *Britain* was a Work of Time, and the *Saxon Monarchy* was long in forming. The Conquest of *Gaul* was carried on with greater Rapidity, and the *French Monarchy* was sooner form'd. From hence some Reasons might be drawn to account, amongst others, for that great Difference between the

the *Constitutions of the two Monarchies*, which these *two German Nations* founded, at no great Distance of Time, in *Britain* and in *Gaul*. But I shall not indulge myself in guessing at the Reasons, or Accidents, that determined the *Franks* to the Division They made of their People, and to the Form of Government They establish'd. Whatever Reasons, or Accidents, determined Them, This is certain; that the Distinction of *Lord* and *Vassal* became the general Distinction of the whole Nation; that the * *Commons* amongst Them were little better than *Slaves*, whatever They had been in *Germany*; and that They were so inured to Servitude under their *Kings*, *Prelates* and *Lords*, that They look'd on Themselves at last, not *justly*, but *unjustly*, as Men, who had no Right, no not even a Right by Nature, to any Share in the Government of that Community, whereof They made so vastly the principal Part.

In *Britain* another Constitution was form'd, and another Spirit prevail'd. The *Saxons* had a † *Nobility* too, arising from personal Valour, or Wisdom, continued by Blood, and sometimes confer'd by the Prince, however legally at first it matters not to enquire, on such as held great Offices about his Person. All these were the *Adelings*, or *Nobles*, an Handful in Comparison of the *Frilingi*, or *Freeborn*, who made the Body of the *Saxon People*. The Freedom of this People was erected on two Colums, that have proved more durable than Brass.

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* *Le Peuple, d'un autre Coté, se fait Justice, reconnoissant combien la Condition naturelle le Doit eloigner de Concours du Government, & dans se sentiment ne se fait entendre que par Requête.*

Boulainv. *Let. sur les an. Parl.*

† Nat. Bacon *Hist. & Pol. Dis.*

They

They were Parties to the making, and to the executing all the general Laws of the Kingdom. They shared the *legislative Power*; were join'd to the *Lords* in the Administration of Justice; and no *Magistrate*, or *Officer*, could exercise Jurisdiction, nor Authority over Them, no not Ecclesiastical, without their Consent and Election. The *Comites ex Plebe*, who were chosen for this last Function, the Administration of Justice, made one Rank amongst the *Saxon Commonalty*. The *Custodes Pagani*, such as had an Helmet, a Coat of Mail, and a gilt Sword, for their ordinary Arms, whether They fought on Foot, or on Horseback, made another Rank; and the plain *Pagani*, or *Ceorles*, made the lowest. But even These were totally distinct from, and far superior to the *Lazzi*, or *Slaves*, nay to the *free Lazzi*, such as had been *Slaves*, and were become free. The *Ceorles* were *Freemen* to all Intents and Purposes, and in all the Essentials of *Liberty*, as much as the *Saxons* of any superior Rank, and were capable of rising to any superior Rank by Merit, or by Favour.

These are the Sources, from which all the Distinctions of Rank and Degree, that exist at this Day amongst us, have flow'd. These are the general Principles of all our *Liberties*. That this *Saxon Constitution* hath vary'd in many Particulars, and at several Periods of Time, I am far from denying. That it did so, for Instance, on the Entry of the *Normans*, though certainly not near so much as many have been willing to believe, and to make others believe, is allow'd. Nay, let it be allow'd for Argument's Sake, and not otherwise, that during the first Confusion, and the subsequent Disorders, which necessarily accompany and follow so great, and so violent a Revolution, the Scheme of the *Saxon Constitution* was broken, and the *Liberties*

of the People invaded, as well as the *Crown* usurp'd. Let us even agree that *Laws* were made, without the Consent of the *People*; that *Officers* and *Magistrates*, civil, military and ecclesiastical, were imposed without their Election; in one Word, that these *Norman Kings* and the *Lords had mounted each other too high to be Lords over Freemen*, and that the Government was intirely *Monarchical* and *Aristocratical*, without any Exercise of *Democratical Power*. Let all This be granted, and the utmost that can be made of it will amount to This; that Confusion and Violence at the Entry, and for some Time after, under the Government of a *foreign Race*, introduced many illegal Practices, and some foreign Principles of Policy, contrary to the Spirit, and Letter too, of the *antient Constitution*; and that *these Kings* and the *Lords abused their Power over the Freemen, by Extortion and Oppression, as Lords over Tenants*. But it will remain true that neither *Kings* nor *Lords*, nor both together, * *could prevail over Them, or gain their Consent to give their Right, or the Law, up to the King's Beck. But still the* Law *remain'd Arbiter both of* King *and* People, *and the* Parliament *supreme Expounder and Judge both if it and Them.* Tho' the Branches were lopp'd, and the Tree lost its Beauty for a Time, yet the Root remain'd untouch'd, was set in a good Soil, and had taken strong Hold in it; so that Care, and Culture, and Time were indeed required, and our Ancestors were forced to water it, if I may use such an Expression, with their Blood; but with this Care, and Culture, and Time, and Blood, it shot up again with greater

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* *Nat. Bacon Summary Conclus. of the first Part of Hist. and Pol. Disc.*

Strength

Strength than ever, that We might ſit quiet and happy under the Shade of it; for if the ſame Form was not exactly reſtored in every Part, a Tree of the ſame Kind, and as beautiful, and as luxuriant as the former, grew up from the ſame Root.

To bring our Diſcourſe to that Point, which is here immediately concern'd; *Parliaments* were never interrupted, nor the Right of *any Eſtate* taken away, however the Exerciſe of it might be diſturb'd. Nay, they ſoon took the *Forms* they ſtill preſerve, were conſtituted *almoſt* as they now are, and were *intirely* built on the ſame general Principles, as well as directed to the ſame Purpoſes.

When I ſay that *they were conſtituted almoſt as they now are*, I do not mean to enter into any of thoſe minute Queſtions, about which a Man may employ much Time and Study, and have as little true and uſeful Knowledge of our *Conſtitution* as the moſt ignorant Man alive. But I propoſe to make a ſhort Reflection or two on the *Property* and *Power* of the *three Eſtates* that compoſe our *Parliament*, as they ſtood formerly, and as they now ſtand; becauſe although our *Parliaments* were compoſed of *King*, *Lords* and *Commons* in thoſe Days, as well as theſe, yet the Difference of the Weight, which each of *theſe Eſtates* hath caſt into the Scale of Government, at different Periods, does in Effect make ſome Difference in the Conſtitution of *Parliaments*; and by conſidering this Difference, our Thoughts will be led the better to judge of the true Poiſe of our *Conſtitution*, on maintaining which our All depends; ſince the nearer We keep to it, the ſafer our *Liberty* is, and ſince every Variation from it is dangerous to our *Liberty*, in a Degree proportionable to ſuch Variation. *Property* then, and *Power* by Conſequence, have changed Hands, or rather have ſhifted much in the ſame

Hands, ſince the *Norman Æra*. *Kings*, *Lords* and the *Church* were in thoſe Days, and long afterwards, the great Proprietors, and by the Nature of Tenures, as well as by the Bulk of their Eſtates, They held the *Commons* in no ſmall Subjection, and ſeem to have govern'd without much Regard to Them, or to their Concurrence, in many Caſes. But the Regard, that was not paid Them at firſt, the *Kings*, the *Lords* and the *Church* found it neceſſary to pay Them in a ſhort Time; and that Authority, that Weight in the Ballance of Power, which *Property* did not give Them, They ſoon acquired, or rather reſumed by their *Numbers*, and by the *Circumſtances*, that follow'd. By the *Circumſtances*, that follow'd, I mean the great Diſorders in the State, and the civil Wars, which the Ambition of *Princes*, of the *Nobility*, and of the *Church* too, created. In all theſe Conflicts, ſome of the Commons * *holding for the* King, *who promiſed Liberty from the* Lords, *and Others ſiding with the* Lords, *who promiſed Them Liberty from the King*, They came off better in the End than their *Principals*, and an Example rarely to be parallel'd was ſet; for *general Liberty* was nurſed by theſe Means, under the Wings of *particular Ambition*. In later Days, when the Nation, harraſs'd and ſpent by the long Wars of *York* and *Lancaſter*, ſeem'd glad to ſettle under any ſtable Government; and in this Temper gave many Advantages to the Cunning of *Henry* the *7th*, which the Violence of his *Son* improved. It is certain that the *Commons* ſuffer'd extremely from the Avarice of *one*, the Profuſion of the *other*, and the high-ſtrain'd Prerogative of *both*. But then their Sufferings were tem-

* *Nat. Bacon Hiſt. and Pol. Diſc. Concluſ. of the 2d Part.*

porary

porary, and may be ſaid to have ended with theſe Reigns; whereas the Sufferings of the *Nobility* and the *Church* were permanent and irretrievable. *The King and his Council*, ſays the Author I quoted laſt, *under Colour of Liveries and Retainders, brought the whole Kingdom to be of their Livery.* It was ſo. But ſtill the *Commons* loſt nothing, and gain'd much. They were more under Subjection to the *Crown*; but They were leſs under Subjection to the *Lords* and the *Church*. Not only the Dependencies on *Theſe* were broken, but the *Lords* and the *Church* were made more dependent on the *Crown* than the *Commons* had been on *Them*. The *Lords* were obliged to attend the *Court* at their own Expence, and might alienate their Eſtates to defray this Expence. A great Part of the Lands of the *Church* were confiſcated and parcell'd out to Thoſe, who could buy, at very cheap Rates; and the Increaſe of *Trade*, which begun about this Time to be very conſiderable, put the *Commons* into a Condition of being the Buyers. Thus were the old Foundations of *Property* and *Power* ſapp'd on one Side, and new Foundations laid on the other. Some of the Weight of the *Church* continued in the Scale of the *Lords*, and ſome of it hath gone ſince into That of the *Commons*. The *Parliamentary Controul of the Crown* did not become leſs, but it became more equally and more uſefully placed. *Democracy* was ſo well poiſed with *Ariſtocracy*, after this great Change, that if They divided, They could not invade one another; and if They united, They could not be invaded by the *Monarchy*. Far different was the Caſe in other Countries, where the *Crown* got the better of the *Lords*, and baffled, at leaſt in ſome Degree, the monſtrous Attempts of *Eccleſiaſtical Uſurpation*. In *France*, for Inſtance, when the Incroachments of the *Papal Power* were check'd, the

Church

Church compounded with the *Crown*, and an Alliance succeeded of the *Monarchy* with the *Hierarchy*. But if the *Church* was able to compound, the *Nobility* was forced to submit in that Kingdom; so that the Authority and Wealth of the *Church* being fix'd on the Side of the *Crown*, the whole Strength and Influence of the *Nobility* being taken from Them, and incorporated with the Power of the *Crown*, and the *Commons* having nothing to do in that Government, but to pay *Taxes*, and carry *Arms*, the Kings of *France* are become *absolute Monarchs*; and whatever *Liberty*, or *Appearance of Liberty*, there was in *that Constitution*, it is totally destroy'd.

When I say, *that Parliaments were intirely built on the same general Principles, as well as directed to the same Purposes, as they still are*, I shall be justify'd by the whole Tenour of our *History*, and of our *Law*. Let us consider This in a Case the plainest imaginable, tho' it suffers so much Debate through the Effrontery of *some Men*. Let us consider it relatively to that great Principle, *that Parliaments ought to be independent of the Crown*, in all Respects, except such as are settled by the Law and Custom of *Parliament*, and concerning which there is no Dispute. Now, this *general Principle* hath not only been always the same, but it hath been always so declared, in the most authentick and solemn Manner; and *Parliaments* have not been more intent on any national Concern whatever, than on maintaining *this Principle*, and securing the Effects of it. I say *Parliaments* have been constantly thus intent, and especially in the best Times, during more than *three Centuries* at least; for I would not go back too far, nor grope unnecessarily in the dark. What else did those Laws mean, that were made in the Time of the *Lancaster Kings*, to regulate the *Elections*,

tions, and to prevent the Influence, which *Richard* the 2*d* had illegally and arbitrarily employ'd, and which there was Room to fear that *other Princes* might employ? What elſe do all thoſe Reſolutions, all thoſe Declarations, all thoſe Remonſtrances, all thoſe Acts of Parliament mean, that have been made ſo often, and enforced ſo ſtrongly, from Time to Time, and from thoſe Days to theſe, againſt the Influence of the *Crown*, either on the *Elections*, or on the *Members of Parliament?* I ſhould be aſhamed to ask any more Queſtions of this Kind, or to deſcend into any Detail, in order to prove what every *Clerk of a Juſtice of Peace*, nay almoſt every *Day-Labourer* knows. But there is another Queſtion, which I muſt ask. If This be ſo, what do *thoſe Men* mean, who are employ'd, or rather what does *He* mean, who employs Them to plead in all Places, and on all Occaſions, even the moſt ſolemn, in Favour of *this very Influence*, nay of the very worſt Sort of it; of *that Influence*, which is created immediately by *Corruption*; for to That their Arguments reach by undeniable Conſequences? *Reaſon* is againſt Him and Them; ſince it is a plain Abſurdity to ſuppoſe a *Controul on the Crown*, (and They have not yet ventured to ſuppoſe the contrary, that I know of) and to eſtabliſh at the ſame Time a Power, and even a Right, in the *Crown*, to render *this Controul* uſeleſs. *Experience* is againſt Them; ſince the Examples of other Countries, and at ſome Times (former Times I mean) of our own, have proved that a Prince may govern according to his *arbitrary Will*, or That of his more *arbitrary Miniſter*, as abſolutely and much more ſecurely with, than without the Concurrence of a *Parliament*. *Authority*, even the uniform Authority of our whole Legiſlature, is againſt Them. The *Voice of our Law* gives

gives Them the Lye. How then shall We account for this Proceeding; this open and desperate Attack upon our *Constitution*, and therefore upon our *Liberty*? Have these *great Men* made any nice Discovery, that escaped the blunt Sagacity of our Ancestors formerly, and is above the narrow Conceptions of all other Men, except Themselves, at this Time? Is it less fit than the Wisdom of this Nation hath judged it to be, for so many Ages, that Kings should govern under the *constitutional Controul* of *two other Estates*? Or is it less fit that They should govern so, for the Time to come, than it was for the Time past? We shall hear, for aught I know, even in this Age, that *Kings are God's Vicegerents*; that They are, next to *Him* and his Son *Christ Jesus*, *supreme Moderators and Governors*. We shall hear again, perhaps, of their *hereditary*, their *divine*, their *indefeizable Right*, and the rest of that silly Cant, which was invented to make the Usurpations of *Prerogative* go down the better. But will even This alter the Case? Will This make it unworthy of them to submit to the full Controul of such a *Constitution* as God himself approved, in the Institution of the *Jewish Senate*. *Moses* was undoubtedly *God's Vicegerent*. He was, if ever Man was so, next and immediately under God, a *supreme Moderator and Governor*. He was * inspired, and assisted in a supernatural Manner; and yet He took the Advice of his Father-in-law *Jethro*, the Priest of *Midian*. He associated to Himself in the Government of the Common-Wealth, or He bad the People take, as he says in † another Place, or chuse *wise Men and understanding, and known among the Tribes*, that They might be

* *Exod.* 18. † *Deut.* 1.

associated

associated to Him. He found Himself unequal to the Task of governing alone, and He expostulated with God upon it. * *I am not able to bear all this People alone. Have I conceived all this People? Have I begotten Them? If thou deal thus with Me, kill Me, I pray Thee, out of Hand.* Whether They, who deduce from hence the Institution of *Sanhedrins*, are in the Right, or They, who assign them a more modern Date, against the Opinion of the *Jewish Doctors* Themselves, whose Authority *our Doctors* receive implicity enough in some Cases, and reject as arbitrarily in others, it matters not to enquire. Let us leave the Dispute to the Partisans of *Joseph Scaliger* and *Petavius*, of Father *Simon* and *Le Clerc*. Thus much is certain. A *great Sanhedrin* subsisted at *Jerusalem* even at the Coming of the *Messiah*, as well as *inferior Sanhedrins* in several Parts of *Palestine*; which Form of Government bore some Resemblance to our old *Saxon Constitution*; and He, who takes the Trouble of looking into Mr. † *Selden*, will find that the *great Sanhedrin* had as much Authority, and exercised as much Power, as ever *Parliaments* did, or *Wittenagemotes* could claim. That God approved a Kind of *Parliamentary Establishment*, and a Division of the supreme Power between his Vicegerent *Moses* and the *seventy Elders*, to whom He gave some of the *Spirit*, *that was on Moses*, the Quotations I refer to from holy Writ do sufficiently prove. After This, it cannot be said, I think, to derogate from the Majesty of any Prince, let us entertain as high Notions of this Majesty as We please, that

* *Numb.* 11. † Seld. *de Synod. & Præf. Lexid. vet. Ebræorum.*

He is relieved from the Burthen of governing *alone*; that He is obliged to ſhare the ſupreme Power with the *Nobility* and *Commonality* of the Realm; and that He is hinder'd from deſtroying, either directly or indirectly, that Independency of *thoſe other Eſtates*, which can alone preſerve this Diviſion of the ſupreme Power, really, as well as apparently. But perhaps, theſe *great* and *honeſt Men* have diſcover'd a Neceſſity of putting the *Members*, or a *Majority of the Members of Parliament*, under the Influence of the *Crown*, in order to preſerve *this very Conſtitution*. Let us ſee therefore what Dangers *this Expedient* is fitted to prevent.—Are We afraid that an *Houſe of Commons*, unleſs reſtrain'd by *Places* and *Penſions*, ſhould give up the Conſtitution to the *Lords*, and eſtabliſh an *Ariſtocracy?* This Fear would be ridiculous ſurely; and He, who ſhould argue againſt ſuch a Suppoſition, would make Himſelf ſo.——Are We afraid that an *Houſe of Commons*, unleſs reſtrain'd in this Manner, ſhould uſurp more Power than belongs to Them, and eſtabliſh a Kind of *Democratical Tyranny?* But They would have in Oppoſition to Them a Power ſufficient to defeat their Deſigns; the united Power of the *Crown* and of the *Houſe of Lords*. Formerly, indeed, They ſucceeded in an Attempt of this Kind; and the *King* and the *Lords* may, at any Time, throw too much Power into their Scale, and ſet the Senſe and Spirit of the People on their Side, as was done at that Time. But This neither hath been, nor can be done, unleſs both *King* and *Lords* conduct Themſelves ſo ill, that the Miſchiefs to be apprehended from their Prevalency appear as great, or greater than Thoſe, which are to be apprehended from the Prevalency of the *Commons*. Let it be remember'd

ber'd too that as the *King* and *Lords* may give too much Power and Popularity to the *Commons*, so the *Lords* and *Commons* may give too much Power to the *Crown*. The Difference will lye only here; that the *King* and *Lords* will never do the first designedly; whereas there is a Possibility that the *Lords* and *Commons* may be induced, in some Age less virtuous than the present, by *Places*, *Pensions*, and *other Gratifications*, bestow'd on a Majority of *those Assemblies*, to do the last designedly. What now remains to be urged in Favour of *this Expedient?* From What Danger are We to be protected by it? Shall We be told that *Parliaments* will not pursue the national Interest, unless their Members are bought into it by the *Crown?* Somethink like This hath been advanced, I have heard, and nothing more impudent, nor more silly could be advanced. A *Court*, that is truly in the Interest of the Nation, will have, nay must have a Concurrence of *Parliament*, as it would be easy, if it was needful, to shew. Time and Trouble, indeed, may be sometimes required to lead *independent Men*, who judge for Themselves, and comply because They are convinced; whereas neither one nor the other are wanting to determine such as hold to a Court by a *corrupt Dependency* on it; for They are soon disciplined and ready to perform the whole Exercise of *Parliamentary Mercenaries* at the Beat of a Drum. Some Inconveniencies may likewise arise (for That, which I have just mention'd, does not deserve the Name) from the *Independency of Parliaments*. *Ministers*, for Instance, may be call'd to Account by the Passion, by the Prejudice, if You will, of *such Assemblies*, oftner perhaps than They deserve to be; or their Errors may be censured, or their Faults be punish'd, in a greater Degree, and with more Rigour, not only than *true political Justice*

ſtice requires, which ſhould always be temper'd with *Mercy*, but even than *ſtrict Juſtice* exacts. But as one of Theſe is a Fault, if it be a Fault, on the beſt Side, and as the other will certainly happen very ſeldom, it does not ſeem reaſonable that a Door ſhould be open'd to *Corruption* and *Dependency*, in order to prevent them. Nay farther, this Vigilance, and this Severity of *Parliaments*, which We here ſuppoſe, will not fail to have ſome very good Effects, that are more than ſufficient to balance the ſuppoſed ill Effects. Among the reſt, they may render the *Raſh*, who are in Power, more cautious, and the *Bold* more modeſt. They may render *Fools* leſs fond of Power, and awe even *Knaves* into Honeſty. It were better ſurely that *able* and *good Men*, ſhould now and then ſuffer, (nay the *good Man*, who ſuffer'd, would be Himſelf of this Opinion) than that the Adulation and Servility of *Parliaments*, which are the neceſſary Conſequences of *Corruption* and *Dependency*, ſhould ever contribute to make the *Court* become, in any future Age, a Sanctuary for *Pickpockets*, and an Hoſpital for *Changelings*.

I am, SIR, &c.

LETTER

LETTER XVII.

SIR,

THE great Alteration we have ſpoken of, in *Property* and *Power*, brought our *Conſtitution*, by ſlow Degrees, and through many Struggles and Dangers, ſo near the moſt perfect Idea of a *free Syſtem of Government*, that nothing would be now wanting to compleat it, if effectual Means were found of ſecuring the Independency of Parliament againſt *Corruption*, as well as it is ſecured againſt *Prerogative*. Our *Kings* have loſt little of the gaudy Plumage of the Crown. Some of their ſuperfluous Power, indeed, hath been bought and more hath been wreſted from Them. Notwithſtanding which, it is a very demonſtrable Truth, that the *Crown* muſt ſit lighter, and more ſecure, on the Head of a *wiſe Prince*, (and no conſtitution provides for, though every Conſtitution ſhould provide againſt, a *weak Prince)* ſince the great Change of *Property* and *Power*, in Favour of the *Commons*, than ever it did before. Our *Kings* are no longer expoſed, as ſome of the greateſt of Them have been, to the Inſults of *turbulent*, *ambitious Lords*, or *haughty Prelates*. It is no longer in the Power of a *few factious Noblemen* to draw Armies into the Field, and oblige their Prince to fight for his Crown, to fight to gain it, and to fight to keep it; as *Edward* the 4*th* did, I think, in nine pitch'd

pitch'd Battles. To make the Prince uneasy, or insecure, as We are now constituted, the *whole Body of the People* must be uneasy under his Government. A *popular King of Great Britain* will be always not only easy and secure, but in Effect absolute. He will be, what the *British Constitution* alone can make any *Prince* the *absolute Monarch of a free People*; and this *Popularity* is so easily acquired, a *King* gains the publick Confidence and Affection at so cheap a Rate, that He must be poor indeed in all the *kingly Virtues*, who does not purchase them, and establish *true Popularity* upon them.

If the Condition of our *Kings* is mended in many Respects, and made worse in none, That of the *Nation* is mended in every Respect, by the great Improvements of our *Constitution*; which are due principally to the *Change* I have mention'd, as the Advances We have made in *Trade*, and in *national Wealth and Power*, are due principally to these Improvements. It is by *These*, that the Subjects of *Great Britain* enjoy hitherto such a Freedom of their *Persons*, and such a Security of their *Property*, as no other People can boast. Hence that great Encouragement of *Industry*; hence that broad and solid Foundation of *Credit*, which must always continue, unless the Weight of *Taxes*, and the Oppression of *Tax-Gatherers* make it worth no Man's while to be industrious any longer, and unless *national Credit* be reduced, by Length of Time, and private Management, to rest no longer on its *natural and original Foundation*, but on the feeble Props of *yearly Expedients*, and *daily Tricks*; by which a *System*, that ought to be the *plainest* and *fairest* imaginable, will become of Course a *dark*, *intricate*, *and wicked Mystery of* STOCKJOBBING.

But

But the great Advantage We are to insist upon here, which hath arisen to the *whole Nation* from the Alteration in the State of *Property* and *Power*, is This; that We have been brought by it to the true Poise of a *mix'd Government*, constituted like ours on the *three simple Forms*. The *Democratical Power* is no longer kept under the same *Dependencies*; and if an *House of Commons* should now fail to assert that *independent Share in the supreme, legislative Power*, which the Constitution assigns to *this Assembly*, it could not proceed, as it might and sometimes did formerly, from the Nature of *Tenures*, and many other unavoidable Restraints; it could proceed alone from the *Corruption of particular Men*, who threw Themselves into a *voluntary Dependency*. The *Democratical Power of our Constitution* is not sufficient to overtop the *Monarchical* and *Aristocratical*; but it is sufficient to counterwork and ballance any *other Power* by its own Strength, and without the fatal Necessity of favouring the Ambition of the *Crown* against the *Lords*, or That of the *Lords* against the *Crown*. Nay more, as our Government is now constituted, the *three Estates* have not only the common Interest, which They always had; but They have, consider'd as *Estates*, no separate, contradictory Interest. Our *Constitution* gives so much Grandeur, so much Authority and Power to the *Crown*, and our *Parliaments* give so immense a Revenue, that no Prince hath any real Interest to desire more, who looks on Himself as the *supreme Magistrate of a free People*; for if We suppose inordinate Ambition, or Avarice, to make Part of his Character, these Passions are insatiable; but then for this very Reason, because they are so, there ought to be no Account held of them; and though a *Prince* may measure

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his *Demands*, a *People*, who are in their Senſes, will never meaſure their *Conceſſions* by them.

The Property of the *Commons* is not only become far ſuperior to That of the *Lords* upon the whole, but in the Detail there are few, very few, Inſtances to be produced of greater Shares of private Property amongſt the *latter*, than amongſt the *former*; and as the Property of the *Commons* is greater, ſo it is equally *free*. There are no Badges of Servitude on *one Side*; no Pretence of any Superiority, except Thoſe of *Title* and *Rank*, on the *other*. The *Peers* are, in ſome Points, (I ſpeak it with all the Reſpect due to Them) *Commoners with Coronets on their Coats of Arms*; and affecting to act as ſuch, it is plain They deſire very wiſely to be taken for ſuch, on many Occaſions. The Intereſts of *theſe two Eſtates* then, with Regard to *Property*, are the ſame; and their *particular Rights* and *Privileges* are now ſo well aſcertain'd, and ſo diſtinguiſh'd, that as the Proximity of their Intereſts of *one Sort* ſhould always unite Them, ſo the Diſtance of Thoſe of *another Sort* cannot eaſily make Them claſh. In ſhort, *theſe two Orders*, according to the *preſent Conſtitution*, (and how different is it from That of *Rome*, or, in the laſt Reſpect, even from That of *Spain*, not to mention That of *France?*) have no Temptation, and ſcarce the Means, of invading *each other*; ſo that They may the better, and the more effectually, employ their Vigilance, and unite their Efforts, whenever it ſhall be neceſſary, againſt the Encroachments of the *Crown*, from whoſe Shackles They have both emancipated Themſelves, whether the Attempts to impoſe theſe Shackles again are carried on by *Prerogative*, or by the more formidable Enemy of Liberty, *Corruption*.

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It hath been obſerved already, that although the *Crown* hath the ſole Power of creating *Peers*, yet the Independency of the *Peerage* on the *Crown* is ſecured by This; that their *Rights and Privileges* cannot be taken from Them, at the Will of the *Crown*. Could the *Crown* un-make, as well as make *Peers*, it would be a Jeſt to talk of *three Eſtates*, ſince there would be virtually, and in Effect, but *two*; and therefore our *Conſtitution* hath provided againſt it. But the *Commons of Great-Britain* can make, and, at proper Seaſons, and in a proper Manner, un-make their *Repreſentatives*; by which Means, many Inconveniences and Miſchiefs are avoided, and many wiſe and juſt Ends obtain'd. The *Peers of the Realm* can, the *Commons* cannot, aſſemble in their *collective Body*, without exceeding thoſe Numbers, amongſt whom the Quiet, Order, Decency and Solemnity of a *Senate* may be preſerved. The *Peers* therefore ſit in Parliament in their *collective*, the *Commons* in their *repreſentative Body*. The *Peers* have an inherent, the *Commons* a delegated Right. The *Peers* are therefore accountable for their Conduct, as all other Men are, to *God*, to their *own Conſciences*, to the Tribunal of *publick Fame*, and to no other. But the *Commons* are accountable to *another Tribunal*, as well as to *Theſe*; to That of their *Conſtituents*, before which They muſt frequently appear, according to the true Intent of our *Conſtitution*, to have a Cenſure, or Approbation, paſs'd on their Conduct, by the Refuſal, or Grant of *new Powers* to the particular Members. Thus the *collective Body of the People of Great Britain* delegate, but do not give up, truſt, but do not alienate their *Right* and their *Power*, and cannot be undone, by having *Beggary*, or *Slavery*, brought upon them, unleſs They co-operate to their own Undoing, and in one Word betray Themſelves.

We cannot therefore subscribe to those two Sayings of my Lord *Bacon*, which are quoted to this Effect; *that* England *can never be undone, unless by* Parliaments; *and that there is nothing, which a* Parliament *cannot do.*—*Great Britain*, according to our *present Constitution*, cannot be undone by *Parliaments*; for *there is Something, which a* Parliament *cannot do.* A *Parliament* cannot annul the *Constitution*; and whilst That is preserved, though our Condition may be bad, it cannot be irretrievably so. The *Legislative* is a *supreme*, and may be call'd, in one Sense, an *absolute*, but in none an *arbitary* Power. * *It is limited to the* publick Good of the Society. *It is a Power, that hath no other End but* Preservation, *and therefore can never have a Right to* destroy, enslave, or *designedly to* impoverish *the Subjects*; *for the Obligations of the* Law of Nature *cease not* Society, *&c.*——If you therefore put so extravagant a Case, as to suppose the *two Houses of Parliament* concurring to make at once a formal Cession of their *own Rights* and *Privileges*, and of Those of the *whole Nation* to the *Crown*, and ask who hath the *Right*, and the *Means*, to resist the *supreme legislative Power*; I answer, the *whole Nation* hath the *Right*; and a *People*, who deserve to enjoy *Liberty*, will find the *Means*. An Attempt of this Kind would break the Bargain between the *King* and the *Nation*, between the *representative and collective Body of the People*, and would dissolve the *Constitution*. From hence it follows that the *Nation*, which hath a Right to preserve *this Constitu-*

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* Locke's *Essay on civil Government*, C. 11. *of the Extent of the* Legislative Power.

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tion, hath a Right to resist an *Attempt*, that leaves no other Means of preserving it but those of *Resistance*. From hence it follows, that if the *Constitution* was actually dissolved, as it would be by such an Attempt of the *three Estates*, the People would return to their original, their natural Right, the Right of restoring the *same Constitution*, or of making a *new one*. No Power on Earth could claim any Right of imposing a *Constitution* upon Them; and less than any *that King*, *those Lords*, and *those Commons*, who, having been intrusted to preserve, had destroy'd the *former*.——But to suppose a Case more within the Bounds of Possibility, though one would be tempted to think it as little within Those of Probability; let us suppose our *Parliaments*, in some future Generation, to grow so *corrupt*, and the *Crown* so *rich*, that a *pecuniary Influence* constantly prevailing over the *Majority*, They should assemble for little else than to establish *Grievances*, instead of redressing them; to approve the *Measures of the Court*, without Information; to engage their Country in *Allyances*, in *Treaties*, in *Wars*, without Examination; and to give *Money* without *Account*, and almost without *Stint*. The Case would be deplorable. Our *Constitution* itself would become our *Grievance*, whilst *this Corruption* prevail'd; and if it prevail'd long, our *Constitution* could not last long; because this slow Progress would lead to the Destruction of it as surely as the more concise Method of giving it up at once. But, in this Case, the *Constitution* would help itself, and effectually too, unless the *whole Mass of the People* was tainted, and the *Electors* were become no honester than the *Elected*. Much Time would be required to beggar and enslave the Nation, in this Manner. It could scarce be the Work of *one Parliament*,

liament, though *Parliaments* ſhould continue to be *ſeptennial.* It could not be the Work of a *triennal Parliament* moſt certainly; and the People of *Great Britain* would have none to blame but Themſelves; becauſe, as the *Conſtitution* is a ſure Rule of Action to *Thoſe*, whom they chuſe to act for Them, ſo it is likewiſe a ſure Rule of Judgment to Them, in the Choice of their *Truſtees*, and particularly of ſuch as have *repreſented them already.* In ſhort, nothing can deſtroy the *Conſtitution of Britain*, but the *People of Britain*; and whenever the *People of Britain* become ſo degenerate and baſe, as to be induced by *Corruption* (for They are no longer in Danger of being awed by *Prerogative*) to chuſe Perſons to repreſent Them in Parliament, whom They have found by Experience to be under an *Influence*, ariſing from *private Intereſt*, *Dependents on a Court*, and the *Creatures of a Miniſter*; or *Others*, who are unknown to the *People*, that elect Them, and bring no Recommendation but That, which They carry in their *Purſes*; then may the *Enemies of our Conſtitution* boaſt that They have got the better of it, and that it is no longer able to preſerve itſelf, nor to defend *Liberty.* Then will that trite, proverbial Speech be verify'd in our Caſe, *that the Corruptions of the beſt Things are the worſt*; for then will that very Change in the State of Property and Power, which improved our *Conſtitution* ſo much, contribute to the Deſtruction of it; and We may even wiſh for thoſe little Tyrants, the *great Lords* and the *great Prelates* again, to oppoſe the Encroachments of the *Crown.* How preferable will Subjection to *thoſe powerful Landlords*, (whom the Commonality were accuſtom'd to ſerve; and by whom, if They ſuffer'd on one Hand, they had conſiderable Advantages on the other) how preferable indeed, will this Subjection

appear

appear to Them, when They shall see the whole Nation oppress'd by a *few Upstarts in Power*; often by the *meanest*, always by the *worst of their Fellow-Subjects*; by Men, who owe their Elevation and Riches neither to *Merit* nor *Birth*, but to the Favour of *weak Princes*, and to the *Spoils of their Country*, beggar'd by their Rapine. Then will the Fate of *Rome* be renew'd, in some Sort, in *Britain*. The Grandeur of *Rome* was the Work of many Centuries, the Effect of much Wisdom, and the Price of much Blood. She maintain'd her *Grandeur*, whilst She preserved her *Virtue*; but when *Luxury* grew up to favour *Corruption*, and *Corruption* to nourish *Luxury*; then *Rome* grew venal; the Election of her *Magistrates*, the Sentences of her *Judges*, the Decrees of her *Senate*, all was sold; for her *Liberty* was sold when *These* were sold; and her *Riches*, her *Power*, her *Glory*, could not long survive her *Liberty*. She, who had been the Envy, as well as the Mistress of Nations, fell to be an Object of their Scorn, or their Pity. They had seen and felt that She govern'd other People by *Will*, and her own by *Law*. They beheld Her govern'd Herself by *Will*; by the *arbitary Will* of the worst of her own Citizens, of the worst of both Sexes, of the worst of Humankind; by *Caligula*, by *Claudius*, by *Nero*, by *Messalina*, by *Agrippina*, by *Poppæa*, by *Narcissus*, by *Calistus*, by *Pallas*; by *Princes*, that were stupid, or mad; by *Women*, that were abandon'd to Ambition and to Lust; by *Ministers*, that were emancipated Slaves, Parasites and Pandars, insolent and rapacious. In this miserable State, the Few, that retain'd some Sparks of the old *Roman* Spirit, had double Cause to mourn in private; for it was not safe even to *mourn* in publick. They mourn'd the Loss of the Liberty and Grandeur of *Rome*; and They mourn'd

mourn'd that both ſhould be ſacrificed to *Wretches*, whoſe Crimes would have been *puniſh'd*, and whoſe *Talents* would ſcarce have recommended Them to the *meaneſt Offices*, in the virtuous and proſperous Ages of the Commonwealth. Into ſuch a State, (the Difference of Times, and of other Circumſtances conſider'd) at leaſt, into a State as miſerable as This, will the People of *Britain* both fall, and deſerve to fall, if They ſuffer, under any Pretence, or by any Hands, *that Conſtitution* to be deſtroy'd, which cannot be deſtroy'd, unleſs They ſuffer it; unleſs They co-operate with the *Enemies of it*, by renewing an exploded Diſtinction of *Parties*; by electing *Thoſe* to repreſent Them, who are hired to betray Them; or by ſubmitting tamely, when the *Mask* is taken off, or falls off, and the Attempt to bring *Beggary* and *Slavery* is avow'd, or can be no longer conceal'd. If ever This happens, the *Friends of Liberty*, ſhould any ſuch remain, will have one Option ſtill left; and They will rather chuſe, no Doubt, to dye the *laſt of* Britiſh *Freemen*, than bear to live the *firſt of* Britiſh *Slaves*.

I am, *SIR*, &c.

LETTER

LETTER XVIII.

SIR,

IF We had propoſed nothing more to Ourſelves in *writing this Diſſertation on Parties* than the Entertainment, ſuch as it is, of your Readers, and our own Amuſement; We ſhould not have dwelt, perhaps, ſo much on the Nature of the *Britiſh Conſtitution*, nor have recurr'd ſo often to aſſert the *neceſſary Independency of Parliaments on the Crown*. But We had another Motive, which We are neither affraid, nor aſhamed to avow. This *neceſſary Independency of Parliaments*, in which the Eſſence of our *Conſtitution*, and by Conſequence of our *Liberty*, conſiſts, ſeems to be in great, not to ſay, in imminent Danger of being loſt. They, who are alarm'd at every Thing, that is ſaid in Favour of our *Conſtitution*, and of *Britiſh Liberty*, and who are prejudiced againſt every Man, who writes or ſpeaks in Defence of them, may take, or affect to take, and try to give, Offence at this Expreſſion. But We deſire to be underſtood, as We have explain'd our Meaning upon ſome former Occaſion. We underſtand our *Conſtitution to be in Danger*, not only when it is *attack'd*, but as ſoon as a *Breach* is made, by which it may be *attack'd*; and We underſtand *this Danger* to be greater, or leſs, in Proportion to the *Breach*, that is made, and without any Regard to the Probability, or Im-

probability

probability of an *Attack*. This Explanation of our Meaning is the better founded, becauſe the Nation hath an undoubted Right to preſerve the *Conſtitution* not only inviolate, but ſecure from Violations. Should *Corruption* prevail among the *Members*, which We truſt will never happen, as notoriouſly as it does in the *Elections of Parliament*, We all know how much the Magnanimity of our *preſent King* would ſcorn to take ſo mean an Advantage over the Nation; how much, on the contrary, his heroical Spirit would prompt Him to maintain the Liberty even of a *degenerate People*, who might deſerve no longer the Enjoyment of ſo invaluable a Bleſſing, who could never deſerve to have it taken from Them by a *Prince of that Family*, which was raiſed by Them to the Throne, for no other Reaſon but to preſerve it. All This We know; and the Nation may have, no Doubt, the ſame Confidence in every *future King, of the ſame illuſtrious and royal Houſe*. But This will not alter the Caſe; nor make That, which I call *Danger*, ceaſe to be ſuch. Should *Angels* and *Arch-Angels* come down from Heaven to govern us, the *ſame Danger* would exiſt until the *Springs*, from whence it ariſes, were cut off; not becauſe ſome *Angels* and *Arch-Angels* have fallen, and from being the *Guardians* have become the *Tempters* and *Tormentors of Mankind*, and Others therefore may fall; but becauſe as *private Liberty* cannot be deem'd ſecure under a Government, wherein *Law*, the proper and ſole Security of it, is dependent on *Will*; ſo *publick Liberty* muſt be in Danger, whenever a *free Conſtitution*, the proper and ſole Security of it, is dependent on *Will*; and a *free Conſtitution* like ours is dependent on *Will*, whenever the *Will of one Eſtate* can direct the Conduct of *all Three*.

Having

Having thus explain'd what I mean by *Danger*, and taken away all Colour for Cavil, it remains that I prove *this Danger* to be real, and not the Phantom of a crazy Imagination, or a prejudiced Mind. This ſhall be done therefore as ſhortly as I am able, and by an undeniable Deduction of Facts.

He, who undertakes to govern a free People by *Corruption*, and to lead Them by a *falſe Intereſt*, againſt their *true Intereſt*, cannot boaſt the Honour of the Invention. The Expedient is as old as the World, and He can pretend to no other Honour than That of being an humble Imitator of the *Devil*. To *corrupt our Parliaments* hath been often attempted, as well as to *divide our People*, in Favour of *Prerogative*, and in order to let the arbitrary Will of our *Princes* looſe from the Reſtraints of *Law*. We obſerved This, in ſpeaking of the Reign of *Charles* the 2*d*; but the Efforts then made were ineffectual. The frugal Habits of the *former Age* were not entirely loſt in *That*; which, I preſume, may be reckon'd as one Cauſe of the noble Stands, that were then made by our *Parliaments*, in Oppoſition to the *Court*. But not to aſcribe more Honour than is due, perhaps, to our Fathers, the *Revenue of the Crown* was at that Time ſo ſmall, (I ſpeak comparatively; for, in every other Reſpect, it was very ample) and the Profuſion of that *Prince* on his Pleaſures was ſo great, that no Miniſter of King *Charles* the 2*d* could find Sums ſufficient to buy a *Parliament*. He ſtood therefore on his *Prerogative*, ſtrain'd it as far as He durſt, and made all the Uſe of it he could. The *Revenue of the Crown* was greatly increaſed in the Reign of King *James* the 2*d*, and was given moſt unwiſely *for Life*. I ſay *moſt unwiſely*; for as a *Prince*, who hath an Heart and Head to govern well, cannot ſtand in need of *ſuch a Grant*;

ſo a *Prince*, who hath neither, does not deſerve it; and therefore whatever the Generoſity of our Countrymen to their *Princes* may carry Them to do at all Times, They might leave This undone at any Time, without any Reflection on their Prudence, or even their Generoſity. The Reign of King *James* was ſhort; and, during this ſhort Reign, He reſted on that Prerogative, which he knew was a cheaper Expedient than Corruption, and which He vainly flatter'd Himſelf was enough confirm'd to ſupport the Meaſures He took, for ſubverting the Religion, the Laws, and the Liberty of *Britain*. Thus were Men brought, by the Conduct of *theſe two Princes*, to fix their Eyes on *Prerogative*, as the ſole Inſtrument of Tyranny, and to forget that *Corruption* had been employ'd, though unſucceſsfully, by King *Charles*, and might have been employ'd with greater Force, and perhaps more Succeſs, by King *James*. The Cry of the Nation was for a *free Parliament*, and no Man ſeem'd to doubt, in that Ferment, but that a *Parliament muſt be free*, when the *Influence*, which the *Crown* had uſurp'd, in the precedent Reigns, over the *Elections* was removed, as it was by the *Revolution*. But this general Inadvertency, as well as the particular Neglect of Thoſe, who took the Lead in national Affairs at that Time, is the more ſurprizing, becauſe *Corruption* having been ſo lately employ'd, amongſt other Means, to render *Parliaments dependent on the Crown*, the Danger of *Corruption* was by Conſequence one of thoſe Dangers, againſt which the Nation had a Right to be ſecured, as well as a Promiſe of being ſo, according to the Terms of the *Prince of Orange's Declaration*. Thoſe Perſons eſpecially, who had exclaim'd ſo loudly againſt *Place-men* and *Penſioners* in the Reign of King *Charles*, and who complain'd at this Inſtant ſo bitterly

of

of the *undue Influence*, that had been employ'd, in ſmall Boroughs chiefly, to promote the *Elections of the Parliament*, which ſate in the Reign of King *James*, ought to have been attentive, one would think, to take the glorious Opportunity, that was furniſh'd Them by a *new Settlement of the Crown*, and of the *Conſtitution*, to ſecure the *Independency of Parliaments* effectually for the future. *Machiavel* obſerves, and makes it the Title of one of his Diſcourſes, *that a free Government, in order to maintain itſelf free, hath Need every Day of ſome new Proviſions*, in Favour of *Liberty*. The Truth of this Obſervation, and the Reaſons that ſupport it, are obvious. But as every Day may not furniſh Opportunities of making ſome of theſe *new and neceſſary Proviſions*, no Day, that does furniſh the Opportunity, ought to be neglected. The *Romans* had been ſo liberal in beſtowing the Right of Citizens on *Strangers*, that the Power of their *Elections* began to fall into ſuch Hands as the *Conſtitution* had not intended to truſt with them. *Quintus Fabius* ſaw the growing Evil; and, being *Cenſor*, He took the Opportunity; confined all theſe *new Electors* into four Tribes; put it out of their Power to turn the *Elections*, as They had done, whilſt their Numbers were divided among all the Tribes; freed his Country from this Danger; reſtored the Conſtitution, according to the true Intent and Meaning of it; and obtain'd, by univerſal Suffrage, the Title of *Maximus*. If a Spirit like This had prevail'd among us, at the Time We ſpeak of, ſomething like This would have been done; and ſurely ſomething like it ought to have been done; for the *Revolution* was, in many Inſtances, and it ought to have been ſo in all, one of thoſe *Renewals of our Conſtitution*, that We have often mention'd. If it had been ſuch, with

Respect to the *Elections of Members to serve in Parliament*, these Elections might have been drawn back to the *antient Principle*, on which they had been establish'd; and the Rule of *Property*, which was follow'd antiently, and was perverted by innumerable Changes, that Length of Time produced, might have been restored; by which the *Communities*, to whom the *Right of electing* was trusted, as well as the Qualifications of the *Electors* and the *Elected*, might have been settled in Proportion to the present State of Things. Such a Remedy might have wrought a radical Cure of the *Evil*, that threatens our *Constitution*; whereas it is much to be apprehended, even from Experience, that all others are meerly *Palliative*; and yet the *Palliative* must be employ'd, no Doubt, till the *Specifick* can be procured.

But nothing of this Kind was done at the *Revolution*. Pleased that the *open Attacks on our Constitution* were defeated and prevented, Men entertain'd no Thought of the *secret Attacks*, that might be carried on against the *Independency of Parliaments*; as if our Dangers could be but of *one Kind*, and could arise but from *one Family*. Soon after the *Revolution*, indeed, Men of all Sides, and of all Denominations, (for it was not a *Party-Cause*, though it was endeavour'd to be made such) began to perceive not only that nothing effectual had been done to hinder the *undue Influence of the Crown in Elections*, and an *Over-Ballance of the Creatures of the Court in Parliament*, but that the Means of exercising *such an Influence*, at the Will of the *Crown*, were unawares and insensibly increased, and every Day increasing. In a Word, they began to see that the Foundations were laid of giving as great Power to the *Crown* indirectly, as the *Prerogative*, which they had formerly dreaded so much, could give

give directly, and of eſtablilling *univerſal Corruption*. The *firſt* hath happen'd, and We pray that the *laſt* never may.

The *Net Revenue of the Crown*, at the Abdication of King *James*, amounted to ſomewhat more than *two Millions*, without any Tax on *Land*, or *Malt*, and without a Multitude of *grievous Impoſitions* and *Exciſes*, that have been ſince heap'd on the Nation. It is plain, and it was ſo then, that *this Revenue* might have been ſo increaſed, as to anſwer annually the great annual Expences, in which We engaged ſoon afterwards. In this Caſe, the People would not have had a greater, nay nor ſo great a Burthen to bear, as They had in the Courſe of the *two Wars*, that follow'd; and, at the End of *theſe Wars*, They would have found Themſelves with little or no Load upon Them, inſtead of crouching under a Debt of *fifty Millions*. That *this Method* was not taken, furniſhes Matter of very melancholy Reflection to the preſent, and will do ſo to future Generations. But theſe Reflections are no Part of my Subject. How it came to paſs that a Method ſo practicable, and ſo eligible, was not taken, (whether This was owing to *private Intereſt*, to *Party-Cunning* of different and oppoſite Kinds, or to an unhappy Refinement in Politicks that contracting *national Debts*, under a *new Eſtabliſhment*, was an effectual Expedient to attach Men to *this Eſtabliſhment*) I ſhall not preſume to ſay. All *three* might have their Share, perhaps, in determining for *another Meaſure*. At leaſt, it is a Point, on which the Men of that Time have ſpoken with much Prejudice, and little Candour. But however That might be, certain it is that We began to borrow at high Intereſt, to anticipate and mortgage, immediately after the *Revolution*; and having once begun, there was no Remedy; We were

forced

forced to proceed in the same Manner thro' the Course of *two mighty Wars*. Formerly, the whole Expence of the State was borne by the *Crown*; and when this Expence grew, upon extraordinary Occasions, too great for the *Revenue of the Crown* to bear, the People aided the *Crown*, if They approved the Occasions of the Expence. These Grants were properly *Aids*, no more; for the *Revenue of the Crown* was engaged in the first Place, and therefore it might seem reasonable that the *Crown* should have the Levying and Management of the *whole*; of *these Aids*, as well as of the *standing Revenue*. But it happen'd in this Case, as it does in many; the *Reason of the Thing* ceased, and the *Thing* continued. A *separate, private Revenue*, or a *Civil-List*, as We commonly call it, was assign'd to the *Crown*. From that Time, the former Order hath been reversed. Our *Kings*, instead of contributing most, have contributed nothing to the publick Charge; and the People of *Britain*, instead of giving occasionally *Aids* to the *Crown*, have taken upon Themselves the whole Load of *ordinary* and *extraordinary Expences*, for which they annually provide. Notwithstanding this vast Alteration in the State of the *Revenue*, and the Interest of the *King* and the *People*, in the Management of it, the same Forms of granting *Aids to the Crown*, and of levying *Taxes*, and of managing the *publick Treasure*, have been continued; so that the *People* stand obliged (for the *Crown*, that is trusted with the whole, is bound for nothing) to make good all *Deficiencies*, though They have no Share in the Management of the *Revenue*. Our *Kings*, since the Establishment of the *Civil-List*, have not only a *private* and *separate Estate*, but receive a Kind of *Rent-Charge* out of the *publick Estate*, to maintain their *Honour* and *Dignity*, nothing else; and whether the *publick*

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Eſtate thrive, or not, this *Rent-Charge* muſt be made good to Them; at leaſt, as it hath been ſettled on *our preſent, moſt gracious Monarch*, if the Funds appropriated produce the double of that immenſe Revenue of 800,000 *l.* a Year, which hath been ſo liberally given Him for Life, the whole is his, without Account; but if they fail in any Degree to produce it, the *entire, national Fund* is engaged to make up the Difference. But although our *Kings* have thus no longer any immediate Intereſt in the *publick Eſtate*, They are truſted with the intire Management of it. They are not only *Stewards for the Publick*, but They condeſcend to be ſuch for *all thoſe private Perſons*, who are the *Creditors of the Publick*, and have the additional Trouble of managing about *three Millions a Year*, on this Head.

Now this *new Settlement*, which appears abſurd in Speculation, how wiſe ſoever it may have been thought contrived for Practice, hath had this evident and inevitable Conſequence. As we have annually increaſed our *Funds*, and our *Taxes*, We have annually increaſed the *Power of the Crown*; and *theſe Funds* and *Taxes* being eſtabliſh'd and laid for *Perpetuity*, or for Terms equivalent to *Perpetuity*, in the Senſe here intended, this *Increaſe of Power* muſt not only continue, but ſtill increaſe, as long as *this Syſtem of Oeconomy* ſubſiſts. How this *Increaſe of Power* ariſes from the *Increaſe of Funds* and *Taxes*, and the *Influence of the Crown* grows, in Proportion to the *Burthen on the People*, heavier, hath been explain'd ſo much in the Debates on a *late, deteſtable Occaſion*, that much leſs needs to be ſaid on the Subject here. If we conſider, in the *Increaſe of Taxes*, nothing more than the *Increaſe of Officers* firſt, by which a vaſt Number of *new Dependents on the Crown* are created in every Part of the Kingdom; (*Dependents* as numerous, and certainly

tainly more prevalent than all the *Tenants* and *Wards of the Crown* were antiently;) and secondly the Powers given to the *Treasury*, and *other inferior Officers*, on Account of *these Taxes*, which are at least as great and as grievous, in this *free Government of ours*, as any that are exercised in the most *arbitrary Government*, on the same Occasions; if We consider This alone, We shall find Reason sufficient to conclude that although the *Power of Prerogative* was more open, and more noisy in its Operations; yet the *Power thus acquired* is more real and may prove more dangerous for this very Reason, because it is more cover'd, and more silent. That Men began to see, very soon after the *Revolution*, the Danger arising from hence to our *Constitution*, as I said above, is most certain. No less than *seven Acts* were *made*, in King *William*'s Reign, to prevent *undue Influences on Elections*; and one of the Acts, as I remember, for I have it not before Me, is grounded on this Fact, * *that the Officers of the* Excise *had frequently, by Threats, and Promises, prevail'd on Electors, and absolutely debarr'd Them of the Freedom of voting.* What hath been done, or attempted to be done, since that Time, in the same View, and what hath been done, or attempted to be done, both in the Reign of King *William* and since, to prevent an *undue Influence on the Elected*, as well as on the *Electors*, I need not recapitulate. They are Matters of fresh Date, and enough known. Upon the whole, this Change in the State and Property of the *publick Revenue* hath made a Change in our *Constitution*, not yet perhaps attended to sufficiently, but such an one however as deserves our utmost Attention; since it gives a *Power*, unknown

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* *Tertio Gul. & Mar.*

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in former Times, to *one of the three Estates*; and since *publick Liberty* is not guarded against the Dangers, that may arise from *this Power*, as it was, and as it is now more than ever, against the Dangers, that used to arise from the *Powers* formerly possess'd, or claim'd by the *Crown*. Formerly, *Prerogative* was kept in Sight, and Provisions were made against the Effects and Encroachments of it, as often as Occasion required, and Opportunity offer'd. They, who call'd Themselves *Friends to the Government*, in those Days, opposed these Provisions. They, who were *Friends to the Constitution*, promoted them. That the same Thing should happen again, in a similar Case, We must expect. But as the *Friends of the Constitution*, in Times past, were not deterr'd, tempted, nor wearied, whilst They defended it against Dangers of *one Kind*, and by their honest Perseverance deliver'd it down, not only safe, but more improved, to Posterity; let us flatter Ourselves with this agreeable Hope, that the *Friends of the Constitution*, at this Time, and in all Times to come, will be neither deterr'd, tempted, nor wearied in the same generous Cause, in watching and guarding it against Dangers of *another Kind*; and that They will deliver it down, in like Manner, to future Generations. Sure I am there are Reasons, and Those of no small Moment, why They should be more watchful, more upon their Guard, more bold, and more incessant in their Endeavours, if possible, even than the *Assertors of British Liberty* were formerly; and the Enumeration of some of these Reasons is an Article not to be omitted on this Occasion.

I am, SIR, &c.

LETTER XIX.

SIR,

AS the Means then of influencing by *Prerogative*, and of governing by *Force*, were consider'd to be increased formerly, upon every Increase of Power to the Crown, so are the Means of influencing by *Money*, and of governing by *Corruption*, to be consider'd as increased now, upon that Increase of Power, which hath accrued to the Crown by the *new Constitution of the Revenue*, since the *Revolution*. Nay farther. Not only the Means of corrupting are increased, on the Part of the *Crown*, but the Facility of employing these Means with Success is increased, on the Part of the *People*, on the Part of the *Electors*, and of the *Elected*. Nay, farther still. These Means, and this Facility are not only increased, but the Power of the *Crown* to corrupt, as I have hinted already, and the Proneness of the *People* to be corrupted, must continue to increase on the same Principles, unless a Stop be put to the growing Wealth and Power of *one*, and the growing Depravity of the *other*. We are, to be sure, in no Danger from any Advantage *his Majesty* will take of this Situation; but if Advantage be not taken, in Favour of our *Constitution*, of the present most happy Reign, of the mild and beneficent Temper of our *heroical Monarch*, of the generous Principle, instill'd by Nature, and improved

improved by Philosophy, of his *Royal Consort*; it may be supposed, (for We speak hypothetically all along as the Reader will please to remember, even where the Precaution is not used) it may be supposed, I say, that *pretended Friends to the Government*, and *real Enemies to this Constitution*, no Matter whether They are such by *Principle*, or become such by their *Crimes*, will get into superior Power, in some future Time, and under some weak or wicked Prince; and whenever This happens, the Subversion of our *Constitution*, and of our *Liberty* by Consequence, will be the most easy Enterprize imaginable; because nothing can be more easy than the Creation of an *anti-constitutional Dependency of the two Houses of Parliament on the Crown* will be in that Case; and because *such a Dependency of the two Houses* is as real a Subversion of our Constitution as an *absolute Abolishment of Parliaments* would be.

The first of those Means of *Corruption*, that have grown up, or been increased, since the *Revolution*, which I shall mention, is the Establishment of the *Civil-List*; not so much on Account of the Manner, in which it was originally given, as on Account of That, in which it hath been since given, and of the vast Augmentations, that have been made to it; Augmentations, that may be doubled, or trebled, in Times to come, upon the same Motives, under the same and other Pretences; in short, just as speciously as they have been made. The Revenue of King *James* the 2*d*, as it stood at his Abdication, hath been mention'd; and it would not be hard to shew, by indisputable Computations, that They, who apprehended He might be able to govern without *Parliaments*, or to buy *Parliaments*, if he wanted their Assistance, had good Reason for such Apprehensions, notwithstanding the

Expence He was at, over and above all the *ordinary Charges of the Government*, in maintaining against Law a great ſtanding Army of *ſixteen*, or *eighteen thouſand Men*.——But to go back to the Reign of King *Charles* the 2*d*, whoſe Revenue was much leſs. The Patriots of that Age, even when this Revenue was computed at no more than 1,200,000 *l.* a Year, took great Alarm at the *pecuniary Influence* it might create, and look'd upon it, and ſpoke of it, as a *Fund for Corruption*. Now, if this Revenue could afford a *Fund for Corruption*, when, beſides maintaining the Honour and Dignity of the *Crown*, it was to defray all the other Expences of the *State*, and among the reſt Thoſe of a *ſmall Army*, and a *great Fleet*; what would the *ſame Patriots* think of a Revenue of 800,000 *l.* or a *Million* a Year, applicable to the particular Expences of the *Crown alone*, and not one Farthing of which ſacred Treaſure was ever diverted to any *national Uſe*? They would have the ſame juſt Confidence, no Doubt, as We have, in his *preſent Majeſty*; but They would ſay, as We do, that ſo *immenſe a private*, or *ſeparate Revenue*, may become hereafter an *inexhauſtible Fund of Corruption*; and therefore that the *Independency of Parliaments* is, and muſt be in real Danger, till ſome Remedies, as effectual againſt the *pecuniary Influence*, as have been found againſt the *Prerogative* of the *Crown*, are provided. They would ſhew that a ſmall Sum, in Aid of *Places* and *Penſions*, of *Fears* and *Expectations*, might ſerve for the ordinary Charge of *annual Corruption*; and that a ſmall Saving reſerved *every Year* might produce, at the End of *ſeven*, a Fund ſufficient for the extraordinary Charge of *ſeptennial* and *national Corruption*.

But

But again. If We ſuppoſe the *Civil-Liſt* to become an inſufficient Fund for theſe Purpoſes, by the Profuſion of ſome future King; (and nothing leſs than the moſt extravagant Profuſion can make it ſo;) or if We ſuppoſe that ſome future King may join to ſo many ill Qualities, as leave Him no Means of governing but by *Corruption*, a ſordid Avarice, that renders Him unable to open his Coffers even for this Uſe; yet will a very little iniquitous Cunning ſuffice to create *Funds for Corruption*, that may come in Aid of the *Civil-Liſt*. It is natural for Men to be leſs frugal, when Others are to pay for their Want of Frugality. Our *Kings* therefore may become more apt to take, and our *Miniſters* to adviſe ſuch Engagements, as plunge the Nation at every Turn into vaſt Expence; ſince the Load, which fell, in Part at leaſt, on the *Crown* formerly, falls intire on the *People* now. But beſides this general Reaſon to promote a Want of Frugality, there may ariſe particular Reaſons of more poſitive, and more pernicious Effect. A *weak Adminiſtration*, for Inſtance, may pretend *publick Neceſſity*, when *private Inability* alone hath form'd the Conjuncture; and frequent and extravagant Supplies may be ask'd and obtain'd, to do, or to undo, by the Weight of *Money*, what might have been attain'd, or prevented, by a *little Foreſight*, and by a *prudent Conduct*. A *wicked Adminiſtration* may propoſe to impoveriſh the People; to render Them as ſubmiſſive and as abject as the Subjects, the Boors, or the Slaves, in ſome foreign Countries, and to *beggar* Them out of their *Sturdineſs*. But there is another View, that may be common to a *weak* and a *wicked Adminiſtration* both. In ſuch an Age as We ſuppoſe, *publick Money* will be eaſily granted, and *publick Accounts* rarely, or incurioſly inſpected. The *Miniſters* therefore, tho'

never

never so weak, may be impudent enough to ask, and able enough to get, *frequent Supplies*, on *national Pretences*, for *private Purposes*. The Consequences of This are manifold; for in general, the more *Money* passes thro' their Hands, the more Opportunities They have of *Gain*; and, in particular, They may share, if They please, in every *bad Bargain* They make for the Publick; and the worse their Bargain, the better their Share will be. Thus an *immense Subsidy* given to some *little Prince*, who deals in *Soldiers*, or an *immense Arrear* stated in Favour of these *little Merchants of human Flesh*, may be so order'd as to steal enough from the Publick to replenish the *royal Coffers*, to glut the *Ministers*, to feed some of their *hungry Creatures*, and to bribe a *Parliament* besides. Several of these *occasional Jobs* may be, and no Doubt will be contrived, in such an Age, and by such Means as We here suppose, and may be justly reckon'd as so many *auxiliary Funds*, belonging to the *great aggregate Fund of Corruption*. Let us however break off from discoursing of These, which may be more easily and more frequently contrived under the *present*, but might have been contrived under the *former Constitution of the Revenue*; and let us turn our Discourse to speak of that *great Source of Corruption*, which was open'd soon after the *Revolution*; which was unknown before it; and which hath spread, since it was open'd, like the Box of *Pandora*, innumerable Evils over this unhappy Country.

The Increase and Continuance of *Taxes* acquire to the *Crown*, by multiplying *Officers of the Revenue*, and by arming Them with formidable Powers against the rest of their *Fellow-Subjects*, a Degree of *Power*, the Weight of which the inferior Ranks of our People have long felt, and They most,

moſt, who are moſt uſeful to the Commonwealth, and which even the ſuperior Ranks may feel one Time or other; for I preſume it would not be difficult to ſhew how a full Exerciſe of the *Powers*, that are in being, with or even without ſome little Additions to them, for the *Improvement of the Revenue*, (that ſtale Pretence for *Oppreſſion*) might oblige the greateſt Lord in the Land to bow as low to a *Commiſſioner of the Cuſtoms*, or *Exciſe*, or to ſome *ſubaltern Harpy*, as any Nobleman, or Gentleman in *France* can be obliged to bow to the *Intendant of his Province*. But the Eſtabliſhment of *publick Funds*, on the Credit of *theſe Taxes*, hath been productive of more and greater Miſchiefs than the *Taxes* themſelves, not only by increaſing the Means of *Corruption*, and the *Power of the Crown* but by the Effect it hath had on the *Spirit of the Nation*, in our *Manners*, and our *Morals*. It is impoſſible to look back, without Grief, on the neceſſary and unavoidable Conſequences of *this* Eſtabliſhment; or, without Indignation, on that *Myſtery of Iniquity*, to which this *Eſtabliſhment* gave Occaſion, which hath been raiſed upon it, and carried on, for almoſt half a Century, by Means of it. It is impoſſible to look forward, without Horror, on the Conſequences, that may ſtill follow. The *ordinary Expences of our Government* are defray'd, in great Meaſure, by *Anticipations* and *Mortgages*. In Times of Peace, in Days of Proſperity, as we boaſt them to be, We contract *new Debts*, and We create *new Funds*. What muſt We do in War, and in national Diſtreſs? What will happen, when We have *mortgaged*, and *funded* all We have to *mortgage*, and to *fund*; when we have mortgaged to new Creditors that *ſinking Fund*, which was mortgaged to other Creditors not yet paid off; when We have mortgaged all

all the *Product of our Land*, and even our *Land itself*? Who can anſwer that when We come to ſuch Extremities, or have them more nearly in Proſpect, *ten Millions of People* will bear any longer to be *Hewers of Wood, and Drawers of Water*, to maintain the two hundredth Part of that Number at Eaſe and in Plenty? Who can anſwer that the *whole Body of the People* will ſuffer Themſelves to be treated, in Favour of an Handful of Men, (for *They*, who monopolize the whole Power, and may in Time monopolize the whole Property of the *Funds*, are indeed but an Handful) who can anſwer that the *whole Body of the People* will ſuffer Themſelves to be treated, in Favour of ſuch an handful, as the poor *Indians* are, in Favour of the *Spaniards*; to be parcell'd out in Lots, as it were; and to be aſſign'd, like theſe *Indians* to the *Spaniſh Planters*, to toil and ſtarve for the *Proprietors of the ſeveral Funds*? Who can anſwer that a *Scheme*, which oppreſſes the *Farmer*, ruins the *Manufacturer*, breaks the *Merchant*, diſcourages Induſtry, and reduces Fraud into Syſtem; which beggars ſo often the *fair Adventurer* and *innocent Proprietor*; which drains continually a Portion of our national Wealth away to *Foreigners*, and draws moſt perniciouſly the reſt of that immenſe Property, that was diffuſed among Thouſands, into the Pockets of a *Few*; who can anſwer that *ſuch a Scheme* will be always endured? —— But I have run, before I was aware, from my Subject, which requires no more than that I ſhould take Notice of the Eſtabliſhment of the *Publick Funds*, as it furniſhes *new Means of Corruption*, on the Part of the *Crown*, and new Facilities to theſe Means, on the Part of the *People*.

Now This, I ſuppoſe, hath Need of no Proof, and of little Explanation; for, *firſt*, the whole

Art

Art of *Stockjobbing*, the whole *Mystery of Iniquity*, mention'd above, arises from *this Establishment*, and is employ'd about the *Funds*; and, *secondly*, the main Springs, that turn or may turn, the artificial Wheel of *Credit*, and make the *Paper Estates*, that are fasten'd to it, rise or fall, lurk behind the Veil of the *Treasury*. From hence it follows, that if *this Office* should be ever unrighteously administer'd; if there should ever be, at the Head of it, one of those *veteran Sharpers*, who hath learn'd by Experience how to improve the Folly, and aggravate the Misfortunes, of his Fellow-Subjects, of the Innocent, of the Poor, of the Widow, and of the Orphan, to his own, or any other private Advantage; it follows, I say, that He must have it in his Power, and there can be no Doubt of his Will, to employ *two Methods of Corruption*, without any Incumbrance to the *Civil List*. Such a *ministerial Jobber* may employ the Opportunities of gaining on the *Funds*, that He can frequently create, by a thousand various Artifices, (notwithstanding the excellent Provisions, that have been lately made against the *infamous Practice of Stockjobbing*, by the Wisdom of the Legislature, and which We promise Ourselves will be still improved) and He may apply the *Gains*, that are thus made, to *Corruption*, in Aid of the *Civil List*. He may corrupt Men with their *own Spoils* and bribe even *Those*, whom He reduced by his clandestine Practices to *that Penury*, which could alone make Them capable of being *bribed*; or, when He hath to do with Men of *another Character*, (for no Rank alone will be sufficient to raise Them, in such an Age, above the most direct and prostitute Corruption) He may bribe Them by a *Whisper*, initiate Them into his *My-*

ſtery to gain Them, and then ſecure Them by a Participation of the *ſame Fraud*, and the *ſame Profit*.

Though this Reaſoning be hypothetical, yet the Suppoſitions are not ſtrain'd, nor unnatural; for as the meaneſt Grubs on Earth have raiſed Themſelves by *Stockjobbing* to the Rank and Port of Noblemen and Gentlemen; ſo may Noblemen and Gentlemen debaſe Themſelves to their Meanneſs, and acquire the ſame Spirit, by following the ſame Trade. That *Luxury*, which began to ſpread after the Reſtoration of King *Charles* the 2*d*, hath increaſed ever ſince; hath deſcended from the higheſt to the loweſt Ranks of our People, and is become national. Now nothing can be more certain than This, that *national Luxury* and *national Poverty* may, in Time, eſtabliſh *national Proſtitution*. Beſides This, it is to be conſider'd that the *immenſe Wealth of particular Men* is a Circumſtance, which always attends *national Poverty*, and is in a great Meaſure the Cauſe of it. We may apply already to our Country thus much at leaſt of That; which *Salluſt* makes *Cato* ſay of the State of *Rome*; and I wiſh We could apply no more,—*Habemus Luxuriam, atque Avaritiam*; *publicè Egeſtatem, privatim Opulentiam*; *Luxury and Avarice, publick Want and private Wealth abound.* Now, as *publick Want*, or *general Poverty*, (for in that Senſe I take it here) will lay Numbers of Men open to the Attacks of *Corruption*; ſo *private Wealth* will have the ſame Effect, eſpecially where *Luxury* prevails, on ſome of Thoſe, who do not feel the *publick Want*; for there is *imaginary*, as well as *real Poverty*. He, who thought Himſelf rich before, may begin to think Himſelf poor, when He compares his Wealth, and the Expence he is able to

make

make, with Those Men, whom He hath been used to esteem, and perhaps justly, far inferior to Himself in all Respects. He, who would have been ashamed to participate in *Fraud*, or to yield to *Corruption*, may begin to think the Fault venial, when he sees Men, who were far below Him, rise above Him by *Fraud* and by *Corruption*; when He sees Them maintain Themselves by *these Means* in an Elevation, which They could not have acquired by the *contrary Virtues*, if They had had them. Thus may *Contraries* unite in their Effect, and *Poverty* and *Wealth* combine to facilitate the Means and the Progress of *Corruption*. Thus may the *great Thieves of the Nation* do more, and less reparable Mischief by the *Practices* They introduce, and the *Examples* They set, than by the *actual Roberries* They commit. *Plusque Examplo quàm Peccato nocent*, to use an Expression of *Tully*, in one of his Books of Laws.

Much more might be said, concerning the *Increase of Power*, which the *Crown* hath acquired, and must continue to acquire, according to the *present Constitution and Management of the Revenue*. Much more might be said to shew that the *Power of Money*, as the World is now constituted, is *real Power*, and that *all Power*, without This, is *imaginary*; that the Prince, who gets *Prerogative* alone, gets a *Phantom*; but that He, who gets *Money*, even without *Prerogative*, gets something *real*, and will be as much stronger than his *Neighbours*, and his *People* too, as He hath a greater Command of *Money*. In fine, a great deal more might be said to shew how much *Corruption* is a more deadly Weapon than the *highest Prerogative*, in the Hands of Men, who are *Ene-*

mies to ſuch a Conſtitution of Government as ours is.———But I haſten to a Concluſion.

If then a *Spirit of Rapine* and *Venality*, of *Fraud* and *Corruption*, continue to diffuſe Themſelves, not only *Luxury* and *Avarice*, but every Kind of *Immorality* will follow; and the whole may be improved by ſuch Ways as have been sketch'd out, and by others, whenever the Nation falls under a *bad Government*, till the *Prince* on the Throne ſhall not be able to ſay, ſpeaking of his whole People, even That, which *Phillip* the 2*d* ſaid, ſpeaking of the Corruption of his own Court; *They all take Money, except* MY SELF *and* SAPENA. *Britain* will then be in that very Condition, in which, and in which alone, her *Conſtitution*, and her *Liberty* by Conſequence, may be deſtroy'd; becauſe the *People* may, in a State of *univerſal Corruption*, and will in no other, either ſuffer Others to betray them, or betray Themſelves. How near a Progreſs We have made towards *this State*, I determine not. This I ſay; it is Time for every Man, who is deſirous to preſerve the *Britiſh Conſtitution*, and to preſerve it ſecure, to contribute all He can to prevent the ill Effects of that *new Influence* and *Power*, which hath gain'd Strength in every Reign ſince the *Revolution*; of thoſe *Means of Corruption*, that may be employ'd, one Time or other, on the Part of the *Crown*, and of that *Proneneſs to Corruption*, on the Part of the *People*, that hath been long growing, and ſtill grows. It may otherwiſe happen that *theſe Cauſes* remaining in Force, their *Effects* will become too ſtrong to be check'd, and will enſure the Ruin of the beſt Conſtitution upon Earth, whenever the *Men in Power* ſhall think their Grandeur, or their Safety, concern'd in the Ruin of it. We are not expoſed, at preſent,

moſt certainly to any ſuch Contingency; but the bare Poſſibility of being ſo is a Reaſon ſufficient to awaken, and alarm every honeſt Man. Hath not every ſuch Man, indeed, Reaſon to be alarm'd, when He hears the Cauſe of *Corruption* publickly pleaded, and when Men are ſuffer'd, nay paid by Somebody or other, to plead this unrighteous Cauſe, as if it was That of our moſt righteous Government. Had We lived when the *Star-Chamber* tyrannized, and many other extravagant Powers were exerciſed, under the Authority of the *Crown*, We ſhould have found Fault as much as We dared, no Doubt, and yet have waited patiently, perhaps, for ſome favourable Opportunity of redreſſing the Grievances. But when We heard theſe *Acts of Power* juſtify'd as *legal* and *conſtitutional*, and the *Prerogative*, by virtue of which They were done, claim'd as a *Right in the Crown*, We ſhould have taken the Alarm, I preſume, as hot as our Predeceſſors did. Thus, in the Caſe now before us, *Corruption* may have been practiſed in ſome Degree, perhaps, at all Times. But then it hath been always kept under by the Shame and Danger, that attended both the *Corrupter* and the *Corrupted*. It hath been always complain'd of, never defended, and Endeavours have been uſed, from Time to Time, with general Applauſe, to prevent it. But according to the *Principles*, now avow'd, theſe Endeavours were unjuſt; they ought to be repented of; and the Acts made in Conſequences of them ought to be repeal'd; for the *conſtitutional Independency of the Crown* cannot be ſupported, unleſs the *Crown* have the Right and the Means of taking their Independency from the *other Parts of the Legiſlature*, by keeping the Members of thoſe Aſſemblies under a *pecuniary Influence*. Let no Man think

think that the Abſurdity and Profligacy of *theſe Doctrines* ſecure us againſt the Effect of them. They may ſoon grow into Vogue, and be reputed as ſacred Truths as any of thoſe Falſhoods, that are eſtabliſh'd by the Syſtems of *Policy* and *Religion*, in many other Countries. What can be too abſurd, or too profligate, for an abſurd and profligate, or for a ſuperſtitious People?

But if We ſhould apprehend the Effects of *theſe Doctrines* as little, as We eſteem the *Doctors*, who preach them, yet ſtill the Alarm is given by Them, and it would be Stupidity, or ſomewhat much worſe than Stupidity, not to take it. We deſpiſe the *Drummers and Trumpeters of an Enemy's Army*; (for I reſume the Alluſion, that I apply'd in the firſt of theſe Diſcourſes;) but when We hear the Noiſe of their *Drums* and *Trumpets*, we take the Alarm, and conclude the Enemy is near. The *Friends of our Conſtitution* therefore are in the Right to join Iſſue upon this Point with the *Enemies of it*, and to fix upon this principal and real Diſtinction, and Difference, the preſent Diviſion of *Parties*; ſince *Parties* We muſt have; and ſince *Thoſe*, which ſubſiſted formerly, are quite extinguiſh'd, notwithſtanding all the wicked Endeavours of *ſome Men*, who can have no Merit but *Party-Merit*, nor Safety but in *Faction*, to revive them. If there was Merit, and ſurely there was great Merit, in oppoſing the Aſſertors of *Prerogative* formerly, when it roſe ſo high as to endanger our *Liberty*; there is great Merit in oppoſing the Aſſertors of *Corruption* now, and in expoſing the Means, by which *this Expedient* may be improved to the Ruin of our *Conſtitution*, and therefore of our *Liberty*. Nay, the Merit is greater in ſome Reſpects, if *Corruption* be in itſelf, in its own Nature, and in the

preſent

present Circumstances of the Nation, and Dispositions of the People, more dangerous than *Prerogative* ever was; and if the Means of establishing a Government of arbitrary Will, by *Corruption*, be more likely to prove effectual, than Those of doing it by *Prerogative* ever were. That it should ever become harder to save our Country from the Effects of *Corruption*, than it was to defeat the Efforts of *Prerogative*, God forbid. ——— On the whole Matter, a *Dissertation upon Parties* could not wind itself up more properly, We think, than by shewing that the *British Constitution of Government* deserves, above all others, the constant Attention, and Care to maintain it, of the *People*, who are so happy as to live under it; that it may be weaken'd for want of Attention, which is a Degree of Danger; but that it cannot be destroy'd, unless the *Peers* and the *Commons* (That is, the *whole Body of the People*) unite to destroy it, which is a Degree of Madness, and such a monstrous Iniquity, as nothing but *confirm'd* and *universal Corruption* can produce; that since the Time, when all our Dangers from *Prerogative* ceased, *new Dangers to this Constitution*, more silent and less observed, are arisen; and, finally, that as nothing can be more ridiculous than to preserve the nominal Division of *Whig* and *Tory Parties*, which subsisted before the *Revolution*, when the Difference of *Principles*, that could alone make the Distinction real, exists no longer; so nothing can be more reasonable than to admit the nominal Division of *Constitutionists* and *Anti-constitutionists*, or of a *Court* and a *Country Party*, at this Time, when an avow'd Difference of *Principles* makes this Distinction real. That this Distinction is real cannot be denied, as long as there are Men amongst us, who argue for, and

and who promote even a *corrupt Dependency of the Members of the two Houses of Parliament on the Crown*; and Others, who maintain that *such a Dependency of the Members* takes away the *contitutional Independency of the two Houses*, and that, *this Independency* lost, our *Constitution* is a dead Letter, and We shall be only in a worse Condition by preserving the *Forms* of it.

To reduce therefore our present Parties to *this single Division*, our present Disputes to this *single Contest*, and to fix our principal Attention on *this Object of Danger*, too long and too much neglected, hath been and is the sole Design of these Discourses. The Design may have been insufficiently executed; but it is honest; but it is of the last Importance; and whatever the *Enemies of our Constitution*, who call Themselves the *Friends of the Government*, may say, to amuse and impose on the weak, ignorant, and trifling Part of Mankind, the Importance of it will be felt every Day, and every Hour, more and more, till it be felt by every Man in *Britain*. Let us hope, and endeavour by all possible Means, that it may not be felt too late; and to encourage the *Constitutionists*, or *Country Party*, in this Attempt, let us consider from whom an Opposition to it is to be expected. ——— Shall it be expected then from *Those*, who have pass'd under the Denomination of TORIES? Certainly not. They feel as much as any Men in *Britain* the Preference, that ought to be given to that System of Government, which was establish'd by the *Revolution*, and in which They took so great a Share, and shew Themselves as ready to render that *great Work*, which was left and still continues imperfect, compleat. ——— Shall this Opposition be expected from the DISSENTERS? It cannot be. Shall *They*, who pretend to *greater*

Purity

Purity than Others, become the Advocates of *Corruption?* Shall *They* contribute their Endeavours to to undermine the *best Constitution of Government* They can hope to enjoy, unless They hope to rise on the Ruins of it, and to form *another* on *their own Model?* As *religious Sects*, They deserve Indulgence, and They have it; but They are too wise not to see that, as a *Faction in the State*, They would deserve none.———In Fine, shall this Opposition be expected from *Those*, who have been call'd WHIGS? That too is impossible. Their Predecessors asserted the *Independency of Parliaments*, and struggled hard against *Corruption*, in former Reigns. When the rest of Mankind embrace the *same Principles*, and pursue the *same Ends*, shall They renounce *one*, and run counter to the *other?* Shall *They* own Themselves against ONE Method *of destroying our Constitution*, but for ANOTHER? Against making KINGS *independent on* PARLIAMENTS *by* PREROGATIVE, but for making PARLIAMENTS *dependent on* KINGS *by* CORRUPTION? Shall *They* give the *Enemies of the Revolution* a plausible Pretence to say that nothing more was meant by *Them* at least than a *Change of Government*, in which They hoped to find their *particular* and *Party Account?* This would be to *cast black and odious Colours on the Revolution*, indeed; more *black*, and more *odious* than any, that it was in the Power of a * *vain, forward, turbulent Preacher* to cast, by his frothy Declamations. But the *Whigs* are so far from opposing the Endeavours to preserve our *Constitution*, that They co-operate to promote the Success of them; and that however *personal Prejudices, personal Partialities*, and *old Habits*, that are daily wearing off, may be still entertain'd

* *Dr. Sacheverel.*

 by

by ſome amongſt Them, all the *independent Men*, who paſs under that Name, unite in the common Cauſe of *Liberty* and their *Country*.————It remains therefore that no NATIONAL PARTY can be form'd in Oppoſition to *Thoſe*, who endeavour to ſecure the *Independency of Parliaments* againſt the *new Influence of the Crown*, and againſt *Corruption*; nor any Strength be exerted, except That of a *Faction*, compoſed of the *Refuſe of all Parties*, glean'd up by *One*, who hath none for Him.——I would willingly carry This farther; and, in doing ſo, I ſhall not advance a Paradox, unleſs it be ſuppoſed, which I think would be a greater Paradox, that a Man may have Abilities to deſtroy the *Conſtitution*, and yet not Senſe enough to ſee his *remote*, as well as *immediate*, his *family*, as well as *perſonal Intereſt*. I ſay then that if a Deſign of raiſing the *Power of the Crown* above any Pitch of *Prerogative*, and of reducing *Parliaments* to an *abſolute Dependency*, as well as a *Faction* to ſupport this Deſign, be form'd; the very Man, who forms *ſuch a Deſign*, and *ſuch a Faction*, muſt be infatuated, if He can wiſh very ſincerely his own Succeſs. His *firſt Deſign*, We are ſure, will be That of raiſing a *great Family*, and heaping upon it *Riches* and *Honours*. Shall his *ſecond Deſign* be That of rendering *theſe Riches* and *Honours* precarious and inſecure, and of entailing Servitude on his *own Race*; for it will be impoſſible to exempt Them from the common Calamity? Nothing but *Deſpair*, (That is, *Fear* void of *Hope*,) ariſing from a *Conſciouſneſs of Guilt*, can drive any Man into ſuch a Deſign. But, in this Caſe, there will be *Fear* oppoſed to *Fear*, and *one of theſe Fears* may be allay'd by *Hope*. The *Fear of being call'd to a ſevere Account* may be mitigated by the *Hope of eſcaping*. Where is the *inſolent*, *rapacious*, *odious Miniſter*, that may not entertain

ſome

ſome Hope, as well as *Fear*, when He ſets before his Eyes the Examples of Thoſe, who have gone before Him? *Pallas* was the Favourite of *Agrippina*. He govern'd like the *Maſter of the Empire*, and ſupported her Pride and Ambition by his Counſels and Services, as He had been raiſed to Power, and was maintain'd in it, by her Credit, whilſt her Credit laſted. * *Nero* diſmiſs'd Him; and, ſeeing Him go from Court with a Croud at his Heels, ſaid pleaſantly enough, as if it had been ſpoken of a *Dictator*, that He went to *abdicate*. But *Pallas* carried off the Spoils of the Empire with Him; all Scores were quitted between Him and the Publick; and, according to the Bargain He had made, He was call'd to no Account. Many ſuch Examples might be cited to comfort with Hope the *moſt guilty Miniſter*, who is wiſe, if not honeſt enough, to ſtop in the Career of Iniquity, before the Meaſure of it be intirely fill'd, preſs'd down, and running over. But if *one of thoſe Bubbles of Fortune*, who thinks He always ſhall eſcape, becauſe He always hath eſcaped, not content to wound a *free Conſtitution of Government*, ſhould reſolve to make it expire under his Adminiſtration; the Condition of *ſuch an one*, however He may flatter Himſelf, or be flatter'd by Others, muſt be ten Times more wretched and forlorn than the worſt of *Thoſe*, to which his Cruelty

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* Nero *infenſius iis, quibus ſuperbia muliebris innitebatur, demovet* Pallantem *Curâ Rerum, quis à* Claudio *impoſitus, veluti Arbitrum Regni agebat; ferebaturque, digrediente Eo, magnâ Proſequentium Multitudine, non abſurdè dixiſſe, ire* Pallantem *ut ejuraret. Sanè pepigerat* Pallas, *ne cujus Facti in præteritum interrogaretur, pareſque Rationes cum Republicâ haberet.* Tacit. An. L. 13.

hath reduced Multitudes —— For what? —— If He ſucceeds in his ſacrilegious Deſigns, (they are of as deep a Dye, at leaſt) He may hope for Impunity, perhaps, to his grey Hairs, and be ſuffer'd to languiſh through the Infirmities of old Age, with an inward Remorſe more pungent than any of Them; but He is ſure to entail Servitude on his *whole Race*, and indelible Infamy on his Memory. If He fails, He miſſes of that Impunity, to which He ſacrificed his Country; He draws triple Vengeance on his *own Head*; and expoſes his *innocent Family* to a thouſand Misfortunes, of which it will not be the leaſt (whether He ſucceeds, or fails) that They deſcended from *Him*. ——But whatever *Miniſters* may govern, whatever *Factions* may ariſe, let the *Friends of Liberty* lay aſide the groundleſs Diſtinctions, which are employ'd to amuſe and betray Them; let Them continue to coalite; let Them hold faſt their Integrity, and ſupport with Spirit and Perſeverance the Cauſe of their *Country*, and They will confirm the good, reclaim the bad, vanquiſh the incorrigible, and make the *Britiſh Conſtitution* triumph, even over CORRUPTION.

I have now gone through the Task I impoſed on Myſelf, and ſhall only add theſe few Words. There was an Engagement taken, in the Beginning of theſe Diſcourſes, not to flatter. I have kept this Engagement, and have ſpoken with great Freedom; but I hope with the Juſtice and Moderation, and Decency, that I intended, of *Perſons* and of *Things*. This Freedom intitles Me to expect that no *Parallels*, no *Innuendo's* ſhould be ſuppoſed, to carry my Senſe farther than I have expreſs'd it. The reaſonable Part of Mankind will not diſappoint ſo reaſonable an Expectation. But there are a *Set of Creatures*, who have *no Mercy on Paper*, to

to use an Expression of * *Juvenal*, and who are ready to *answer*, even when They are absolute Strangers to the *Subject*. Unable to follow a Thread of *Fact* and *Argument*, They play with *Words*, and turn and wrest *particular Passages*. They have done mine that Honour, as I am told, and have once or twice seen. They may do the same again, whenever They please, secure from any *Reply*, unless They have Sense enough, or their *Patron* for Them, to take for a *Reply* the Story I am going to tell You, and which You may find related a little differently in one of the *Spectators*. The Story is This.

A certain pragmatical Fellow, in a certain Village, took it into his Head to write the Names of the *Squire*, of *all his Family*, of the *principal Parish Officers*, and of some of the *notable Members of the Vestry*, in the Margin of the *whole Duty of Man*, over-against every Sin, which He found mention'd in that most excellent Treatise. The Clamour was great, and all the Neighbourhood was in an Uproar. At last, the *Minister*, was call'd in, upon this great Emergency; a pious and prudent Divine, and the same, for aught I know, who was a Member of the *Spectator's Club*. He heard Them with Patience; with so much, that He brought Them to talk one after the other. When He had heard Them, he pronounced that They were all in the wrong; that the *Book* was written against *Sins of all Kinds*, whoever should be guilty of them; but that the *Innocent* would give Occasion to unjust Suspicions by all this Clamour, and that

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——— *stulta est Clementia* ———
——— *periturae parcere Chartae*,

the

the *Guilty* would convict Themſelves. They took his Advice. The *whole Duty of Man* hath been read ever ſince, with much Edification, by all the Pariſhioners. The *Innocent* have been moſt certainly confirm'd by *Virtue*, and We hope the *Guilty* have been reform'd from *Vice*.

I am, SIR, &c.

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